Eroded Unity and Clientele Migration. Explaining Mexico's Democratic Transition[*]

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Abstract

This paper offers a new explanation of what catalyzed Mexico's democratization. I propose that despite the occurrence of three serious economic crises and five electoral reforms between 1977 and 1994, by the mid-1990s the PRI was able to remain as Mexico's dominant party because its elite still had strong incentives to remain united. This, in turn, allowed the party to keep its unparalleled advantage over voters' mobilization in order to win elections. However, once the 1996 electoral reform changed the structure of incentives for many PRI faction leaders at the federal and state level, the unity of this party's elite rapidly eroded, leading to the migration of experienced cadres and the valuable clientelistic machines under their control to other parties. This soon translated into significant electoral defeats for the PRI, including the loss of the presidency in the 2000 election. Using evidence from 112 gubernatorial elections held between 1987 and 2006, the statistical results indicate that the 1996 reform increased almost 4 times the probability that a high-ranked PRI member defected the party, even after controlling for socioeconomic levels, economic performance and, importantly, the PRI's electoral results in the previous state and federal elections.

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Introduction

Mexico's political regime has been a puzzling case for the most influential theories that try to explain why and how democracies emerge. If economic development was the fundamental driving force behind this process, as modernization theory proposes, Mexico should not only have democratized by 1951, but its probability of having an authoritarian regime in 1990 were as low as 0.11 (Przeworski et al., 2000: 87). However, it was not until 2000 that the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) lost the first presidential election in more than seventy years. Likewise, Mexico's democratic transition can hardly be explained as a concession made by the rich (or elite) to the poor (or citizens) in their historical struggle to redistribute income, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003) argue. Actually, two distinctive elements of Mexico's democratization are that it was demanded by diverse sectors of society –including rich and poor–, and that the redistribution of income was not a central issue in dispute during this process.[1] In addition, if the negative consequences of the recurrent economic crises experienced by Mexico since the beginning of the 1980's (1982, 1985 and 1994) mainly explain this country's final transition to democracy, as scholars like Magaloni (2006) and Greene (2008) have argued from quite different perspectives, the inevitable questions are why it started when it did and why the process took almost two decades to conclude.

In this paper I offer a new causal explanation for why the PRI was able to remain in power for so many years after the successive economic crises and electoral reforms that took place between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, as well as why this party's dominance finally ended. The answer to both of these questions, I propose, is rooted in the PRI's capacity to prevent the massive defection of its factions even in times of economic hardship and decreasing electoral performance.[2] Given that the electoral market remained

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[1]This does not imply, however, that the Mexican public opinion was not confronted around other economic issues. Dominguez and McCann show, for example, that before the 1988 election Mexico's electorate was deeply divided by issues like the debt rescheduling, the liberalization of foreign investments and trade, as well as the privatization of many public companies (1996: 53-65).

[2]Contrary to what many scholars have argued (Greene, 2008; Langston and Díaz-Cayeros, 2003; Magaloni, 2006), a central result of this research is that the erosion of PRI's unity was not a consequence of the declining electoral performance of this party during the first half of the 1990s, but a response to the specific institutional reforms approved in 1996.

patently uneven in favor of the PRI until the mid-1990s, most of the mid- and high-ranked *Priístas* did not have incentives to leave the ruling party in order to join or create an opposition party and compete under another political banner. By limiting widespread defections until the first half of the 1990s,[3] the PRI was able to retain many of its most experienced and qualified cadres and, more importantly, its significant comparative advantage to mobilize voters by keeping control over its clientelistic structure. As a result, the PRI was able to remain as Mexico's dominant political force at the federal and state level until the end of the 1990s.[4]

Still, four factors worked against the PRI's electoral results during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. First, the five electoral reforms implemented between 1977 and 1994 reduced the regime's capacity to commit fraud, improved the electoral commission's autonomy, and increased the proportionality of the political system, among other things. Second, the degree of modernization and urbanization increased the likelihood of citizens opposition to the regime and reduced the number of voters dependent on clientelistic handouts. Third, the increasing deterioration of the public perception of the PRI after seven decades in power. And fourth, the historic –though politically contained– split of the *Corriente Democrática* (the faction that eventually formed one of the two strongest opposition parties) from the PRI in 1987. These factors clearly challenged the PRI but did not alter its status as Mexico's dominant party.

This situation changed after the electoral reform of 1996.[5] Several authors have noted already that this reform generated a more competitive set of electoral conditions at the federal *and* state level, and this, in turn, improved the situation of the opposition forces (e.g., Andrade, 1997; Becerra et al., 2000; Castellanos, 1998; Labastida and López, 2004;

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[3]The PRI suffered some factional defections before 1996, the most famous of which is the exit of two important leaders, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, along other members of the *Corriente Democrática* in 1987. I discuss this case in greater detail in the third section, as well as why this and other defections that included a relative small number of factions and/or factions of low hierarchy did not caused the end of the PRI.

[4]By 1995 the PRI had only lost 4 out of 32 state governments, and it was not until 1997 and 2000, respectively, that this party lost the 50% majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the Presidency for the first time.

[5]I agree with the scholars that have emphasized the relevance of the electoral reforms implemented between 1977 and 1994 (Molinar, 1991; Becerra et al., 2000). Nevertheless, I argue that it was not until the 1996 reform that the structure of incentives of most PRI faction leaders was decisively transformed.

Molinar and Weldon, 2001). What has been less noticed, though, is the profound impact that this reform had on the internal life of the PRI. The institutional changes implemented in 1996 opened an unprecedented opportunity for many PRI's faction leaders to continue their political careers in an opposition party in case they did not receive the benefits they expected from the ruling party. Thus, by transforming the structure of incentives for many of the PRI's faction leaders, the 1996 electoral reform initiated the progressive and systematic erosion of this party's unity (i.e., a *massive* defection of factions) across the country. As a result, the PRI not only lost experienced cadres but it also saw the migration of many parts of its clientelistic structure to other parties, breaking its historical advantage over the mobilization of voters.[6] Eventually, the increasing number of defections of PRI leaders and the migration of these leaders with their clientelistic networks to the opposition, in addition to the deterioration of the public perception of the PRI after seven decades in power, caused the defeat of this party in the 2000 presidential election.

In this paper I test one of the central parts of this argument: the effect of the 1996 electoral reform on the unity of the PRI's factions. To do this, I constructed a dataset that measures the occurrence of defections of PRI leaders at the state level immediately before, during or after the party selected its gubernatorial candidate for the 112 governor elections held between 1987 and 2006. The statistical results illustrate that, first, more than 83% of this type of defections occurred after 1996 and, second, that the 1996 electoral reform increased almost 4 times the probability of these types of defections, even after controlling for socioeconomic levels, economic growth and, importantly, the PRI's electoral performance in the previous state and federal elections.

The paper is organized in five sections. I start presenting a brief overview of Mexico's macroeconomic situation since 1982, as well as a description of the PRI's electoral decline between 1985 and 2006. In the second section I review some of the main theories that try to explain Mexico's democratic transition. In the third section I present a more detailed explanation of my argument, which I empirically test in the fourth section. I

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[6]As I argue in section 3, the control of a clientlistic machine allows parties to mobilize and monitor the behavior of voters, and in the Mexican case it is also fundamental to defend the results in each stage of an election (e.g., polling stations, district councils, state councils and the national council).

finish discussing the main contributions of this work, as well as how it improves our understanding of Mexico's democratization and the demise of other dominant-party regimes.

1   Mexico's economic record and the PRI's electoral performance during the 1980s and 1990s

The last quarter of the twentieth-century represented a turbulent and challenging period for the PRI's hegemony. On the one hand, the Mexican economy was hit by three severe crises between 1976 and 1995: the 1982-1983 Debt Crisis, the 1985-1986 Oil Shock and the 1994-1995 Peso Crisis. Originated by separate causes,[7] each of these crises carried similarly negative repercussions. To mention only a few indicators, the three crises brought a significant reduction of the country's income per capita (-6.9% in 1983, -5.9% in 1986 and -7.9% in 1995),[8] the peso drastically devaluated (438% in the period 1982-1983, 356% in 1985-1986, and 146% in 1994-1995) and inflation significantly rose (above 80% in 1982 and 1983, over 100% in 1986 and 1987, and 52% in 1995). In addition, while the 1982-1983 and 1985-1986 crises were also characterized by sharp reductions of real minimum wages (a 60% lost between 1982 and 1988) and significant increases in the public debt (in 1982 and 1987 it represented around 16% of the GNP), the 1994-1995 crisis almost doubled the share of population that lived under the line of poverty (from 21.1% in 1994 to 37.1% in 1996). Finally, though smaller in terms of the change of income per capita, a fourth crisis hit the Mexican economy in 1987. Produced by the international financial crisis of that year, the 70% drop of the Mexican financial market particularly affected middle-class investors.

While the Mexican economy was going through this devastating process, the PRI's electoral performance suffered a progressive decline. The left panel of Figure 1 shows the share of votes received by the PRI in each state in the seven federal deputy elections held between 1985 and 2003.[9] As these boxplots indicate, the PRI's median percentage of votes

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[7]The structural weakness of the Mexican economy in the 1980s, characterized by an enormous public debt and the country's high dependence on oil exports, was the scenario in which the drastic declines of the international prices of oil took place in 1982 and 1985-1986 (Garrido and Quintana 1986; Lustig 1998: 39-50).

