Regional Trade Agreements and Democratization in Africa

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September 8, 2019

Abstract

Previous research indicates that regional trade agreements (RTAs) can promote both democratic transition and democratic certain under certain conditions. Recently, a number of democratic transitions in Africa have taken place in ECOWAS countries, bringing nearly all of the countries into Freedom House's Partly Free category, while the SADC Free Trade Area includes both stable democracies and stable dictatorships. This paper examines whether and why regional trade agreements affect democratic transition and survival in Africa.

I find that Increased trade resulting from membership in a regional trade agreement (and more so in free trade agreements (FTAs) increases the probability of democratic survival. In addition, democratic countries who have deep trade relations with other democracies in either a RTA or FTA are more likely to remain democratic. Finally, democratic countries who are members of RTAs with higher "democratic density" are more likely to remain democratic than are democratic countries who are members of RTAs with generally low democracy scores. These patterns are generally robust to the inclusion of other explanations for democratic transition or survival, including income level, domestic history of democracy, democracy in nearby countries, and country fixed effects.

These findings have high salience given the African Continental Free Trade Area which formally went into force last May.

Prepared for the Southern California Comparative Political Institutions Conference, September 13, 2019 in Claremont, California.

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1 Introduction

According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the number of regional trade agreements has expanded dramatically since the 1990s, and free trade agreements (which seek to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade) have become numerous. During this same time period, an increasing number of countries have democratized.[1] This global pattern is visible in Africa, home to some twenty percent of the world's countries (see Figure 1). This prompts the question: Do regional trade agreements, and free trade agreements in particular, have an effect on democratic transition and survival?

The question is of particular interest since "the world's largest free trade zone since the establishment of the World Trade Organization", the 54-country African Continental Free Trade Area, went into effect last May.[2]



Figure 1: Percentage of countries in Africa member of RTA, FTA, and coded as democracy (polity2 > 0)

In addition to the temporal relationship between regional trade agreements and democ-

[1] https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_forum_e/wtr11_29mar11_e.htm
[2] https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/11/africa-free-trade-what-is-the-afcfta.html

ratization, there is a geographic pattern to explain. When looking at a map of Africa on a website such as that of Freedom House, the observer is immediately struck by the relationship between geography and political freedom (see Figure 2). Southern Africa is mostly coded as Free; West Africa and East Africa are generally coded as Partly Free, and Central and North Africa are largely coded as Not Free.



Figure 2: Freedom in the World 2018 map of Africa, from Freedom House. Green=Free; Yellow=Partly Free; Purple=Not Free.

This geographic distribution of political freedom leads to the question, why is democracy more common in some areas of Africa and dictatorship more common in others? One possibility is that geographic factors (such as tropical climate or landlock) affect income level, and income level affects the level of democracy. A second possibility is that natural endowments, such as oil wealth, tend to be concentrated in certain regions and are associated with a lack of democracy. A third possiblity is that democracy in one country spreads to its neighbors. A fourth possible explanation, which is the focus of this paper, is that regional trade agree-

ments (RTAs) may influence transition and survival of democracies. (See Table 1 for a list of African RTAs in this study, with start and end years and the range of member counts in each.)

A number of observers have made the claim that particular RTAs in Africa have promoted democracy among their members. In 2001, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) adopted a Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, whose principles included "Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means"[3] In early 2017, many argue that ECOWAS "restored democracy" in Gambia after Yahya Jammeh, who took power in a coup in 1994 and attempted to retain his hold on the presidency after losing the election in December 2017, was forced by ECOWAS forces to accept the electoral results (Hartmann, 2017). ECOWAS also helped restore civil order, enabling a presidential election, following a military coup in Burkina Faso in 2015,[4] and imposed sanctions on Togo in 2005 when the military placed the recently deceased president's son in office, in violation of the constitution. Following the sanctions, the new president agreed to hold presidential elections.[5]

Observers also report that the South African Development Community (SADC) has promoted democracy among its members. For example, SADC sent observers to the 2015 election in Mozambique, which reportedly "exemplifies SADC's commitment to the enhancement of democracy and governance" in the region.[6] SADC suspended Madagascar's membership in 2009, when a member of the political opposition seized power through a series of public protests and dissolved the legislature; SADC membership was not restored until a new president was democratically elected in 2014; this suspension was described as "standing firm on SADC principles against those who usurp power through violence and unconstitutional

[3]http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/ECOWASProtocol.aspx
[4]https://guardian.ng/news/how-nigeria-ecowas-restored-civil-rule-in-burkina-faso-by-osinbajo/
[5]https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42493.htm
[6]https://southernafrican.news/2014/10/13/sadc-committed-to-promote-democracy/

Table 1: RTA years and size (number of members)

RTA	Acronym	RTA Start	FTA Start	Last Year	Min Size	Max Max
Arab Maghreb Union	AMU	1989		2015	5	5
Economic Community of West Africa	CEAO	1960		1994	6	7
Central African Economic and Monetary Community	CEMAC	1994		2015	6	6
Community of the Sahel-Saharan States	CEN-SAD	1998		2015	6	28
Economic Commuity of Great Lakes Countries	CEPGL	1976		2015	3	3
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	COMESA	1994	1994	2015	18	21
East African Community	EAC	2005	2010	2015	4	4
East African Common Market	EACM	1967		1977	3	3
Economic Community of Central African States	ECCAS	1985		2015	8	10
Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS	1975	1996	2015	15	16
International Governmental Authority on Development	IGAD	1986		2015	6	7
Mano River Union	MRU	1980		2015	3	3
Preferential Trade Agreement for Southern and Eastern Africa	PTASEA	1981		1993	9	20
South African Customs Union	SACU	1969	2004	2015	4	5
South African Development Community	SADC	1992	2000	2015	10	14
Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa	UDEAC	1964		1994	4	6
Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa	UEMOA	1994		2015	7	8

Note: The data for this paper begin in 1960 and end in 2015.

means."[7]

Other African RTAs, on the other hand, appear less active in promoting democracy. The three-member Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL, made up of Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) seemingly had little to say in 2015 when Burundi's president, in office since 2005, violently repressed those who protested his decision to seek a third term, despite the constitutional two-term limit.[8] Nor did the CEPGL appear involved when the DRC's President Kabila, in office since his father's death in 2001, remained in office beyond his two-term mandate in December 2016, and pushed the election date first to 2017 and then to December 2018.[9] Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda since 1994, had little standing to complain about his CEPGL partners, since the Rwandan constitution was amended in 2015 to enable him to win a third presidential election in August

[7]https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-lifts-madagascar-suspension/

[8]https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/15/should-we-be-using-the-g-word-in-burundi/

[9]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/31/drc-close-to-deal-for-president-joseph-kabila-to-step-down-after-2017-elections , https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election-exclusive/exclusive-congo-poised-to-see-election-pushed-back-to-late-2018-sources-idUSKBN1CB1X7

2017.[10]

Although CEPGL, of which the DRC has been a member since 1976, had no comment about the December 2018 election, SADC, which the DRC joined in 1997, did have some thoughts. SADC monitored the election, and, noting strong doubts about the election results, called for a recount.[11] SADC's call for a recount was viewed by some as historic, since "SADC is known for not publicly intervening in member state electoral affairs."[12]