[8]All data sources used in this paper are listed in Table 3 in the Appendix.

[9]Although the PRI's electoral results are available at the *district* level, I analyze them at the *state* level

Figure 1: PRI's Electoral Performance, 1985-2003

(a) Federal Deputy Elections

(b) States Governed by the PRI and Other Parties

dropped from 74.3% in 1985 to 40.5% in 2003.[10] However, it is interesting to notice that it was not until the 1997 election that this party's median share of votes dropped below the politically significant 50% threshold. Furthermore, while in the 1994 federal deputy election the PRI won 50% or more of the votes in 75% of the states, three years later this party was able to win 50% or more votes in less than 25% of the states (7 out of 32).[11] Put it differently, while the PRI only lost the simple majority of the votes in one state between the 1985 and 1994 federal deputy elections (Michoacán in 1988), in 1997 this party occupied the second or third position in more than 25% of the states (9 out of 32).[12]

The right panel of Figure 1 offers a different perspective of the significant change that the PRI's electoral performance experienced after the mid-1990s. This graph shows the number of states governed by the PRI (dashed line) and other parties (solid line) between 1985 and 2003. Although the PRI lost the first gubernatorial election in 1989 (Baja California, to the PAN), by 1996 it still governed 28 out of the 32 states (87.5% of

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because the federal district boundaries were redrawn in 1996. This decision might imply the potential loss of precision in the information used, and the loss of part of the richness of the data at the district level.

[10]Juan Molinar (1991) has already pointed out that the PRI's electoral decline started at least in the 1973 federal deputy elections. For the purpose of this paper, however, I focus on the period 1985-2003.

[11]Again, the aggregation of the electoral data at the state level hides the fact that the PRI started to lose in many districts since the 1988 federal deputy election. For an analysis of part of this process see Molinar (1991).

[12]The PRI's electoral performance was very similar at the state deputy elections. This graph is not shown but it is available upon request.

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the total).[13] However, from 1997 on the PRI started to lose gubernatorial elections at an unprecedented rate and by 2001 it "only" governed 17 states (53% of the total).

At least two conclusions can be drawn from the brief descriptive analysis just presented. The first is the remarkable capacity of the PRI to remain in power at the federal and state level even after the disastrous performance of the Mexican economy during most of the 1980s and early 1990s. Despite its progressive electoral decline, by 1995 the PRI was still able to control the presidency, 60% and 74% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, respectively, as well as 28 of the 32 state governments and 50% or more of the seats in 30 out of 32 states legislatures. A second relevant fact is that the PRI's demise seems to have accelerated during the second half of the 1990s even though the good performance of the economy, eventually leading to this party's defeat in the 2000 presidential election. What might have happened in the mid-1990s that catalyzed this process? In the next section I discuss three of the most recent accounts that have tried to answer this question in order to explain the PRI's downfall.

2 Alternative explanations

According to Kenneth Greene (2008; 2010), the resilience of the PRI regime –like any dominant-party regime– is mostly explained by the enormous resource advantages that this party enjoyed over the opposition.[14] This resource advantage was obtained through several illicit mechanisms, but one of them seems to be particularly relevant for Greene's theory: the deviation of funds from the budgets of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the PRI's coffer.[15] Hence, from Greene's perspective the end of the PRI's regime was mainly

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[13]The PAN governed the other four states: Baja California, Chihuahua, Guanajuato and Jalisco. One of these governments (Guanajuato from 1991 to 1995, under Carlos Medina Plascencia) was a political concession made by the PRI to the PAN in order to solve a post-electoral conflict (Eisenstadt, 2004: 108). Hence, by 1996 the opposition had only won three gubernatorial elections.

[14]Greene proposes a second but less relevant factor to explain the resilience of dominant party: the ability of the regime to raise the costs of supporting the opposition through denying access to patronage goods, threatening individuals with losing their public jobs, access to public services or repression (2008; 2010).

[15]The other mechanisms mentioned by Greene are the allocation of public sector jobs to supporters of the dominant party, the kickbacks and illicit campaign contributions made by domestic businesses in exchange for economic protection, and the use of public agencies as campaign headquarters during electoral times (2010: 5-6). However, the empirical analysis and conclusions of Greene's 2008 book and 2010 article are almost exclusively based on the advantages that the access to SOEs' resources represent.

caused by the drastic reduction of this party's resource edge due to the privatizations and budget cuts that followed the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s.[16] In Greene's terms, "privatization weakens dominant parties because it limits their access to public funds, and without these funds, well-greased patronage networks run dry, the machine of dominance seizes up, and the increasingly fair market for votes allows opposition to expand" (2008: 33-34).

Few scholars would challenge that part of the reasons why dominant-party regimes manage to rule for long periods of time has to do with their clear superiority of resources. However, the evidence challenges Greene's explanation in different ways. In order to illustrate how the PRI's resource advantage declined after the 1982 crisis, Greene mentions that while in 1982 there were 1,155 SOEs, in 1990 this number dropped to 280 and by 2000 there were only of 202 state enterprises left.[17] Although the change in these figures is impressive, they need to be contextualized to fully assess their relevance. By starting his description at the beginning of the 1980s, Greene omits to mention that during the first 40 years of PRI rule the number of SOEs was significantly smaller. While in 1970 there were 272 SOEs, by 1975 this figure increased to 504 (roughly the same number as in 1989), and it was not until the period 1976-1982 that this number jumped to 1,155 (Chong and López de Silanes 2005: 351; Lustig 1998: 104-105; MacLeod 2004; Salinas 1990, 1994; Zedillo 1995, 1997).[18]

In addition, a significant proportion of the increase in the number of SOEs during

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[16]In order to explain why the PRI was able to remain in power for almost ten years after the harshest parts of the economic liberalization took place, Greene argues that the historic nature of the PAN and PRD as niche political organizations made it difficult for them to quickly transform into catch-all parties able to compete for the median voter. This depiction of the PAN is in sharp contrast to the historical description provided by Soledad Loaeza (1999: 329-336), one of Mexico's specialist on this party. It also seems inappropiate for the PRD, a party that was founded by former PRI members along with different left organizations.

[17]Greene also mentions the significant decline in the number of federal government employes between the 1980s and 2000 (2008: 102-103, Figures 3.3 and 3.4). Although it is true that the number of federal government employees in 2000 (978,267) was roughly half of the figure at the end of the 1980s (1,950,247), this number did not experience a monotonic decline during the period. From 1988 to 1992 it actually increased from 1,950,247 to 2,065,859, and it was not until 1993 that this number dropped to 1,028,105 (INEGI, 2000, 2005). Even more important, this sharp decrease is explained by the transfer of public school teachers from the federal government to the state governments –largely controlled by the PRI until the end of the 1990s (see Figure 1)– as part of the Educational Reform of 1993 (Trejo, 1995).

[18]This same pattern is described in Figure 1 of Dag MacLeod's book (2004: 39), one of the main sources used by Greene.

the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s is explained by the state's decision to take over companies in financial distress and, more importantly, by the nationalization of the bank system in 1982 (Chong and López de Silanes 2005: 352-353; Lustig 1998: 104; MacLeod 2004: 41, 46). In general terms, these nationalizations transferred existing workers in the private sector into state employees rather than allowing the PRI to hire more of its own supporters. In addition, Greene fails to mention that despite the constant decline in the number of SOEs during the 1980s and 1990s, *Petróleos Mexicanos* (PEMEX) –Mexico's richest and most profitable SOE, which has been the main source of fiscal resources of this country over the last forty years– was not privatized.[19]

But what probably represents the most serious challenge to Greene's theory is the fact that even after the economic liberalization had drastically reduced the number of SOEs and shrunk the size of the public sector, by the mid-1990s the PRI still enjoyed an enormous resource advantage over all other parties. According to the reports published by IFE, Mexico's electoral commission, the PRI spent 71.4%, 77.3% and 81.2% of the total campaign resources used by *all* parties in the presidential, senatorial and federal deputy races of 1994, respectively (Becerra et al., 2000: 371-372). And these figures are likely to be an underestimation because they do not include the public resources that could still be illegally diverted to favor the official party.

Beatriz Magaolni's book *Voting for Autocracy* (2006) offers a second influential explanation of the PRI's fall. Building on the idea that the survival of a dominant-party regime is a function on the unity of its elite (Van de Walle, 1994; Geddes, 1999), Magaloni argues that the PRI's capacity to deter intra-elite defections largely depended on having an extensive base of electoral support.[20] According to this author, "The pillar of a hegemonic-party regime is its monopoly of mass support" because "elites possess strong incentives to remain united as long as the population supports the ruling party. If electoral support begins to wither, so do incentives to remain united within the ruling

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[19]During the 2000 presidential election PEMEX's CEO and the leader of the labor union were accused of illegaly funneling almost $150 millions from this public company to the PRI's accounts.

[20]Magaloni mentions two other factors. First, the amount of spoils and government jobs distributed by the PRI to the political elite. Second, the ruling party's capacity to manipulate the electoral rules and commit electoral fraud (2006: 18).

party" (2006: 14-15). The PRI's level of electoral support, in turn, was a function of the long-term economic performance of the country, the distribution of government transfers to voters through what Magaloni calls a "punishment regime,"[21] and the use of electoral fraud and force (2006: 20, 55-72). Consequently, she argues that even when the electoral reforms of the *first* half of the 1990s[22] and the increasing coordination of the opposition contributed to the end of the PRI's regime, the main cause of Mexico's democratization was the massive detachment of voters from the ruling party as a result of the 1994 peso crisis and the weakening of the PRI's "punishment regime" since the end of the 1980s.

In order to explain why Mexican voters were more forgiving of the economic downturn of 1982 but not of the 1994 peso crisis, Magaloni proposes an innovative Bayesian model. The basic logic behind it is that even when the 1982 economic crisis represented a severe economic downturn for Mexico, voters could still rationally believe that the PRI would be more capable than the opposition in handling the national economy because the regime's economic history had been consistently good until then (2006: 64). In contrast, the 1994 peso crisis meant falling below a "threshold of acceptability" after which voters no longer trusted the PRI's competence. As a consequence, this last economic crisis confirmed the systematic deterioration of the economy and led voters to "embrace political change regardless of the risks" (2006: 80). It was only after this moment that voters became "vindictive" and detached from the PRI, reducing this party's popular support and, consequently, increasing its vulnerability to internal splits (2006: 54, 79).

Although innovative and appealing, the evidence challenges two core aspects of Magaloni's argument. First, the results presented in section 4 indicate that, contrary to what Magaloni's theory proposes, the probability that a high-ranked Priísta defected the party was higher in those places where the PRI still had a *large* base of electoral support,

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[21]According Magaloni the PRI used this regime to exclude opposition voters and politicians from the party's spoils system. The poorer the median voter and the stronger the capacity of the hegemonic party to monitor the behavior of voters and target economic transfers, the more effective the "punishment regime" will be. (2006: 20, 80).

[22]For Magaloni the 1994 reform was "The most fundamental institutional reform in the construction of democracy in Mexico" because it granted "true independence to the IFE", and this, in turn, "offered a way to minimize ex ante violations of the electoral laws by removing the PRI's *institutional capacity* to commit electoral fraud" (2006: 243, original emphasis; see also 38).

not were it was weaker. Second, her description of the Mexican economy during the 1980s and 1990s fails to mention that besides the 1982 and 1994 crises, Mexico also experienced a profound economic breakdown in 1985-1986 (e.g., the GDP per capita dropped -5.9%).[23] If we include this crisis in the analysis, the question then is why the 1994 crisis was the one that triggered the supposedly massive detachment of voters from the PRI and not the one of 1985-1986, especially given that this last crisis took place only a few years after the 1982-1983 one and a little before the 1988 presidential election, precisely when the party was going through the internal turbulences generated by the emergence of the *Corriente Democrática.*

Also in line with Van de Walle and Geddes' conception of the survival of dominant-party regimes, Joy Langston (2006) proposes that the breakdown of the PRI's internal unity –an the regime's eventual demise– was caused by the electoral reforms implemented in Mexico during the last quarter of the twenty century. This author argues that while the split of the "small number of PRI politicians" (i.e., the *Corriente Democrática*) that left the party with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in 1987 "was made possible by the fact that presidential elections allowed internal struggles to grow into regime challenges" (2006: 69),[24] the posterior "river of defections" was caused by the improvement of the conditions of electoral competition as a result of the electoral reforms and the increasing willingness of citizens to vote against the dominant party. These new conditions, Langston proposes, changed "the calculus of discipline for an *individual* politician [within the PRI] even if he or she does not enjoy the support of a camarilla or group [. . .] An *individual* can compete under an opposition party banner and hope to win the elected post, especially for local executive races such as the gubernatorial and mayoral

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[23]Even though Figure 2.1 of her book (2006: 83) illustrates that the 1985-1986 crisis reduced Mexico's economic growth rate almost as much as the 1982 crisis (it dropped to almost to -4% in 1986), Magaloni describes these two separate crises as part of the same one (see p. 83). This depiction seems inappropriate because the 1982-1983 and 1985-1986 crises were the result of separated causes. See Garrido and Quintana (1986), Lustig (1998: 39-50), and Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009).

[24]Similarly to Rigger (1999), Langston suggests that one of the necessary conditions for the erosion of the internal cohesion of any dominant party is the pre-existence of an electoral system. Even when the regime could have constantly manipulated the electoral system, elections "play a large role in these ruptures because they lower the costs for minority factions within the authoritarian coalition [i.e., dominant party] of leaving the regime and continuing a political career" (Langston, 2006: 72).

contests" (Langston, 2006: 60,71, emphasis added).

Langston's explanation represents a significant contribution to understanding Mexico's democratization. As it will be evident in the next section, my theory aims to push this general argument further by providing its micro-foundations and, with this, shed light on the strategic interaction between the PRI's factions. I build on this author's theory in three particular ways. First, Langston points out that "From the end of the 1980s until midway through the *sexenio* of PANista Vicente Fox, over thirty [PRI] politicians [...] left the hegemonic party and ran under another partisan banner in gubernatorial elections (2006: 71, original emphasis). However, these subsequent splits had an important temporal and geographical variation that has not been considered yet. The evidence presented in section 4 illustrates that while the frequency of PRI defections was relatively low and concentrated in a few states between 1987 and 1995, it significantly increased and spread across the country after 1996. Hence, despite the exit of the *Corriente Democrática* and the electoral reforms approved in 1989-90, 1993 and 1994, the PRI was able to largely preserve its internal unity until the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the chronological and spatial change in the number of PRI defections before and after 1996 poses a challenge to Langston's theory. If the Mexican electoral system was reformed four times between 1989 and 1996, how can her theory explain that the number of defections only increased after the last reform? I address this question in section 3.

Second, my theory agrees with Langston's idea that the erosion of the PRI's internal unity was largely caused by an electoral reform. I take this argument one step further by explaining why, despite the improvements introduced to Mexico's electoral system by the five reforms approved between 1977 and 1994, the internal unity of the PRI only started to be systematically eroded after the approval of the 1996 reform. Thus, I contend that while it is plausible that an electoral reform improves the competitiveness of an electoral system and this, in turn, might erode the unity of the a dominant party, not all electoral reforms –even the ones that imply a certain degree of liberalization– necessarily have this result. This is precisely what happened in Mexico before 1996.[25]

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[25]Molinar (1991), Weldon (2001) and Brinegar et al. (2006), among others, argue that most of the electoral

Third, Langston proposes that as a consequence of the defections of individual members experienced by the PRI in the late-1980s and 1990s, the dominant party started to suffer electoral defeats in several gubernatorial races to former PRI members. Although the relation between these variables is plausible, the causal link proposed by Langston raises some questions. Even when state and municipal executive races might be more candidate-centered,[26] a party must still persuade, coordinate and mobilize more voters than its competitors in order to win these election (Cox, 2008). Hence, if the defections experienced by the PRI only involved *individual* members, as Langston claims, it is difficult to understand how the exit of a single cadre could have significantly reduced the PRI's capacity to perform the three tasks just mentioned, while drastically increasing the capacities of an opposition party at the same time. This becomes even more puzzling if we consider that in many of these states the opposition was almost non-existent (e.g., Tlaxcala, Zacatecas). Below I propose an alternative causal mechanisms to explain why the defections suffered by the PRI were so costly for the ruling party. I argue that most of these splits not only implied the migration of a single individual from the PRI to other parties, but also, and most importantly, the clientelistic machine under his or her control. While this reduced the ruling party's capacity to mobilize voters, it improved the opposition's clientelistic machines and electoral results.

3   Clientele migration theory

I start this section by presenting a new theory of how authoritarian dominant parties manage to stay in power and what causes their demise. Then, I explain how and why the PRI managed to stay in power despite the several electoral reforms and economic downturns experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. I end this section examining what caused the progressive demise of the authoritarian regime led by this party in the second half of

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reforms approved in Mexico since the 1960s were designed to open up the system enough to satisfy part of the opposition and the population's demands (e.g., reduce electoral fraud and increase representativiness), but not so much as to risk the PRI's resource advantage and control over the political regime. Similarly, many Sub-Saharan African dominant-party regimes were able to remain in power despite the political reforms that liberalized their regimes in the early 1990s. See Van de Walle (2007).

[26] According to Langston this characteristic gave the former PRI members that competed as opposition candidates "more opportunity to win elected post from outside the PRI" (2006: 71).

the 1990s until the historical victory of an opposition party in the 2000 presidential election.

3.1 The Survival and Demise of Dominant-Party Regimes

The theory presented in the following pages builds on the idea that the likelihood and mode of breakdown of each type of dictatorship depends on the characteristics of its intra-elite factionalism and competition (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Geddes, 2004), and that the survival of an authoritarian dominant-party regime, in particular, is largely a function of the unity of its elite (Van de Walle, 1994; Geddes, 2004). By an authoritarian dominant-party regime[27] I mean one in which "one party dominates access to political office and controls policy, though other parties may sometimes legally compete", and the party has enough institutional autonomy to constrain the dictator's discretion over policy and personal choices (Geddes, 2004: 3).