A closer look at RTAs' role in promoting democracy in Africa suggests that the impact may be less than suggested by some of the more newsworthy examples, even for those who have a reputation for promoting democracy. As Nathan (2016) remarks, "Given that the introduction or restoration of a democratic system is a primary goal of peacemaking on the continent, it may be surprising to learn that African mediators frequently compromise democracy in their efforts to resolve a conflict." The mediating bodies Nathan describes include RTAs whose missions include peace and development as well as trade, including ECOWAS, ECCAS, and SADC. Although ECOWAS intervened to encourage elections in Togo in 2005, the president used fraud and violence to win that election, and, like Kagame, won a third term in 2015.[13] In 2017, hundreds of thousands of Togolese protested against the president's third term, and security forces responded with deadly force, but the ECOWAS response has been mild: "ECOWAS heads of state ... have called on Togo to begin an immediate dialogue on political reforms and curb the rising violence."[14] Similarly, SADC withdrew its call for a recount within 24 hours.[15] SADCs abandoning of the call for a recount led some to call the organization a "toothless bulldog."[16] Of interest for this paper: the DRC

[10] https://qz.com/1047239/election-in-rwanda-paul-kagame-has-won-re-election-to-secure-third-term/

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/13/african-nations-call-for-recount-in-drc-election

[12] https://beta.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/21/the-african-union-called-on-congo-to-suspend-its-elections-results-thats-unprecedented/

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/03/most-togolese-support-term-limits-but-they-just-re-elected-their-president-for-a-third-term/

[14] http://africatimes.com/2017/10/26/ecowas-urges-gnassingbe-to-resolve-togo-political-crisis/

[15] https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/SADC-walks-back-calls-for-Congo-election-recount/4552902-4940358-8cra8d/index.html

[16] https://beta.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/21/

is one of two countries (the other being Angola) among 15 in SADC who are not members of the Free Trade Area.[17]

In this paper, I systematically analyze the effect of African RTAs on transition to and survival of democracy. There are a number of possible channels by which RTAs might promote democracy: (1) RTAs may promote trade and thereby economic development and economic autonomy of private actors, which has been found to promote and/or sustain democracy; (2) RTAs, by lowering the cost of imports, decrease the ability of authoritarian leaders to capture rents through monopolistic prices, thus reducing the incentive to establish authoritarian rule; (3) increased trade relations with democracratic members of the RTA may promote citizens' interest in and commitment to democracy, and (4) membership in a RTA dominated by democracies may incentivize political elites to respect the country's institutional commitment to democracy.

The question of how RTAs affect democracy in Africa is not merely of academic interest. The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), which merges 26 countries in three existing FTAs, was launched in June 2015, and the 54-nation Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) went into effect in May of this year.[18] If new and larger regional trade agreements are implemented, this may influence democracy levels in different ways, depending on how and why RTAs affect democratization. For example, if RTAs promote trade, trade promotes development, and development promotes democracy, then increasingly larger RTAs should inevitably increase the chances of democratic transition survival. If, however, increased trade with other democracies increases the likelihood of democratic survival but increased trade with autocracies has no positive effect on democracy, then a merger between a predominantly democratic RTA with a predominantly authoritarian RTA could dilute the degree of inter-

the-african-union-called-on-congo-to-suspend-its-elections-results-thats-unprecedented/

[17] https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/

[18] https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/06/17/understanding-the-importance-of-the-tripa
,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/14/the-7-things-you-need-to-know-about-afr
,https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/11/africa-free-trade-what-is-the-afcfta.html

democracy trade for members from the predominantly democratic RTA, thus increasing the risk of democratic failure.



Figure 3: Selected RTAs and the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area, from The Economist.

In this analysis, I find varying degrees of support for all four of these arguments, particularly with respect to democratic survival. Regional trade agreements that promote trade among member states are associated with higher democratic survival, and this effect is strengthened for free trade areas, which seek to eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers. FTAs are also associated with more democratic resilience when they promote imports from member states. In addition, democratic countries who have deep trade relations with other democracies in a RTA are also more likely to remain democratic. Finally, democratic countries who are members of RTAs with a higher level of democracy among its members are more likely to remain democratic than are democratic countries who are members of RTAs who

remain broadly at low democracy scores. These patterns are robust to the inclusion of other explanations for democratic transition or survival, including income level, domestic history of democracy, democracy in nearby countries, and country fixed effects.

2 Conditions Favoring Democratic Transition and Survival, and the Role of RTAs

Although the primary goal of RTAs is to promote regional trade, there are a number of possible pathways by which RTAs may promote democratic transition and survival. Some of these mechanisms are indirect, such as trade promoting development and thereby democracy; others, particularly in cases when RTAs include support for democratic institutions, are more direct.

2.1 Trade, development, and democracy

One possible pathway by which RTAs may affect democratization is by increasing the level of trade with its fellow members. Increased RTA trade might affect democracy in a number of ways. First, if international trade promotes economic growth, and if prosperity increases the probability of democracy, then expanding trade should indirectly promote democracy (Bhagwati, 2004, 93). Second, to the extent that increased regional trade reduces government control of the economy, this may reduce the ability of authoritarian governments to control the political system.

On the other hand, if increased trade increases inequality or volatility, this may undermine the introduction and consolidation of democracy.

There is empirical support that trade expanded by RTAs does improve economic growth. Yamarik and Ghosh (2015), in a study that controls for the endogeneity of which countries

to join regional trade agreements, find that regional trade integration promotes economic growth, and the relationship between regional integration and growth is more robust than the relationship between broad trade liberalization and growth, particularly for low income countries.

Although RTAs in Africa tend to be less effective, on average, in promoting trade than those in more developed regions such as North America and Europe (Gray, 2014), some African RTAs do have a positive effect on trade, and thereby economic prosperity. Gray and Slapin (2012) use a survey approach to assess the effectiveness of various RTAs. Among those in Africa, five (COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, and UEMOA) score 6.4 or higher on the 1-10 scale (6.47 is the global average) and five (AMU, CEMAC, ECCAS, MRU, and SACU) score below 6.4 (see Table 3). Of the five with a score above 6.4, all have over 13% of their total trade occuring among RTA members, whereas the five with a score below 6.4 all have less than 13% of total trade occuring among RTA members.

These findings are supported with multiple gravity studies, which estimate the additional trade between countries produced by RTAs, beyond what can be explained by factors such as distance and relative economic size. In a study of ECOWAS and SADC, Afesorgbor and van Bergeijk (2011) find that the two RTAs have had "a positive and significant impact on bilateral intra-RTA trade. The relative impact of regional trade agreements is stronger than the trade stimulating impact of preferential trade agreement with the European Union." In a study of ECOWAS, COMESA, and ECCAS, Musila (2005) finds that ECOWAS and COMESA had a positive effect on trade creation, and thereby welfare, but that the ECCAS had a weak effect on trade creation.