The Clientelistic Nature of Dominant Parties

Although the degree of centralization and institutionalization of a dominant party's clientelistic machine[28] greatly varies across cases,[29] it is remarkable that most dominant parties base their power on these type of political networks (e.g., Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Baum, 1994; Greene, 2008; Magaloni, 2006; Rigger, 1999; Tam, 2005; Tremewan, 1994).[30] The basic building block of these clientelistic structures are political factions. Each faction is composed of a subgroup of politicians that share common goals and act together in order to advance their agenda and win positions within the party and

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[27]Dominant-party regimes are also called *single*-party regimes, *one*-party regimes or *hegemonic*-party regimes. I prefer the term "dominant" because this includes cases in which the dominant party is the only one formally allowed to exist (e.g., Senegal's PS before 1978 or Taiwan's KMT before 1987), as well as cases in which there might be more than one party allowed to compete but one of them is clearly dominant (e.g., Malaysia's UMNO, Mexico's PRI, Singapore's PAP).

[28]I use the terms "clientelistic machine", "clientelistic structure" and "clientelistic network" interchangeably.

[29]For example, while most communist parties have an extensive clientelistic network that is highly centralized and in many cases influences almost every aspect of a citizen's life, the clientelistic structures of many dominant parties in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to be loose and decentralized (Van de Walle, 2007). Also, dominant-party regimes tend to have clientelistic machines regardless of their ideology or level of economic development (e.g., Cuba, Singapore).

[30]For studies on the clientelistic nature of the PRI's regime see, for example, Bernstein (1993), Knight (2005), Padgett (1955).

Figure 2: A Dominant Party's Hypothetical Clientelistic Structure

the political regime. Factions' membership, ideology and policy preferences are generally fluid, constantly adapting to the changing circumstances. Every faction controls different types and amounts of human, material, organizational and financial resources.

Importantly, even when the size and relevance of each faction within the party's clientelistic machine varies, they all tend to work in the same way: the faction leader (i.e., the patron) provides the faction members (i.e., the clients) different types of benefits and services under his control in exchange for some form of political and economic support.[31] Every faction leader is responsible to its superior (i.e., patron) for the behavior and the results provided by the faction(s) under his or her control. At the top of the clientelistic structure is the main leader or patron of the party.[32]

Figure 2 presents the diagram of a dominant party's hypothetical clientelistic

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[31]As in other clientelistic structures, the relationship between a faction leader and its members is defined by at least five characteristics. It is *dyadic* (i.e, it involves two actors) and in many cases it takes place *face-to-face*. Given the unequal levels of wealth, power and information between the leader and members of a faction, their relationship is *asymmetric*, always favoring the leader. In addition, the relationship is *reciprocal*, meaning that it is based on the mutual exchange of resources valued by each actor in the dyad. Finally, the interaction between the faction's leader and its members is *contingent*. That is, the leader provides benefits and services only to those members who have already delivered or who promised to deliver him some type of political support. See Landé (1983), Muno (2010) and Scott (1972).

[32]For a detailed historial description of the characteristics, transformation and internal organization of the factions within the PRI, see Camp (1980, 1995, 2002).

machine with four factions.[33] Each circle corresponds to a politician and the branches represent the relationship between him and the politicians that are below and above him in the structure. Three things must be noticed. First, clientelistic machines usually have several levels. Thus, the categories of "patron" and "client" must be understood in relative, not absolute terms. The same individual can be classified as one or the other, depending on his or her position in a particular dyad (Hicken, 2011; Muno, 2010; Scott, 1972).[34] Second, each faction might be composed of smaller factions of lower order. In this example the four main factions are each formed by two factions of lower order. Third, thanks to their virtual monopolistic control over the state resources, dominant parties tend to have the largest and densest clientelistic machine of the regime, which gives them an unparalleled advantage over opposition parties.

Among the several important political tasks that clientelistic machines perform for the dominant party they support, it is worth highlighting two that are particularly relevant for those regimes where elections –although unfair and unfree– are held regularly and some kind of opposition is allowed to compete (e.g., Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore). First, given that a political party needs to simultaneously *persuade*, *coordinate* and *mobilize* voters in order to win an election (Cox, 2008: 342), one of the key advantages that a clientelistic machine provides to a dominant party vis-à-vis other parties in electoral times is the unparalleled capacity to mobilize voters through its extensive networks. This point is particularly important to understand the pace of Mexico's democratization. Most of the existing explanations implicitly assume that the two central challenges for the PAN and the PRD in their efforts to defeat the PRI were to *persuade* enough voters about their policies and *coordinate* them to vote for only one of the opposition parties (e.g., Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2008). In this paper I explicitly propose that one of the central advantages that the unity of the PRI's factions provided to its leaders –one that proved particularly valuable when the electoral competition increased in the middle of the 1980s– was the

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[33]Clientelistic structures are significantly more complex in the real world, including many more factions and levels within the network. I use this simplified diagram for ease of exposition.

[34]For example, while politicians 2, 3, 4 and 5 are all clients of politician 1 (the main leader or patron of the clientelistic machine), they are also the patrons of all the politicians that form part of they respective faction and that are below them in their corresponding branch of the network.

significant edge that the ruling party had to mobilize voters through its extensive clientelistic networks.

Second, and related, clientelistic machines might improve the dominant parties' capacity to monitor and influence how people vote. Susan Stokes (2005) argues that in order to successfully influence the decisions of voters (what she defines as a situation of "perverse accountability"), political parties need to know or make good inference about what individual voters have done in the voting booth and reward or punish them conditional on these actions. This, in turn, is mainly determined by the type of voting technology used and the characteristics of the party's organization.[35] In particular, she argues that those parties with a bottom-heavy and decentralized organization with an army of grassroots militants (i.e., a clientelistic network) will be significantly more efficient in monitoring and affecting the behavior of voters in their favor.

The Importance of the Factions' Unity

Following Horiuchi and Tay (2004), I assume that the central goal of each faction leader in a dominant party is to maximize its *own* payoff –and not necessarily the party's– in the political regime (i.e., to increase the size of *their* share of the political pie). A faction leader can accomplish this in at least two different ways: by either (i) maximizing the payoff of the dominant party (i.e., increasing the slice of the political pie that the party receives); and/or by (ii) maximizing the payoff of the faction within the dominant party (i.e., increasing the faction's share of the party's slice) or in another party (i.e., joining or creating another party). Hence, in contrast to previous theories that have model the interactions within a dominant party (e.g., Geddes, 2004), I propose that the interests of the party's faction leaders do not have to necessarily converge.[36]

Each faction leader contributes part of the resources under his or her control to

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[35]I contend that the distinction between the two main determinants of a party's capacity to monitor voters' behavior is relevant in the context of Mexico's democratization. The five electoral reforms instituted between 1977 and 1994 mainly reduced PRI's capacity to monitor voters through improving the security and reliability of the existing voting technology, while leaving the organizational structure of this party largely intact. However, the 1996 electoral reform generated certain conditions that eventually led to divisions among the PRI's elite. I discuss the reasons below.

[36]See Garrido de Sierra (2011) for a detailed discussion of these differences.

Figure 3: Self-Reinforcing Survival Mechanism of Dominant-Party Regimes

either build and mobilize popular support in favor of the authoritarian regime (Geddes, 2008; Magaloni, 2006), deter the organization and expression of opposition against the government, as well as to increase the party's capacity to win elections, if there are any. In return, the party offers each faction leader some type of benefits, with certain probability of fulfilling this promise in the future. Together, the benefits, the probability of receiving them, and the costs (i.e., the resources contributed) determine the expected utility (or payoff) that the party can provide to each faction leader.[37] This can be formalized as:

$$EU_{Leader faction_k}(Party_j) = P_j B_j - C_j \qquad (1)$$

where B_j stands for the benefits associated with being a member of Party j, P_j refers to the probability of receiving these benefits, and C_j the costs of supporting Party j.[38]

In order to prevent the massive defection of its factions, a dominant party must provide their faction leaders and expected utility that is *relatively* higher than what any

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[37]In contrast to Langston's theory, where individual politicians make a cost-benefit analysis, this conceptualization implies that politicians also consider the probability of receiving the benefits offer by every altenative party. This is a crucial conceptual difference because, as I explain below, one of the ways in which dominant parties are usually able to keep providing a relatively higher expected utility in the regime is by manipulating the probability that the opposition forces will be able to deliver the benefits they could offer to a political faction.

[38]This conception of the expected utility of a party's faction is largely an adaptation of Aldrich and Bianco's model of "Party Affiliation" (1992), which is also the point of departure of Magaloni (2006) and Greene's (2008) models. The assumptions made here to simplify this equation are the same as the ones proposed by Aldrich and Bianco, and includes the fact that the probability that a faction that belongs to party j will receive some kind of benefits from party i is equal to zero.

opposition organization offers them. This, in turn, largely depends on the dominant party's capacity to obtain, concentrate, coordinate and mobilize different types of financial, human, material, political and repressive resources. Consequently, all else equal, the stronger the cohesion of the dominant party's factions within the clientelistic structure, the higher the capacity of the party to perform these tasks, the larger the expected utility that the party can –although not necessarily will– allocate to its factions, the lower the expected payoff that other parties can offer, the more likely it is that the factions will prefer to stay in the party, increasing the regime's chances of prevailing. This is why, as several authors have previously argued (Van de Walle, 1994; Geddes, 2004), the unity of a dominant party's elite is a key component of the self-reinforcing mechanism –the "virtuous cycle of dominance" in T.J. Pempel's words– that makes the survival of this type of regime such a resilient equilibrium. Figure 3 illustrates this causal relationship.