The most well-known argument that economic development promotes democracy is modernization theory, which proposes that development promotes both democratic transition and survival (Lipset, 1959; Boix and Stokes, 2003). Przeworski et al. (2000) argue that economic development increases the probability of democratic survival but not transition. In Africa

Table 2: RTA Average Import Share, RTA Average Trade Share, RTA Effectiveness score (1 to 10), Average Real GDP per capita, and Average Polity Score (-1 to 1)

RTA	Import Share	Trade Share	Effectiveness	GDP/capita	Polity Score
SACU*	.653	.434	6.29	6257	.182
SADC*	.466	.352	6.45	4766	.300
UEMOA	.242	.241	6.60	1531	.271
EAC	.209	.229	7.44	1738	.771
COMESA	.215	.188	7.81	3210	.065
CEPGL	.206	.162		883	-.299
CEN-SAD	.163	.157		2837	.117
CEAO	.165	.145		1728	-.578
IGAD	.136	.145		1841	-.236
ECOWAS	.161	.143	6.68	1833	-.077
EACM	.190	.141		1555	-.618
UMOA	.155	.136		1648	-.560
ECCAS	.145	.102	5.52	5184	-.282
PTASEA	.093	.087		2152	-.469
MRU	.099	.057	1.50	1186	-.108
CEMAC	.089	.054	5.36	8480	-.257
AMU	.054	.049	3.75	6955	-.387
UDEAC	.069	.045		5856	-.682

*SACU and SADC trade and import data are for 2012-2015; trade data among SACU countries are not available pre-2010, nor in 2011.

specifically, the relationship between income level and democratic transition is not clear; Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), for example, observe that "attempts at democratic *transition* can occur under a range of economic conditions under a range of economic conditions and at any level of economic development"(p. 219). One reason for the weak relationship between income level and democratic transition in Africa may be due to the importance of oil wealth in some of the wealthier African countries (e.g., Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon); Boix and Stokes (2003) find that although high income levels generally promote democratic transition, this relationship emerges primarily in countries that are neither Soviet-dominated nor dependent on oil exports. Smith (2004) and Morrison (2009) find that oil wealth promotes regime stability for both dictatorships and democracies, which would

Table 3: FTA Average Import Share, FTA Average Trade Share, RTA Effectiveness score (1 to 10), Average Real GDP per capita, and Average Polity Score (-1 to 1)

RTA	Import Share	Trade Share	Effectiveness	GDP/capita	Polity Score
SACU*	.653	.434	6.29	8465	0.440
SADC*	.466	.352	6.45	5458	.433
COMESA	.272	.255	7.81	3451	.188
EAC	.212	.237	7.44	1762	.141
ECOWAS	.182	.188	6.68	2298	.266

*SACU and SADC trade and import data are for 2012-2015; trade data among SACU countries are not available pre-2010, nor in 2011.

undermine a relationship between income level and democratic transition in Africa.

A second dynamic by which liberalized trade might promote democracy is the elimination of a government-controlled tool to divert revenues from producers (particularly farmers) to the government, for personal consumption or redistribution to supporters in exchange for political support. In the early decades of independence, many African governments set up stabilization banks and marketing agencies to purchase cash crops in their countries, and over time these agencies increasingly paid farmers less that the international price; the surplus was intended for investment projects, but a portion was retained by the state. This indirect taxation of export agriculture contributed a large share of government budgets, ranging from 20 percent in Ghana and Senegal to 90 percent in Kenya (Bates, 1981, 17). Civil servants were in some cases able to capture a significant share of this surplus; in Kenya, for example "marketing costs" accounted for 10 to 35 percent of the surplus (Bates, 1981, 26). Although some farmers managed to avoid these low prices by the smuggling their crops to neighboring countries (Bates, 1981, 85), the introduction of liberalized trade should enable farmers to earn higher revenues while reducing the ability of the state to capture these revenues and use them to hold onto power. As noted above, economies that are controlled by the state are significantly less likely to democratize (Boix and Stokes, 2003) .

Another economic outcome from increased trade, is relative income distribution (i.e., the

level of income inequality), which in turn may promote or undermine democracy, depending on the pattern of winners and losers and the ability of democratic governments to tax wealth (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003). In the case of African countries, many of which predominantly export natural resources rather than labor-intensive products, and in which economic prosperity does not always translate into jobs (Gyimah-Boadi, 2015), trade-induced growth may not promote democracy.

Finally, increased exposure to international trade can contribute to income volatility, which increases demand among voters for public sector spending. Interest groups who benefit from trade may prefer authoritarian institutions to maintain trade openness without incurring the cost of public insurance (Adsera and Boix, 2002). The experience of some African countries with structural adjustment programs, which promoted trade liberalization and reduced public spending, illustrates this argument: "the two most significant economic reformers in Africa, Rawlings in Ghana and Museveni in Uganda" overthrew democratic governments that struggled politically when they sought to implement structural adjustment policies (Bienen and Herbst, 1996). As Ghana democratized, the country's reform program, 'the only macroeconomic policy in Africa rated at least "adequate" by the World Bank, was dealt an enormous blow when the government greatly increased civil service wages before the election'(Bienen and Herbst, 1996). (Museveni remains in office in Uganda, considered by most a nondemocracy.)

In sum, there is some theoretical and empirical support for the proposition that trade promoted by RTAs promotes democratic transition and/or survival in Africa, but there are also theoretical arguments and evidence that suggest trade would have no such effect. Free Trade Areas (which, in theory, eliminate rather than merely reduce trade barriers among members) may be expected in particular to have an effect on the probability of democratic transition and/or survival.

Null Hypothesis 1: Trade levels with other RTA members have no positive

relationship with democratic transition or survival.

Alternative Hypothesis 1a: High levels of trade with other RTA members (especially members of FTAs) increases the probability of transition to democracy.

Alternative Hypothesis 1b: High levels of trade with other RTA members (especially members of FTAs) increases the probability of democratic survival.

2.2 Tariffs, Rents, and Democracy

Trade freedom also reduces the ability of the government to control the economy as a means to maintain political control. In the first decades of independence, many African governments pursued protectionist policies with the stated goal of import substituting industrialization, but these policies had the political effect of generating scarcity that political elites could exploit for both economic and political benefits. As Bates (1994) argues, "Interventionist policies can transform economic markets into political machines ... one in which those who hold power exchange political benefits for political loyalty ... With demand exceeding supply, those who command power over the allocation of the good give it to some and withhold it from others."

For example, in Ghana, which at independence in 1957 had a democratically elected government and a trade surplus, protectionism and other state-led industrialization policies quickly led to international reserve shortages. By the ealy 1960s, large trade deficits were addressed with "stringent import licensing"(Bates, 1981, 101), enabling corrupt politicians to enrich themselves by selling import licenses, and Kwame Nkrumah was elected president for life, then overthrown by a military coup. A second attempt at democracy in 1969 was also short-lived; import licenses under President Busia were allocated "to individuals and companies who were [backing] the ruling party"(Bates, 1981, 102); the military took over for a second time in 1972, led by General Ignatius K. Acheampong, who was executed in 1979 on corruption charges. Similarly, protectionist policies in Kenya in the 1970s gave

favored firms an effective "license to print money, being subject to no competition at home or abroad"(Bates, 1981, 104).

The more RTAs reduce protectionism and promote liberalized trade, the less economic incentive for aspiring dictators to replace democratic governments with authoritarian rule. A high share of imports from RTA countries that are free of price-raising protectionist policies should therefore reduce the probability of an at-risk democracy being replaced with dictatorship. Liu and Ornelas (2014) formalize this argument, and in a cross-national empirical analysis find that countries with a high share of imports from free trade agreement (FTA) members increases the longevity of democracies, but that a high share of imports from Preferred Trade Agreement (PTA) members has no discernible effect on democratic survival.[19]

Null Hypothesis 2: Imports from RTA members have no relatonship with democratic transition or survival.

Alternative Hypothesis 2a: High imports from other RTA members (especially members of FTAs) increases the probability of transition to democracy.

Alternative Hypothesis 2b: High imports from RTA members (especially members of FTAs) increases the probability of democratic survival.

2.3 Trade and democratic exposure

Another explanation for democratic survival is cumulative exposure to and experience with democracy, including multiparty elections. Persson and Tabellini (2006) find that if a democracy accumulates domestic democratic "capital," the democracy is more likely to be sustained. Similarly, Lindberg (2006) argues that as African polities accumulate experience with multiparty elections, even under conditions with authoritarian features, democracy is

[19]FTAs eliminate tariffs, and therefore have a greater effect on import prices than do PTAs, which reduce tariffs.

more likely to emerge and survive.

Persson and Tabellini (2006) argue that foreign democratic capital can also promote both democratic transition and democratic survival. If there are few democracies in the world, citizens are less likely to expect their governments to enable voters to remove them from power. As the number of democracies in the world increases, citizens have a greater expectation that their own government should be democratically elected. Przeworski et al. (2000, 127), for example, find that a higher percentage of "other democracies in the world" increases the probability of democratic survival (but not democratic transition). Various democratic waves (Latin America post-WW2, Africa and Eastern Europe post-Cold War, the Arab Spring, etc.) suggest that democratic transitions in close geographic proximity are particularly likely to influence democratic transition and survival (Huntington, 1993; Strand et al., 2012). Persson and Tabellini (2006) find that foreign democratic capital, or geographic "closeness to democracy" increases the probability of both democratic transition and survival.

Brinks and Coppedge (2006) build on the framework of Rogers (2010) to argue that diffusion of innovations such as change in political regime type are communicated through members of a social system. Physical proximity does not always indicate shared membership in such a system; North Korea and South Korea, for example, are contiguous but historically have little interaction. Brinks and Coppedge (2006) find that countries tend to move toward the average level of democracy in contiguous neighbors, and that membership in the US alliance, or the Soviet Bloc – networks that do not rely solely on geographic proximity – also influence regime change toward, or from, democracy.

RTAs are another social network by which political regime type might be communicated to fellow members. If a businesswoman from a dictatorship has the opportunity to travel regularly to a democratic neighbor, for example, those business trips will generate a concentrated exposure to democracy, and in her return trips she will bring that familiarity with

democracy back to her own country, increasing her expectations that she should have a voice in choosing her own government.

Null Hypothesis 3: Trade levels with democratic RTA members have no relatonship with democratic transition or survival.

Alternative Hypothesis 3a: High levels of trade with democratic RTA members increases the probability of transition to democracy.

Alternative Hypothesis 3b: High levels of trade with democratic RTA members increases the probability of democratic survival.

2.4 RTAs and Democratic Pressure

Separate from the role of trade, membership in a regional international organization (IO) that is dominated by democracies may influence the incentive of political elites to support democracy in their own country. Pevehouse (2002), for example, argues that governments of young democracies join regional international organizations dominated by democracies in order to deter other domestic elites (particularly the military) from overturning the democracy. Particularly if the regional IO has criteria with regard to democratic norms, any democratic reversals may result in sanctions or even expulsion from the organization. The suspension of Madagascar from SADC and ECOWAS sanctions against Togo, described above, serve as examples of this dynamic.

Pevehouse (2002) also argues that highly democratic IOs will have more influence on member states because democracies tend to be more affluent than nondemocracies. This latter relationship breaks down in Africa, however. As shown in Table 3, RTAs with high average income levels, such as the AMU and CEPAC, often have low democracy scores (as indicated by Polity IV, standardized to a -1 to 1 scale), and RTAs with a high average democracy scores, such as UEMOA and the EAC, often have low average income scores.

Examples of RTAs with highly democratic members promoting democratic transition

or continuation among less democratic counterparts include ECOWAS members promoting democracy in Gambia and Togo, and SADC members promoting democracy in Mozambique, as described above. Examples of RTAs lacking highly democratic members allowing democracies in their midst include CEPGL, in which Burundi (2002) was the only example of a country transitioning to democracy, and no intervention was forthcoming by the other two members when the country sank back into dictatorship in 2015.

Null Hypothesis 4: Democracy levels of other RTA members have no relationship with democratic transition or survival.

Alternative Hypothesis 4a: Membership in a RTA with high democratic member increases the probability of transition to democracy.

Alternative Hypothesis 4b: Membership in a RTA with a highly democratic member increases the probability of democratic survival.

Because the act of joining a regional IO with higher democratic density than those regional IOs in which the state was already a member will increase the country's commitment to democracy, Pevehouse (2002) argues that an increase in the democracy level of a country's most democratic regional IO (assumed to be the result of joining a more democratic IO) will be associated with greater democratic durability. In his empirical analysis, he finds that it is positive change in the level of RTA democracy, rather than the level of RTA democracy, that promotes democratic durability.

Null Hypothesis 5: Changes in democracy levels of other RTA members have no relationship with democratic transition or survival.

Hypothesis 5a: A positive change in the democracy level of a country's most democratic RTA increases the probability of transition to democracy.

Hypothesis 5b: A positive change in the democracy level of a country's most democratic RTA increases the probability of democratic survival.

3 Data and Empirical Strategy

I begin with Persson and Tabellini (2006)'s model as a baseline model (as does Liu and Ornelas 2014), then add the RTA variables to test the hypotheses described above. Their data end in 2000, so I followed their operationalization to estimate domestic democratic capital, foreign democratic capital, and the dependent variables, democratic survival and democratic transition, for the years 1960-2015. I include both sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, up to 50 countries.[20]

Since the dependent variable is democratic transition and survival, political regime is defined as a binary variable. Countries with a polity2 score from Polity IV (Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers, 2016) greater than 0, on a -10 to 10 scale, are coded as democracy; those with scores of 0 or less are coded as nondemocracies.[21] As Persson and Tabellini (2006) note, this is a more generous definition of democracy than is commonly used with Polity IV data (5 or 6 are common thresholds for democracy), but this seems a suitable threshold for Africa, where the median polity2 score from 1960-2015 is -5. The threshold captures the series of democratic failures in the 1960s, which for most of Africa was the first decade of independence, and the wave of democratic transitions in the post-Cold War period (see Figure 1). Because some explanatory variables, such as income level may affect democratic transition and failure differently, the probability of democratic transition and democratic survival are analyzed separately. The dependent variable for democratic tranisition is 1 for dictatorships who become a democracy in the following year, and 0 for dictatorships who remain a dictatorship. The dependent variable for democratic survival is 1 for democracies who remain a democracy in the following year, and 0 for democracies who revert to dictatorship.[22]