The "Safer Bet"

Dominant parties use a wide variety of mechanisms to maintain the cooperation of their factions and, consequently, to reinforce their chances of staying in power. Each of these tools is used to affect one or more of the three components that determine the expected utility that the dominant party and other political organizations can offer (B, P and C in equation 1 above). For instance, the probability that a faction receives the benefits promised by the ruling party or the opposition depends on the number of parties allowed to compete. If the dominant party is the only one authorized to exist, as in many communist and Sub-Saharan regimes for decades, then the probability of receiving the benefits promised by an "opposition" party is close to zero. Similarly, the amount of benefits that a party can provide to its factions largely depends on its access to public jobs, elected positions and state resources. By retaining an almost absolute control over the sources of these benefits, dominant parties usually enjoy significant resources advantages over the rest of the political forces. Finally, a dominant party can increase the costs that its factions would have to pay for joining an opposition organization through a wide variety of repressive means, including harassment, imprisonment and physical

violence (Baum, 1994; Geddes, 2004; Greene, 2008; Key, 1950; Magaloni, 2006; Mickey, 2005, 2008; Molinar, 1991; Tam, 2005).

What is remarkable, though, is that no matter what particular combination of mechanisms is used by a dominant-party regime, all have the same fundamental goal: to create a situation in which most faction leaders perceives the ruling party as the "safer bet" because it provides him or her an expected utility that is *relatively* higher than what any other political organization could offer.[39] As long as this happens, no faction will have incentives to defect from the ruling coalition and the regime has higher chances of remaining in power.

Importantly, a dominant party might be able to become the "safer bet" and maintain its factions united by either increasing the expected utility it provides to them, reducing the expected payoff that other political organizations could offer, or both. This implies that a dominant party might be able to keep the cohesion of its ranks –and stay in power– even after providing a low absolute expected utility to one or more of its factions, as long as it is also able to use the mechanisms mentioned above to reduce the expected payoff offered by other political organizations (e.g., repression).

The Type and Number of Defections Matters

Although the survival of a dominant-party regime largely depends on the unity of its factions, I disagree with the theories that treat dominant party defections in a generic way, assuming, implicitly, that any internal split entails similarly negative consequences for the future of the regime (e.g., Geddes, 2004; Van de Walle, 1994). From my perspective, not all defections are caused by the same factors nor represent the same kind of threat for the survival of a dominant-party regime, and these differences are very important to understand and explain the demise of a dominant-party regime.

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[39]This means that in order to maintain the unity among its ranks a party must offer each of its factions the highest expected utility they could get –in relative terms– in the political regime, but it does not necessarily imply that the expected utility received by each faction will be large in absolute terms, or that all factions will receive the same expected utility. Thus, even when all factions might have incentives to remain in a party because it provides them a higher expected utility than any other party, some factions might receive a higher expected utility than others because they control the party apparatus and the material and ideological benefits associated to it. For a detailed explanation of this argument see Garrido de Sierra (2011).

Figure 4: Threat Posed to a Dominant-Party Regime's Survival
by Type of Factional Defection

Giving that clientelistic nature of dominant parties, the damage that a factional defection can cause to them is directly related to the amount of voters and resources that would migrate to other political parties or organizations as a result of the split. This is determined by at least two factors. The first is the *hierarchy* of the defecting faction leader. The higher his position within the clientelistic pyramid, the larger the amount of resources, sub-factions and voters that will be under his control, and, consequently, the bigger the potential loss that his departure would represent for the dominant party.[40] The second factor is the *number* of factions that leave the party. The larger their number, the bigger the amount of voters and resources that will migrate from the dominant party to other political organizations..

Figure 4 offers a graphic representation of the magnitude of the threat that a factional defection would pose to the survival chances of a dominant-party regime, depending on the hierarchy of the leaders of the factions that split (y-axis) and the number of factions involved (x-axis). The least threatening situation for a dominant-party

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[40]Alan Knight (2005) proposes that the PRI's clientelistic machine had five levels of faction leaders or *caciques*: national (i.e., the president), state, regional, municipal and local caciques. While the three highest level of caciques would be located above the horizontal dotted line on Figure 4, the municipal and local caciques would be below it. The empirical test presented in section 4 analyzes the impact of the 1996 reform on the frequency of high-ranked faction leader defections from the PRI.

regime –asides from not suffering a split at all– is when a small number of factions headed by low-ranked leaders leave the party (quadrant III). While the situation might turn more complicated as the number of lower order factions that defect increases (quadrant IV),[41] this scenario would still only represent a low/medium threat for the survival of the regime. Not only because the leaders of each of these low-ranked factions control relatively few resources and a small group of voters, but also because they are likely to be geographically disperse and uncoordinated. Thus, while these defections might affect the electoral performance of the dominant party in local races (e.g., state deputies, mayors), if they take place at all, they are unlikely to have consequences at the state or national level.

Remarkably, as the experiences of the PRI (see footnote 44), Malaysia's UMNO[42] and other cases illustrate, dominant parties have good chances of surviving defections led by mid- or even high-ranked party leaders if these splits only involve a few factions and their resources (quadrant I). This type of splits are generally motivated by a change in the structure of incentives of a small number of faction leaders after being ostracized –many times purposefully– within the dominant party, and they are unlikely to put at risk the ruling party's clientelistic advantage.

In contrast, what poses a much more serious threat for the survival of a dominant-party regime is when many mid- and high-ranked leaders decide to defect from the dominant party, taking with them the resources and the parts of the clientelistic machine under their control (quadrant II). These massive high-ranked factional defections tend to be caused by structural transformations that change the incentives of most faction leaders

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[41]The number of lower order factions that split might increase for several reasons. For instances, this could be caused by a sudden reduction of the dominant party's resources as a result of an economic crises. Given that these factions are at the lowest level of the party's clientelistic structure, they are likely to be the first to suffer the consequences of the resource shortages, and also the first for which the dominant party no longer represents the safer bet.

[42]Similar examples can be found in many other dominat-party regimes. For instance, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the largest and more powerful party of the coalition that has governed Malaysia since 1955, has experienced several defections through its history. These include the case of its founder, Datuk Onn Jaafar in 1951, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak in 1963, or the split of Team B in 1987-1988, a faction led by well-known UMNO members (e.g., Tengku Razaleigh, Datu Harun Idris) that left the party after losing the internal election for the leadership of the party and being harshly marginalized thereafter. Although all these defections reduced in different degrees the amount of resources that UMNO could obtain, concentrate, coordinate and mobilize, and the defection of Team B posed an important but temporary threat once this organization evolved into the political party *Semangat 46* and allied with other opposition forces during the 1990 elections (see Singh (1991) for details), UMNO still remains as Malaysia's dominant party.

within the party. These defections cause a systematic and severe damage to the dominant party's clientelistic machine because they considerably reduce the ruling party's capacities to mobilize and monitor voters, while improving these same capacities for the opposition parties that adopt these factions.

Hence, in order to explain the demise of a dominant-party regime we need to answer what factor(s) triggered the massive high-ranked factional defections, as well as why this led to the end of the regime.[43] In the following subsection I propose a response to both questions for the PRI's case.

3.2   The Demise of the PRI

For almost sixty years after its foundation in 1929, the PRI was able to prevent the massive defection of its factions by providing them the highest expected utility –in absolute and relative terms– of Mexico's political regime. To a great extent, this was possible thanks to the PRI's control over the largest –and, for a long time, unparalleled– clientelistic machine in the country. This, in turn, allowed the ruling party to virtually monopolize the access to all elected offices and any public jobs, to diverge public resources to finance the activities of the party and to allocate preferential contracts to its members (Greene, 2008; Magaloni, 2006). The PRI's dominant position was reinforced by the repression of those factions that decided to defect and challenge the party either militarily (e.g., the revolt led by Aarón Sáenz in 1929) or electorally (e.g., the defections of Almazán in 1940, Padilla in 1946 and Henríquez in 1952),[44] as well as by the successive electoral reforms of the 1940s and 1950s.[45] In addition, for many years these factors were complemented by the good performance of the economy and the fiscal resources derived

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[43]These elements might include different types of political reforms, as well as exogenous factors. For instance, if the mechanisms and resources used by a dominant party to maintain the unity of its factions relies on the economic, military or political support provided by a foreign regime or institution (e.g., the commmunist regimes in East and Central Europe), or even the exports of a particular commodity, the structure of incentives of the member of these parties –and, consequently, the cohesion of the elite– might be upset by an exogenous event that suddenly interrupts the flow of the crucial resources that the regime requires.

[44]Before each of the three Mexican presidential elections of 1940, 1946 and 1952, the factions headed by these PRI high-ranked members defected the party and created their own after their respective leaders were not nominated as presidential candidates. See Molinar (1991).