Domestic democratic capital is operationalized using a formula based on the assumption

[20]Some countries are dropped due to lack of data for the dependent variable.
[21]The polity2 score replaces missing values, due to interegnum or transition, with an interpolated score.
[22]In a later iteration of the paper I will explore alternative measures of democracy.

that democratic capital "accumulates in years of democracy and depreciates geometrically, at the rate of $(1-\delta)$ in years of dictatorship. ... Thus, democratic experience is more valuable the closer it is to the present."[23] Over time, in an uninterrupted democracy, domestic democratic capital will converge to 1. The highest domestic democratic capital value in Africa, using this approach, is .99 in South Africa in 2015, where the regime type has been coded as democracy since 1910 (with a score of polity2= 4 until 1989, then rising to 9 in 1994). Other African countries with high democratic capital scores include Mauritius and Botswana (.95 in 2015). Ten countries (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Morocco, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Togo) have 0 domestic democratic capital for the entire period, indicating that their polity2 score never surpassed the 0 threshold to qualify, even at this low standard, as a democracy.

Summary statistics of domestic democratic capital, as well as other variables used in the analysis, are presented in Table 4. Figure 4 indicates changes over time for the key explanatory variables. In Figure 4, and in the analysis, I transform these variables into a standardized scale (mean=0, standard deviation = 1) to facilitate interpretation across variables.

Foreign democratic capital is intended to measure a country's geographic "closeness to democracy" and is operationalized using proximity and a continuous measure of democracy, using the polity2 score (divided by 10 to normalize the range to -1 to 1) from Polity IV. Foreign democratic capital is the weighted average polity2 score of all other countries in the world, where the weight is $\frac{\text{distance between countries}}{\text{total possible distance}}$; total possible distance is half the length of the equator.[24] The lowest foreign democratic capital score is -.21; much of the continent had a foreign democratic capital score below -.2 in the 1970s. The highest foreign democratic

[23]Persson and Tabellini (2006) get similar results using depreciation rates of $\delta = .94$ and $\delta = .99$. I use .94 in this paper.

[24]Note: in the text, Persson and Tabellini (2006) say they normalize democracy to [0,1], but in replicating the data it becomes apparent that they divide polity2 by 10, which they also specify in the text; thus, countries surrounded by dictatorships have negative foreign democratic capital.

Table 4: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Democracy (Polity> 0)	0.29	0.454	0	1	2593
Democratic Transition	0.027	0.163	0	1	1827
Democratic Survival	0.952	0.215	0	1	722
RTA	0.768	0.422	0	1	2593
FTA	0.245	0.43	0	1	2593
RTA Share of Imports (lagged)	0.112	0.146	0	0.799	2273
RTA Share of Trade (lagged)	0.095	0.117	0	0.676	2274
FTA Share of Imports (lagged)	0.045	0.116	0	0.787	2298
FTA Share of Trade (lagged)	0.04	0.097	0	0.634	2298
Democratic RTA Share of Trade (lagged)	0.043	0.1	0	0.743	2404
Democratic FTA Share of Trade (lagged)	0.029	0.086	0	0.726	2515
Top RTA Polity Score (lagged)	-0.014	0.042	-0.1	0.078	1985
Change in Top RTA Polity Score (lagged)	0.002	0.01	-0.082	0.15	1928
Top FTA Polity Score (lagged)	0.287	0.186	-0.211	0.775	634
Change in Top FTA Polity Score (lagged)	0.024	0.06	-0.151	0.5	597
Domestic Democratic Capital (lagged)	0.157	0.245	0	0.985	2549
Foreign Democratic Capital (lagged)	0.017	0.172	-0.212	0.303	2549
Log GDP per capita (lagged)	7.667	0.878	5.085	10.749	2401



Figure 4: Average standardized scores for national share of trade in RTAs and FTAs, domestic democratic capital, foreign democratic capital, log GDP per capita, and top RTA polity score.

capital score is .30; much of North Africa (close to Europe and Tunisia) and West Africa had a score in that range in the 2010s.

RTAs and their memberships are identified initially using the International Governmental Organization (IGO) dataset from the Correlates of War (COW) (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke, 2004). To be included in this dataset, an IGO must have at least three state members, hold plenary sessions at least once every ten years, and possess a permanent secretariat and headquarters. I then used Liu and Ornelas (2014) and the Regional Economic Communities recognized by the UN Economic Commission for Africa[25] to identify regional trade agreements. The IGO dataset v3 (released in July 2019) is annual from 1965-2014 and at five year intervals prior to 1965. I identified annual data for 1961-1964 for the three RTAs that existed prior to 1965, and extended the data through 2015.[26] Figure 1 indicates that few African countries were members of RTAs at independence, and by 2000, all African countries are members of at least one RTA.

When analyzing the effect of imports and trade, I examine the effect of Free Trade Areas (FTAs), as well as RTAs. Many African RTAs have officially notified to the WTO[27] that a Free Trade Area is "in force," and a common market is a stated goal, but tariffs and other non-tariff barriers continue to impede intra-RTA trade. Gupta (2016) notes that four RTAs are recognized as having a functioning FTA: COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS, and SADC. Liu and Ornelas (2014) recognizes both SACU and SADC as FTAs. Following Liu and Ornelas (2014), I identify RTAs as FTAs if they notify the WTO under GATT Article 24 (ECOWAS, SACU, SADC), or if they notify the WTO under the Enabling Clause and also GATS Article 5 (EAC). I also include COMESA (notified under the Enabling Clause), since COMESA is generally recognized as a functional FTA. The first year of the FTA is based on the "date

[25] `https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/regional-economic-communities`

[26] I also corrected extensive errors for COMESA membersh p://www.comesa.int/overview-of-comesa/ , as my main source.

[27] http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx

in force," although it is often many years before tariffs and nontarff barriers are removed. Table 1. As indicated in Table 1, FTAs have the highest Effectiveness Scores and promote more intra-RTA trade than other RTAs.

Dyadic trade data are from Correlates of War (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins, 2009; Barbieri and Keshk, N.d.). RTA Share of Imports is calculated using the sum of "smoothed imports" from RTA members divided by the sum of "smoothed imports" from all trade partners.[28] RTA Share of Trade is the sum of total "smoothed total trade" (exports plus imports) with RTA members divided by total "smoothed total trade" with all trade partners.Democratic RTA Share of Trade is the sum of total "smoothed total trade" (exports plus imports) with democratic RTA members divided by total "smoothed total trade" with all trade partners. Summary statistics of RTA imports and RTA trade, by RTA, are presented in Table 3.[29]

The Top RTA Polity Score is the average democracy score (polity2 divided by 10, to normalize the scale to -1 to 1) of all other RTA members in the most democratic RTA of which the country is a member. Change in Top RTA Polity Score is the Top RTA Polity Score in year t minus the Top RTA Polity Score in the year $t-1$. Change in Top RTA Polity Score can occur from changes in the polity2 score of existing RTA members, or from the joining or leaving (or suspension) from an RTA by the country itself or another RTA member.

Income level is measured using Real GDP per capita (constant 2011 prices) from Penn World Tables (PWT v.9.0), logged to reduce skew.

All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.

[28]Smoothed trade data has lower spikes and dips. In addition to other sources of measurement error, the lack of trade data for many dyads, particularly in earlier years, introduces measurement error. In country-years where there are no trade data for fellow RTA members, I code the import or trade data as missing.

[29]Unfortunately, data for trade among SACU countries - South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) are unavailable pre-2010 and in 2011, so much of the analysis excludes SACU. This is likely attenuating the effects of RTAs on democracy, since trade among these countries is high and most are stable democracies.

4 Analysis

The baseline model for democratic transition (Table 5) and democratic survival (Table 6) includes domestic democratic capital, foreign democratic capital, and per capita income level.[30] In both the tables and figures (beginning with Figure 5), I present exponentiated coefficients, which enable an intuitive interpretation. An "odds ratio" greater than 1 indicates a higher predicted probability – for example, a 1.2 odds ratio for RTA membership would indicate that RTA members are 20 percent more likely to experience democratic transition than non-RTA members; an odds ratio less than 1 indicates a lower probability – for example, an odds ratio of 0.8 for RTA membership indicates that RTA members are 20 percent less likely than non-RTA members to experience democratic transition. The figures also present 90 percent confidence intervals, to indicate whether the relationship between the explanatory variable and the probability of democratic transition/survival is statistically significant.

The baseline model ("Controls" in Figure 5) the results generally replicate those of Persson and Tabellini (2006); high foreign democratic capital and high domestic democratic capital are associated with a higher probability of both democratic transition and survival (although domestic democratic capital is not statistically significant for democratic survival), and high income is associated with higher probability of democratic survival. Counter to Persson and Tabellini (2006), high income is associated with a lower probability of democratic transition, indicating that prosperity in Africa stabilizes both democracies and dictatorships. For example, relatively high income (averaging over 4000 dollars real GDP per capita) dictatorships that never experienced democracy include Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, and Swaziland, and democracies (over the threshold of 0 on the -10 to 10 Polity scale) that never transitioned to dictatorship with relatively high income include Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa.

[30]This corresponds to Models 1 and 2 in Persson and Tabellini (2006) Table 2, but substitutes the probit model with an analagous logistic regression model to enable easier interpretation.



Figure 5: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition and survival, given RTA membership, RTA share of imports, and RTA share of trade, as well as control variables.

When I test the RTA dummy variable model without control variables from the baseline model, membership in at least one RTA appears to increase the probability of democratic transition and survival over two-fold. However, when the control variables from the baseline model are re-introduced, the null hypothesis that RTA membership has no effect on democracy cannot be rejected with confidence. Similarly, when RTA share of trade and RTA share of imports are introduced without the baseline controls, a one-standard deviation increase in the share of trade with, or imports from, RTA members is associated with a 50 percent increased probability of democratic transition and survival, but inclusion of the baseline control variables renders these coefficients statistically insignificant. The strongest predictor of democratic transition and survival is foreign democratic capital; a one-standard deviation higher level of foreign democratic capital is associated with an approximately two-fold higher probability of democracy in the following year for both current democratices and dictatorships. High income, on the other hand, promotes regime continuity for both autocracies and democracies.



Figure 6: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition and survival, given RTA membership, RTA share of imports, and RTA share of trade, as well as control variables. Country Fixed Effects model.

In order to control for country-level omitted variables that are not specified in the model, I next estimate a logistic regression model with country fixed effects (Figure 6 and Tables 7 and 8). Because country-level fixed effects perfectly predict democracy or dictatorship for countries that retain the same regime type throughout the period studied, the fixed effects analysis is restricted to countries that have democratized at least once (for the democratic transition analysis) or have experienced democratic failure at least once (in the democratic survival analysis). The analysis therefore excludes countries that are effectively consolidated dictatorships or democracies, and explanatory variables can be interpreted as deviations from the country's average level.

The results for the fixed effects models are similar; RTA membership and RTA share imports are not statistically significant when the control variables from the baseline model are included. A standard deviation of RTA share of trade, however, is associated with a more than two-fold increase in probability of democratic survival. A higher level of for-

eign democratic capital (i.e., the democracy level of foreign countries, particularly those in close geographic proximity) remains a robust predictor of democratic transition and survival. When fixed effects are included, income level no longer has a statistically significant associtation with regime change.

I repeat the analysis using Free Trade Areas (FTAs). FTAs, on average, have a greater impact on the level of both imports and trade in general among members than is the case for the broader category of RTAs. Figure 7 and Tables 9 and 10 present the results from the logistic regression model, and Figure 8 and Tables 11 and 12 present the results from the logistic regression model with fixed effects.



Figure 7: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition and survival, given FTA membership, FTA share of imports, and FTA share of trade

As with RTAs, when ignoring the control variables and excluding country fixed effects, membership in a FTA, high FTA share of trade, and high FTA share of imports all appear to promote demoracy, but when the control variables are included, these associations are not statistically significant.

When controlling for unobserved country-level fixed effects, however, FTAs are associated

with higher levels of democratic survival (see the right panel in 7 and Table 12), even when controlling for other explanatory variables. Membership in FTAs, and a high share of imports or trade with FTA members, are each associated with a significantly higher probability of democratic survival, relative to countries who are either not a member of a FTA or are weakly integrated with fellow FTA members.

The largest substantive effect (with fixed effects and other controls) among the FTA-related economic variables for democratic survival is FTA share of trade; one standard deviation is associated with a four-fold increase in the probability of democratic survival. Some countries with FTA share of trade more than two standard deviations above average for 5+ years after the year 2000 include ECOWAS members Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali; SADC member Mozambique, and SADC and COMESA members Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Note that many of these are not exemplary cases of democracy (even with the low threshold of 0 on the Polity scale, Zimbabwe is coded as a dictatorship from 1987-2008); however, most are very low-income and therefore not expected to be democratic at all according to modernization theories of democracy. Membership in an FTA is associated a two-fold increase and a standard deviation of FTA share of imports is associated with a three-fold increased probability of democratic survival.

An increase in foreign democratic capital remains a strong and robust predictor of democratic transition and survival in the fixed effects models. When consolidated democracies and dictatorships are dropped from the analysis, within-country increases in income level appear to have no statistically significant effect on democratic transition or survival. Among countries that experienced at least one democratic failure, previous experience with democracy appears to have a negative association with democratic transition and survival. This may result from countries such as Ghana and Nigeria who have experienced multiple military coups after spells of democracy and countries such as Gambia and Zimbabwe who experienced decades of democracy followed by democratic failure.



Figure 8: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition and survival, given FTA membership, FTA share of imports, and FTA share of trade. Country Fixed Effects model.

Figures 9 and 10, and Tables 13 – 16, analyze the effect of democracy levels among other RTA and FTA members.

In the models without controls and without country fixed effects (Figure 9 and Tables 13 and 14), most of the democracy-related variables (share of trade with democratic members of RTAs and FTAs, and top RTA Polity score) are statistically significant predictors of both democratic transition and survival. In the democratic transition analysis with controls, the null result can no longer be ruled out with confidence for most of the democracy-related RTA or FTA variables.