[45]These reforms were designed to centralize the control of all federal elections on the federal government, forbid independent candidacies, and make increasingly difficult to create new parties (Molinar, 1991).

from the expansion of the national oil industry in the early 1970s.[46]

The situation started to turn substantially more complicated for the PRI at the beginning of the 1980s. While the repeated economic crises and the progressive liberalization of the economy decreased the benefits that the dominant party could provide to its factions, these same factors raised the level of dissatisfaction that many sectors of the population had with different aspects of the PRI's long-lived regime (González and Lomelín, 2000; Greene, 2008; Loaeza, 1999; Magaloni, 2006; Teichman, 1995). In addition, the five electoral reforms implemented between 1977 and 1994 reduced the regime's capacity to commit fraud, increased the proportionality of the political system, incorporated historically marginalized political organizations and improved the electoral commission's autonomy.[47]

As a result of these and other factors,[48] the official party started to experience increasing levels of tensions and conflicts among its ranks about the distribution of these scarce resources. What is remarkable, though, is that even in the midst of this difficult and unprecedented situation, by the mid-1990s the PRI was still able to prevail as the safer bet for most of its factions and, consequently, to prevent their defection *en masse.* The losers of an internal nomination process or any other decisions that involved the allocation of increasingly scarce resources might have been, of course, discontent. Many of them might have even threaten to leave the ruling party. But for the large majority of the mid- and high-ranked faction leaders it still was a better strategy to remain in the PRI

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[46]This positive and sustained economic performance also brought negative consequences for the PRI. As several authors have argued (e.g., Magaloni, 2006; Molinar and Weldon, 1990), the ruling party faced an earlier electoral decline in the most developed and urbanized regions of the country because the opposition had more economic, material and human resources to compete against the incumbent party in these territories More important, however, was that the extension and effectiveness of the PRI's clientelistic structure was significantly smaller in them (Magaloni, 2006: 70).

[47]For a detailed description of these reforms see Becerra et al. (2000), Castellanos (1998) and Molinar and Weldon (2001).

[48]There were at least two other important sources of frictions within the PRI between 1988 and 1994. One is the political concessions made by the federal government to opposition parties (known as *concertacesiones*) in order to solve different post-electoral conflicts. These concessions include, among other things, forcing PRI candidates that had just been elected governors or mayors to either not to take office or to resign shortly thereafter (Eisenstadt, 2004). The second is the creation of the *Programa Nacional de Solidaridad* (PRONASOL) in December 1988, which was perceived by many Priístas as a threat to the party because it implied building a parallel territorial structure through which the federal government could articulate its social policy and mobilize political support (i.e., create a new clientelistic machine) without the participation of the traditional sectors or the PRI (González and Lomelín 2000: 608, 651; Teichman 1995: 176-83).

rather than try to compete under an opposition party label.[49]

This is explained by at least three factors. First, while it is unquestionable that the successive economic crises progressively reduced the amount of resources (and expected utility) that the PRI could provide to its clientelistic machine, these shocks also decreased the level of resources that opposition parties could obtain from private donors (a very important source of resources until the mid-1990s). As a result, even after absorbing the negative consequences of this period of economic instability the PRI was still able to provide its factions an expected utility that although lower than before in *absolute* terms, it was still *relatively* larger than what other political parties could offer them. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that not all the mechanisms used by the PRI to influence the expected utility that political parties provided depended on the situation of the economy (see subsection 3.1). Second, while the bad economic performance reduced the *benefits* that both the PRI and the opposition parties could offer, the long-lasting ruling party was still able to maintain a tight control over some of the most important mechanisms that affected the *probability* (e.g., an unparalleled clientelistic machine) and *costs* (e.g., access to the media, repression) that determined the expected utility offered by any political organization to the factions.

Third, the gradual liberalization of the political regime that started in the late 1970s seems to have been carefully designed to maintain the relative advantage of the expected utility that the PRI could provide to its factions vis-à-vis other parties.[50] Hence, even when the political reforms adopted before 1996 improved several aspects of Mexico's electoral system (see above), by the mid-1990s the electoral market was still markedly uneven in favor of the PRI.[51] To illustrate the magnitude of this unbalance, the PRI spent

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[49]For an illustrative description of the conflicts and defection threats generated by the nomination of the PRI's senatorial candidates in 1994, see Chávez (May 14, 1994).

[50]This strategy is not exclusive of the PRI. According to Geddes, "Hegemonic parties [. . .] often attempt to distract opponents from their economic grievances by granting them modest political rights. Because their dominant strategy is to coopt potential opposition, single-party regimes tend to respond to crisis by granting modest increases in political participation, increasing opposition representation in the legislature, and responding to some opposition demands." (Geddes, 2004: 11).

[51]From a similar perspective, Brinegar, Morgenstern and Nielson argue that the reforms enacted before 1996 "had reduced electoral fraud and increased representation for the opposition, but they allowed the PRI to safely remain in power because of its grip on the media [and] its massively disproportionate share of campaign expenditures" (2006: 77).

between 70% and 80% of the total campaign resources used by *all* parties in the presidential, senatorial and federal deputy races of 1994, respectively (Becerra et al., 2000: 371-372).[52] Additionally, even by 1996 the public funds legally allocated to the PRI at the federal level were larger than the amount of public resources given to the two largest opposition parties combined (45% vs. 41.2%). This enormous resource advantage allowed the PRI to minimize the likelihood of a *massive* defection of factions and to keep control over most of the branches of its clientelistic machine.

The PRI was not completely immune to internal splits during this period, but most of the defections that took place between the early 1980s and 1995 were sporadic, geographically disperse and only involved lower order factions (i.e., at the municipal or below). One important exception is the defection led by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, whom along other members of the so-called *Corriente Democrática* (CD) were expelled or quit the PRI by the end of 1987. Despite its profound historical relevance, this split was not motivated by a generalized change in the structure of incentives of most PRI faction leaders, as would happen after the reform of 1996, but by circumstances that only affected the interests of the CD's leaders.[53] Consequently, at the beginning the CD's defection only implied the migration of a relative small number of mid- and high-ranked factions from a limited number of states.[54] And while Cárdenas was

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[52]As was mentioned before, these figures are likely to be an underestimation because they do not include the public resources that could still be illegally diverted to favor the official party.

[53]These circumstances included the harrasment and ostracism that Cárdenas' faction suffered in Michoacán after he finished his period as governor of the state in 1986 (Anaya, 2008), Cárdenas' failure to obtain the PRI's presidential nomination for the 1988 election, ideoligical differences with the *technocrats*, as well as the CD members' fear of being completely marginalized within the party by the leadership (Bruhn, 1997; Garrido, 1993; Langston, 2006; Teichman, 1995). The hypothesis that the CD's exit was motivated by factors that only affected the interests of the leaders of a *small* number of PRI factions is supported by two other facts. First, many of the Priístas that first formed part of the CD (e.g., Rodolfo González Guevara, Carlos Tello, Gonzálo Martínez Corbala and Silvia Hernández) stepped aside from it –and stayed in the PRI– when it became evident that this faction would inevitably have a costly confront with the party leaders (Suárez, 2003: 119-127). Second, as Molinar and Weldon pointed out (1990: 243), the political context that prevailed immediately after the 1988 presidential elections offered an excellent opportunity to extend the PRI's fracture initiated at the end of 1987. At that time the Chamber of Deputies, also elected in 1988, was responsible for qualifying the validity of that year's controversial presidential election. For the first time in its history the PRI won less than 60% of the seats (260 out of 500) of the Lower House. This situation increased the chances for the creation of an opposition coalition that could deny the victory to Carlos Salinas with the support of some PRI defectors. However, despite the calls of the *Frente Democrático Nacional* (FDN) leaders –the coalition of parties that supported Cárdenas' presidential candidacy– to the "patriot Priístas" to leave the PRI and join the FDN, all the 260 PRI deputies ratified Salinas triumph.

[54]According to Luis Javier Garrido, an scholars that has studied this fracture with detail, "The dissidents

able to obtain the formal or informal support of some mid- and high-ranked PRI faction leaders during the campaign (e.g., part of PEMEX's workers union), the PRI did not suffered a massive defection of these types of factions during this period.[55]

Equally important, many of the factional splits that the PRI experienced during this period were not permanent.[56] While several of the faction leaders that had informally supported Cárdenas realigned with the PRI after the election,[57] others were imprisoned and their factions were either disarticulated or brought back under the PRI's control.[58] In addition, one of Salinas' priorities since he took power was to modernize and reconstruct the PRI's clientelistic machine with programs like PRONASOL (see footnote 48). These factors explain in part the PRI's significant electoral recovery in the federal deputy elections of 1991 (it won 58.7% of the votes, 10% more than in 1988) and the drastic decline of Cárdena's coalition (from 28.2 % obtained by the FDN in 1988 to 8.3% the PRD got in 1991).[59]

The 1996 electoral reform drastically transformed the situation just described by significantly leveling the conditions of electoral competition at the federal and state level through at least five crucial institutional transformations.[60] First, this reform established a new formula to distribute the public resources and the media spots given by the state to political parties, allocating 30% of the total in equal shares to all parties, and the remaining 70% in a proportional way according to the results obtained by each party in

[i.e., Cárdenas' group] did not take with them corporate groups [from the PRI] nor important sectors of the ruling bureaucracy" (1993: 179, also see 183). Varela (1993: 219) suggests something similar.

[55]Bruhn (1997) and Varela (1993) propose that Cárdenas' high electoral support in 1988 is explained by his ability to capitalize the social discontent with the bad economic situation that prevailed since 1982, his capacity to attract the support of social organizations that had traditionally not participated in electoral politics, as well as the coordination of most left-wing parties behind his candidacy.