The exception is top RTA Polity score. With controls, a one-standard deviation increase in the top RTA Polity score is associated with a higher probability of democratic transition, and democratic RTA share of trade and top RTA polity score each have a statistically significant positive correlation democratic survival when controls are included. An example of a dictatorship with a Polity score significantly lower than the average Polity scores in a RTA is Gambia in 2014; in 2016, the authoritarian president lost an election and he

stepped down in 2017. Another example is Burkina Faso in 2011; by 2015, the country had transitioned to democracy. A third example is Togo in 2011 and 2014; despite membership in the same more democratic RTA (ECOWAS), the president has maintained his authoritarian grip on power. An example of a democracy whose Polity score was significantly lower than the average Polity scores in a RTA is post-civil war Cote d'Ivoire in 2013; the country transitioned to democracy in 2011 and has remained a democracy since.



Figure 9: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition and survival, given RTA democratic share of trade, FTA democratic share of trade, RTA top Polity score, and change in RTA top Polity score

In the models with country fixed effects (Figure 10 and Tables 15 and 16), all democracy-related variables are again statistically significant for both democratic transition and survival when control variables are excluded. None, however, are statistically significant predictors of democratic transition when control variables are reintroduced.[31]

With respect to democratic survival, however, shares of trade with democratic RTA members and democratic FTAs are both statistically significant predictors of democratic

[31]Change in the top polity score is excluded since top polity score is equivalent to change in top polity score in the fixed effects model.

continuity; each is associated with a four-fold increased probability of democratic survival. This indicates that RTA membership increases the probability of democratic survival if RTA or FTA membership leads to more intensive trade relations with other democracies, perhaps through broad-based exposure to democracy.

The top RTA polity score falls just short of the 90 percent confidence level, but has a larger substantive effect; one standard deviation of the top RTA polity score is associated with an eight-fold increased probability of democratic survival. The large confidence intervals in this analysis are due to small sample size, since this model only includes democracies who are members of at least one RTA.



Figure 10: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition and survival, given RTA democratic share of trade, FTA democratic share of trade, and RTA top Polity score. Country Fixed Effects model.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, I systematically analyze the effect of African RTAs on transition and survival of democracies. There are a number of possible channels by which RTAs might promote

democracy: (1) RTAs may promote trade and thereby economic development, which has been found to promote and/or sustain democracy; (2) RTAs, by lowering the cost of imports, may decrease the ability of authoritarian leaders to capture rents through monopolistic prices, thus reducing the incentive to establish authoritarian rule; (3) increased trade relations with democracratic members of the RTA may promote citizens' interest in and commitment to democracy, and (4) membership in a RTA dominated by democracies may incentivize elites (including military elites) to respect the country's institutional commitment to democracy.

In this preliminary analysis, I find that increased trade resulting from membership in a regional trade agreement (and more so in a free trade agreement) increases the probability of democratic survival. Free trade agreements also appear to promote democratic survival in fragile democracies when the FTA promotes imports from other FTA members. In addition, democratic countries who have deep trade relations with other democracies in either a RTA or FTA are more likely to remain democratic. Finally, democratic countries who are members of RTAs with high "democratic density" are more likely to remain democratic than are democratic countries who are members of RTAs with generally low democracy scores. These patterns are robust to the inclusion of other explanations for democratic transition or survival, including income level, domestic history of democracy, and democracy in nearby countries.

The question of how RTAs affect democracy in Africa is not merely of academic interest. Negotiations are under way to merge three current RTAs into a 26-nation Tripartite Free Trade Area and a 54-nation Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). The preliminary findings in this paper suggest increased economic integration, particulaly for countries integrating with more democratic neighbors, may accelerate and consolidate democracies in member states.

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Table 5: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition, given RTA membership, RTA share of imports, and RTA share of trade

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se	(7) b/se
End_Dic							
Dom Dem Capital	1.438+				1.433+	1.406	1.405
	(0.31)				(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.32)
For Dem Capital	2.458**				2.369**	2.419**	2.406**
	(0.39)				(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)
Log GDP per capita	0.658**				0.661**	0.664*	0.667*
	(0.10)				(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)
RTA		2.527*			1.324		
		(1.04)			(0.71)		
RTA Share of Trade			1.537**			1.004	
			(0.20)			(0.17)	
RTA Share of Imports				1.493**			1.020
				(0.19)			(0.18)
Observations	1714	1889	1728	1727	1714	1604	1603
Pseudo R^2	0.098	0.013	0.019	0.016	0.099	0.096	0.096

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

Table 6: Estimated change in probability of democratic survival, given RTA membership, RTA share of imports, and RTA share of trade

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se	(7) b/se
Stay_Dem							
Dom Dem Capital	1.413				1.338	1.208	1.253
	(0.35)				(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.30)
For Dem Capital	1.825**				1.637*	1.640*	1.774**
	(0.34)				(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)
Log GDP per capita	1.752*				1.836*	1.497+	1.418
	(0.43)				(0.47)	(0.36)	(0.35)
RTA		2.708**			1.861		
		(0.97)			(0.91)		
RTA Share of Trade			1.622**			1.329	
			(0.30)			(0.25)	
RTA Share of Imports				1.378*			1.144
				(0.21)			(0.17)
Observations	717	775	546	546	717	530	530
Pseudo R^2	0.095	0.023	0.029	0.014	0.101	0.071	0.067

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

SACU countries are excluded for models using trade or import data; trade data among SACU countries are not available pre-2010, nor in 2011.

Table 7: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition, given RTA membership, RTA share of imports, and RTA share of trade. Country Fixed Effects.

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se	(7) b/se
End_Dic							
Dom Dem Capital	0.428*				0.437+	0.445+	0.446+
	(0.18)				(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
For Dem Capital	9.889**				10.745**	8.812**	8.307**
	(3.50)				(3.94)	(3.36)	(3.00)
Log GDP per capita	0.931				0.877	0.669	0.698
	(0.64)				(0.60)	(0.47)	(0.49)
RTA		2.526+			0.562		
		(1.24)			(0.35)		
RTA Share of Trade			2.893**			0.853	
			(0.88)			(0.33)	
RTA Share of Imports				2.063**			1.006
				(0.54)			(0.36)
Observations	1183	1218	1137	1136	1183	1128	1127
Pseudo R^2	0.280	0.012	0.043	0.026	0.282	0.261	0.261

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

Table 8: Estimated change in probability of democratic survival, given RTA membership, RTA share of imports, and RTA share of trade. Country Fixed Effects.

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se	(7) b/se
Stay_Dem							
Dom Dem Capital	0.268**				0.269**	0.169**	0.228**
	(0.12)				(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)
For Dem Capital	11.890**				11.663**	9.657**	11.223**
	(7.44)				(7.55)	(6.23)	(7.20)
Log GDP per capita	0.947				0.971	1.995	1.121
	(1.04)				(1.08)	(3.05)	(1.73)
RTA		1.762			1.075		
		(0.76)			(0.66)		
RTA Share of Trade			2.386*			2.627+	
			(0.97)			(1.48)	
RTA Share of Imports				1.618			1.398
				(0.54)			(0.58)
Observations	384	422	374	374	384	358	358
Pseudo R^2	0.177	0.009	0.039	0.016	0.177	0.199	0.180

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

SACU countries are excluded for models using trade or import data; trade data among SACU countries are not available pre-2010, nor in 2011.

Table 9: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition, given FTA membership, FTA share of imports, and FTA share of trade

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
End_Dic						
FTA	3.825**			1.122		
	(1.14)			(0.39)		
FTA Share of Trade		1.620**			1.060	
		(0.17)			(0.15)	
FTA Share of Imports			1.585**			1.044
			(0.18)			(0.16)
Dom Dem Capital				1.434+	1.393	1.389
				(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.32)
For Dem Capital				2.384**	2.333**	2.360**
				(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.41)
Log GDP per capita				0.665*	0.684*	0.680*
				(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Observations	1889	1747	1747	1714	1620	1620
Pseudo R^2	0.037	0.028	0.023	0.098	0.094	0.094

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

Table 10: Estimated change in probability of democratic survival, given FTA membership, FTA share of imports, and FTA share of trade

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Stay_Dem						
FTA	3.471**			2.343		
	(1.41)			(1.27)		
FTA Share of Trade		1.642*			1.223	
		(0.38)			(0.25)	
FTA Share of Imports			1.576*			1.185
			(0.34)			(0.21)
Dom Dem Capital				1.333	1.191	1.204
				(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.30)
For Dem Capital				1.420	1.710**	1.752**
				(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Log GDP per capita				1.767*	1.384	1.388
				(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Observations	775	551	551	717	535	535
Pseudo R^2	0.038	0.030	0.024	0.105	0.068	0.067

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

SACU countries are excluded for models using trade or import data; trade data among SACU countries are not available pre-2010, nor in 2011.

Table 11: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition, given FTA membership, FTA share of imports, and FTA share of trade. Country Fixed Effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
End_Dic						
FTA	9.666**			1.125		
	(4.07)			(0.62)		
FTA Share of Trade		3.261**			1.331	
		(0.88)			(0.40)	
FTA Share of Imports			3.026**			1.133
			(0.84)			(0.33)
Dom Dem Capital				0.420*	0.385*	0.410*
				(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)
For Dem Capital				9.648**	8.147**	8.596**
				(3.59)	(2.97)	(3.14)
Log GDP per capita				0.957	0.811	0.782
				(0.67)	(0.57)	(0.55)
Observations	1218	1156	1156	1183	1147	1147
Pseudo R^2	0.093	0.080	0.062	0.280	0.269	0.266

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

Table 12: Estimated change in probability of democratic survival, given FTA membership, FTA share of imports, and FTA share of trade. Country Fixed Effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Stay_Dem						
FTA	4.297**			2.596		
	(2.03)			(1.68)		
FTA Share of Trade		2.392**			4.352**	
		(0.78)			(2.28)	
FTA Share of Imports			2.269*			3.019*
			(0.80)			(1.69)
Dom Dem Capital				0.267**	0.098**	0.158**
				(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.09)
For Dem Capital				8.113**	9.956**	9.805**
				(5.43)	(6.35)	(6.20)
Log GDP per capita				1.235	1.163	1.036
				(1.39)	(1.59)	(1.41)
Observations	422	374	374	384	358	358
Pseudo R^2	0.057	0.058	0.043	0.190	0.238	0.206

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

SACU countries are excluded for models using trade or import data; trade data among SACU countries are not available pre-2010, nor in 2011.

Table 13: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition, given RTA democratic share of trade, RTA top Polity score, and change in RTA top Polity score

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	top2b
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
End_Dic						
Dem RTA Share of Trade	1.533**			1.074		
	(0.17)			(0.17)		
Dem FTA Share of Trade		1.554**			1.099	
		(0.16)			(0.15)	
Top RTA Polity Score			1.639**			0.736
			(0.22)			(0.26)
Top RTA Polity Change			1.368*			1.337+
			(0.21)			(0.21)
Dom Dem Capital				1.397	1.382	1.335
				(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
For Dem Capital				2.353**	2.310**	2.915**
				(0.41)	(0.39)	(1.14)
Log GDP per capita				0.672*	0.686*	0.648*
				(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Observations	1728	1747	1296	1604	1620	1152
Pseudo R^2	0.020	0.024	0.036	0.097	0.095	0.080

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

Table 14: Estimated change in probability of democratic survival, given RTA democratic share of trade, RTA top Polity score, and change in RTA top Polity score

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	top1b
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Stay_Dem						
Dem RTA Share of Trade	1.980**			1.517+		
	(0.52)			(0.34)		
Dem FTA Share of Trade		1.692*			1.242	
		(0.43)			(0.25)	
Top RTA Polity Score			1.829**			2.973+
			(0.35)			(1.75)
Top RTA Polity Change			0.810+			1.632
			(0.10)			(0.53)
Dom Dem Capital				1.163	1.184	1.135
				(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.35)
For Dem Capital				1.571*	1.734**	0.877
				(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.52)
Log GDP per capita				1.472	1.386	1.886*
				(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.54)
Observations	546	551	636	530	535	484
Pseudo R^2	0.044	0.028	0.041	0.077	0.069	0.111

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

SACU countries are excluded for models using trade or import data; trade data among SACU countries are not available pre-2010, nor in 2011.

Table 15: Estimated change in probability of democratic transition, given RTA democratic share of trade, RTA top Polity score, and change in RTA top Polity score. Country Fixed Effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	6
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
End_Dic						
Dem RTA Share of Trade	2.851**			1.589		
	(0.72)			(0.54)		
Dem FTA Share of Trade		3.290**			1.602	
		(0.98)			(0.52)	
Top RTA Polity Score			6.227**			0.796
			(1.90)			(0.52)
Dom Dem Capital				0.376*	0.346*	0.177**
				(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.11)
For Dem Capital				7.684**	8.182**	22.309**
				(2.71)	(2.96)	(16.65)
Log GDP per capita				0.665	0.720	1.187
				(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.96)
Observations	1137	1156	867	1128	1147	843
Pseudo R^2	0.059	0.071	0.202	0.267	0.274	0.300

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

Table 16: Estimated change in probability of democratic survival, given RTA democratic share of trade, RTA top Polity score, and change in RTA top Polity score. Country Fixed Effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	6
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Stay_Dem						
Dem RTA Share of Trade	2.284*			4.135*		
	(0.88)			(2.40)		
Dem FTA Share of Trade		2.291*			4.149**	
		(0.85)			(2.19)	
Top RTA Polity Score			1.740+			8.408
			(0.54)			(11.55)
Dom Dem Capital				0.112**	0.099**	0.116**
				(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)
For Dem Capital				10.549**	11.345**	3.929
				(6.44)	(7.26)	(6.47)
Log GDP per capita				2.102	1.331	4.591
				(3.10)	(1.84)	(9.83)
Observations	374	374	296	358	358	271
Pseudo R^2	0.041	0.045	0.025	0.225	0.235	0.159

Exponentiated coefficients

Standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 * *p < 0.01$

SACU countries are excluded for models using trade or import data; trade data among SACU countries are not available pre-2010, nor in 2011.