[56]I thank Joy Lanston for helping me realize this point.

[57]For example, Salvador Miranda Polanco and Hugo Cárdenas Avendaño defected the PRI in 1988 in order to become federal deputy and mayor candidates for the FDN. A few months later, once it became clear that Salinas would be the next president, both quitted the FDN and returned to the PRI (Reyes September 2, 1988; Betancourt November 14, 1988.)

[58]One example of this is the case of Joaquín Hernández Galicia, *La Quina*, then leader of PEMEX's workers union. After several confrontations with Salinas before and during the campaign, *La Quina* instructed a large part of the members of PEMEX's union to vote in favor of Cárdenas in the 1988 presidential race. In response, a few months after taking power, Salinas' government imprisoned *La Quina*, appointed a new and loyal union leader and started a drastic reduction of the number of PEMEX workers (Roxborough 1998: 283; Murillo 2001: 283; Teichman 1995: 175). This union remains as a close ally of the PRI until today.

[59]The left's electoral decline is also explained by the disintegration of the FDN after the 1988 election.

[60]This reform included other significant modifications but I only focus on these five due to space constraints.

the previous federal deputy election.[61] This new disposition had important and immediate consequences. While in the 1994 presidential election the PRI received 3.4 and 4.8 times more public resources than the PAN and the PRD, respectively, by 1997 this discrepancy had reduced to 1.6 and 2.3. By the 2000 presidential election the PAN and the PRI received the same amount of public resources (around 30% of the total), and the PRD –along with its allies– was the frontrunner of this category with 34% of the total (Becerra et al., 2000: 47).

Second, the 1996 electoral reform gave an unprecedented dominant role to public financing in all electoral campaigns. It established that the share of public resources used by political parties to finance their campaigns should always be larger than the share of private resources. In addition, the reform increased by 640% the amount of public resources allocated to political parties in 1997 if compared to the 1994 figures (Becerra et al., 2000: 46, 426).[62] Therefore, the 1996 reform significantly increased both the total amount of public resources legally allocated to electoral campaigns, as well as the share of resources received by each opposition party, creating much fairer conditions of electoral competition. Third, the reform significantly improved the electoral judicial system. It created the federal electoral court, the *Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación* (TEPJF), as the highest tribunal in electoral matters, enlarged its powers[63] and incorporated this institution into the judiciary branch. In addition, the reform established that all the decisions adopted by the states' electoral courts could be revised and reverted, if necessary, by the TEPJF.

Fourth, one of the most relevant but least noticed aspects of this electoral reform is

[61]Before the reform only 10% of the public funds legally allocated to political parties were distributed in equal terms. There was no regulation about media spots.

[62]One of the mechanisms that allowed Mexico's president to keep a close control over the PRI was that most of the resources received by the party depended on the discretionary power of the executive. The 1996 reform ended this by institutionalizing and making transparent the source of the resources received by the PRI. According to Oscar Levín Coppel, one of the crucial reasons why the PRI agreed to support the 1996 electoral reform was precisely the fact that party would gain financial independence from the president, and that this would be defined through transparent and legal mechanisms (Albarrán, November 17, 1996). For a detailed analysis of why Zedillo proposed the 1996 reform and why the PRI approved it see Garrido de Sierra (2012).

[63]For example, for the first time since 1917 it would be the Electoral Court, not the Chamber of Deputies, who would sanction the validity and the result of presidential elections.

the modification of section IV of article 116 of Mexico's Federal Constitution in order to require *all* 32 states to modify their constitutions and local electoral laws to replicate the federal electoral system.[64] This implied, among other things, that all states should have an autonomous electoral commissions with certain minimum characteristics, create detailed legal procedures for allowing political parties to challenge the electoral results, and particularly relevant, replicate the scheme used at the federal level to distribute public resources and media spots among political parties (Becerra et al., 2000: 452-453).[65] As a result, the 1996 electoral reform also leveled the conditions of electoral competition at the state level and improved the fairness of the electoral system in local elections.

Fifth, the 1996 electoral reform also generated a profound transformation of Mexico City's political system, establishing the popular election of the city's mayor and the head of each of the city's 16 sub-territorial units (*delegaciones*, in Spanish) for the first time in more than 70 years.[66] This reform carried significant negative consequences for the PRI's unity, in part because the PRD has governed Mexico City since 1997, but especially because by losing control of the capital's government the PRI lost a highly valuable source of economic, human and material resources, as well as a crucial mechanism to maintain the party's unity: the allocation of Mexico City's administration positions, contracts and resources to compensate those Priístas that might be discontent after losing an internal nomination process or a political dispute in other parts of the country.

In sum, by significantly leveling the conditions of electoral competition at the federal and state level, the 1996 reform drastically reduced the expected utility that the PRI could provide to its factions, and simultaneously increased the benefits that the opposition parties could offer to them, as well as the probability that they would be

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[64]Given the numerous conflicts that characterized the state elections of the first half of the 1990s (Eisenstadt, 2004), this was one of the central goals for the opposition parties since the negotiations of this reform started (Becerra et al., 2000: 391).

[65]While some states started to improve the autonomy of their electoral commissions before the 1996 reform (Aparicio and Ley, 2008), most of them had not considered the other issues that this reform forced them to incorporate in their local laws.

[66]In 1928 president Alvaro Obregón replaced Mexico City's municipality system by a regency system, whose head (i.e., the *regente*) was directly appointed by –and politically responsible to– the president. The regent, in turn, appointed all the officials of the local administration (Ziccardi, 1996: 100). Mexico City's mayor was elected again for the first time in 1997 and the heads of the 16 territorial sub-units in 2000.

provided. Hence, this reform transformed the structure incentives of many PRI faction leaders at the federal and state level by opening up the possibility of continuing their political careers in a different party with reasonably high probabilities of winning in case they did not receive the policies, nominations, resources or jobs they requested from the dominant party. This, in turn, drastically reduced the PRI's capacity to prevent massive splits.

The effects of this substantive change were felt immediately. As I describe in section 4, the defections of high-ranked Priístas and the factions under their control expanded to different states across Mexico in a short period. In most cases the splits were triggered by gubernatorial, mayoral and legislative elections because the succession of power –there is no reelection for any elected office in Mexico– forced many PRI faction leaders who were not nominated as candidates –or who knew they had little chance of being nominated– to decide whether they preferred to stay in the party or try their luck as candidates for an opposition force.

These fractures alone represented a significant blow to the PRI's electoral performance. While the PRI started to lose experienced cadres along with its huge advantage to mobilize voters, opposition parties gained professional politicians and enhanced their organizational and clientelistic machines. The consequences were significantly more serious, however, if an opposition party was able to win the gubernatorial election. By controlling the state government the opposition gained the power to cut off one of the principal sources of resources used by the PRI to sustain its local clientelistic structures, as well as the possibility of using these same resources to create their own clientelistic machines and to even co-opt groups that were former PRI members. In a short period of time the negative consequences of the massive defections triggered by the 1996 reform accumulated and eventually affected the electoral performance of the PRI at the national level. The culmination of this process was the historical defeat of this party in the 2000 presidential election.

I conclude this section addressing a potential concern about the endogeneity of my argument. It could be argued that if the electoral reform was presented and ratified by

those Priístas who wanted to leave the party in the first place, then the direction of the causal mechanism I presented above is actually the opposite. Several pieces of evidence indicate that this was not the case. First, the reform was proposed by president Zedillo as an effort to reduce the political instability generated by the recurrent post-electoral conflicts that characterized Mexico's local elections between 1988 and 1994, not to satisfy the demands of particular PRI factions (Zedillo's Chief of Staff, 2011: interview). Also, the most important parts of the reform (e.g., the modifications to the electoral law) were negotiated by the parties and the government at the Secretary of Interior, drastically reducing the capacity of PRI's legislators to shape the bill in their advantage.[67]

In the few but significant occasions in which the PRI's legislative groups modified the agreements reached at the Secretary of Interior (e.g., the level of public funds given to parties), the changes always favored the dominant party and were previously authorized by the government (Under-Secretary of Interior, 2011: interview). Furthermore, none of the high-ranked government officials or PRI leaders directly involved in the negotiation of the reform –and who could have tailored it to build their exit into an opposition party– defected the PRI during the eight years after its approval.[68] And many of the politicians that defected the PRI after 1996 did so only after first trying and failing to obtain a candidacy from this party or a position within a PRI government.

4   Statistical analysis

This section presents an empirical test of one of the central parts of the argument presented in this paper: the idea that the 1996 electoral reform drastically eroded the unity of the PRI's factions. I start by explaining how I operationalized the PRI's unity and the way the defections from the PRI increased from 1987 to 2006. Then, using different rare event logit models I test the relative power of i) the 1996 electoral reform, ii)

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[67]For example, the final list of nominees for the General Council of the IFE was negotitated at the office of Secretary of Interior and sent to all legislative groups in the Chamber of Deputies –including the PRI– ten minutes before the deadline (Pérez et al., October 31, 1996). See also Irízar (November 3, 1996) and (November 5, 1996).

[68]The list includes, among others, Esteban Moctezuma, Emilio Chuayffet, Arturo Núñez, María de los Angeles Moreno, Santigo Oñate, Fernando Ortiz Arana and Humberto Roque Villanueva.

the PRI's electoral support in previous elections and iii) Mexico's economic performance to explain the erosion of this party's unity.

My dependent variable is the unity of the PRI's factions. I operationalize it through a dummy variable called *PRI's Defection.* For each of the 112 gubernatorial elections held between 1987 and 2006 I coded whether one or more Priístas described by newspapers, articles or books[69] as potential contenders for the nomination for governor (in what follows I will refer to them as "PRI's contenders" for simplicity) decided to leave the PRI shortly before, during or soon after the gubernatorial candidate's selection process took place, as a response to either the procedure used or the final result of the process.[70] If one or more contenders did leave the PRI, the dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 and 0 otherwise.

Two reasons motivated this operationalization of the PRI's unity. First, until the late 1990s most PRI governor candidates were selected through two highly discretional and authoritarian mechanisms called "electoral conventions" and "candidacies of unity" (Langston and Díaz-Cayeros, 2003).[71] As a consequence, most of the Priístas that might have been interested in competing for the nomination were not allowed to formally register to participate, if there was a registration process at all. Due to the lack of a reliable official list of gubernatorial contenders for each case, I constructed it by including the names of all the Priístas mentioned by the press, articles and books as potential competitors in each state.[72] Second, given that all PRI members were aware of the unfair nature of the process

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[69]The sources used to construct this database are available upon request.

[70]The rule followed was to code as "defectors" only those contenders that left the party after publicly complaining about the "undemocratic" mechanism chosen to select the governor candidate (a common argument between those contender that left the PRI before the nomination process started) or the result of the nomination process. As it is explained with greater detail in the coding rules, available upon request, there are three exceptions to this. In Tabasco in 1988, Oaxaca in 1992 and Chiapas in 1994 a Priísta quit the party to become opposition governor candidate without making a public statement (in Tabasco's case the defector was Andres Manuel López Obrador). However, these cases were coded as "defections" because given the relatively high rank of the Priístas involved, they illustrate a fracture within the PRI's unity. In any case, this coding decision generates a bias against my argument because it increases the number of defections of PRI contenders *before* the 1996 reform.

[71]"Candidates of unity" was the name given to the candidates that, in theory, were supported by the four sectors of the party in each state branch. In practice, the nomination of most of these candidates was the result of the negotiations between the PRI's national leaders, and an imposition of the national executive committee on each state. This was the most common mechanism used to select gubernatorial candidates in the PRI until 1997, when the party started to use open primaries (Langston and Díaz-Cayeros, 2003).

[72]In most occasions the contenders themselves made public their interest to compete for the PRI's gubernatorial candidacy. However, in some cases the names of one or more Priísta were mentioned by a newspaper editorial, article or book as potential contenders, even when these politicians might not have

used by the party to select its gubernatorial candidates, it is plausible to assume that many potential contenders might have decided to leave the PRI even before the selection process formally started because they were aware of their low chances of success. For this reason, this variable includes the defections that occurred *before* the gubernatorial candidate's selection started, as long as they were a response to either the procedure used or the final result of the process.

This operationalizaton of the PRI's unity has a significant advantage. It measures the frequency of defections across time of mid- and high-ranked Priístas (those located in quadrants I and II in Figure 4, which in Knight's terms would be considered state or regional *caciques*) exposed to a political situation (i.e., the gubernatorial nomination) in which they are forced to evaluate their alternatives, and these alternatives are greatly influenced by the existing institutional constraints. Thus, *PRI's Defection* offers a good estimate of how changes in the institutional framework affected the strategic decisions of the PRI's leadership over time. However, the reader should keep in mind that this variable only captures the defections related to executive successions at the state level, leaving aside the defections that might have been motivated by other political processes (including presidential, legislative and municipal's nominations).

The statistical analysis of the PRI's unity presented in this paper covers the 112 gubernatorial elections held in the 32 Mexican states –3.5 elections per state, on average– between 1987 and 2006. In 33.1% of these elections (37 out of 112) one or more of the PRI's contenders left the party shortly before, during or after the PRI's governor candidate's selection process took place.[73] If we analyze the percentage of defections

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publicly declared their intention to compete for this candidacy. The universe of PRI contenders in each election includes the names of both types of politicians. This decision could imply at least two types of bias. First, the universe of contenders might include names of Priístas that were not actually interested in being nominated as governor candidates. This could artificially increase the universe of contenders, but it is unlikely that this would bias the measurement of the PRI's unity because I am only considering as defections those cases in which a contender quit the PRI as a response to the gubernatorial's candidate selection process (see footnote 70). This, in turn, significantly limits the universe of defectors to those that were actually interested in the governor nomination. In addition, it is also possible that one of the actual contenders was not mentioned in the newspapers and, therefore, was not included in the database. If this is the case, and this Priísta happened to leave the PRI as a response to the gubernatorial candidate selection process, the measurement of the PRI's unity would be biased. However, this is also an improbable case because the defection of Priístas was –and still is– attractive material for the media, and therefore it is likely that it would have been reported in any of the sources consulted.

[73]In 78.4% of the occasions when the PRI suffered a defection only one contender left the party (29 out

before and after the electoral reform of 1996, we observe that while from 1987 to 1995 (there were no governor elections in 1996) the share of states in which one or more PRI contenders left the party was 12.8% (6 out of 47 elections),[74] this percentage increased to 47.7% (31 out of 65 elections) in the period 1997-2006. A reasonable concern could be that the significant jump in the percentage of defections in this second period is driven by the PRI's historic defeat in the 2000 presidential election, rather than the 1996 electoral reform. However, the share of gubernatorial elections in which one or more PRI contenders left the party between 1997 and 2000 is almost equally high: 43.3% (13 out of 30 elections). An alternative way to dimension these figures is to consider the fact that 83.8% (31 out of 37) of the state elections in which one or more PRI contenders left the party between 1987 and 2006 took place after 1996. And if we limit the analysis only to the period 1987-2000, 68.4% (13 out of 19) of the splits occurred between 1996 and 2000.

Figure 5 offers a picture of the evolution of the PRI's defections over time. While the height of each bar represents the total number of gubernatorial elections held each year, the black area illustrates in how many of these elections one or more PRI contenders left the party and the grey area describes the number of elections in which not contender split. Consistent with the results previously described, this figure shows that the PRI experienced a significant increase of defections after 1996. Before the electoral reform the PRI never suffered a defection in more than two states in a single year, and in three years (1987, 1989 and 1995) the party suffered no defections at all. However, from 1997 on the PRI experienced a defection in at least two of the states that held elections every year, and in five of the nine years between 1997 and 2006 the PRI suffered a defection in four or more of the states that had a governor election.

It is also relevant to highlight that the PRI only suffered one defection between 1987 and 1989, period in which Cárdenas' faction left the PRI and created the PRD.

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of 37). In 16.2% of the cases two contenders left the dominant party and in the remaining 5.4% of the cases three contenders split.

[74]If the defections in Tabasco in 1988, Oaxaca in 1992 and Chiapas in 1994 are dropped from the analysis (see footnote 70), the percentage of states in which one or more PRI contenders left the party between 1987 and 1995 decreases to 6.8% (3 out of 44 elections). This would also reduce the defection frequencies before 1996 shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Defections of PRI's Gubernatorial Contenders, 1987-2006

Similarly, the PRI only suffered one defection between 1994 and 1995, a period marked by successive political and economic crises (e.g., the emergence of the EZLN; the murder of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI's presidential candidate; the Peso Crisis).

In geographic terms, the 37 elections in which one or more PRI gubernatorial contenders left the party took place in 25 out of the 32 Mexican states,[75] and 10 of these 25 states experienced defections in two or more gubernatorial elections.[76] While the six defections registered between 1987 and 1995 concentrated in an equal number of states, this phenomenon spread across the country after the 1996 electoral reform: 13 states experienced this type of defections between 1996 and 2000, and this figure jumps to 24 during the period 1996-2006. Hence, the number of states in which one or more high-ranked Priístas defected the party as a response to the nomination process of the gubernatorial candidate was twice higher in the period 1996-2000 than in 1987-1995, and

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[75]The seven states in which the PRI did not suffer a split as a result of the gubernatorial nomination process are Chihuahua, Coahuila, Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Puebla and Yucatán.

[76]These states are Baja Californa Sur (1993, 1999), Campeche (1991, 1997), Colima (1997, 2003), Chiapas (1994, 2000, 2003), Guerrero (1999, 2005), Quintana Roo (1999, 2005), San Luis Potosí (1991, 2003), Tabasco (2000, 2006), Tamaulipas (1998, 2004) and Tlaxcala (1998, 2004).

five times higher if we consider the period 1996-2006.

The evidence presented so far indicates that the number of gubernatorial elections in which one or more PRI members defected the party substantially increased after the 1996 electoral reform. However, it still needs to be demonstrated that this sudden rise in defections was produced by this political reform, rather than being the result of the strategic response adopted by many Priístas after realizing that the electoral performance of their party had decreased in the previous elections (Greene 2008; Langston and Díaz-Cayeros 2003; Magaloni 2006), and/or that the declining economic performance would negatively affect the vote for the PRI.

In order to test the explanatory power of each of these three possibilities, I use different logit models with *PRI's Defection* as the dependent variable. In particular, I use the "rare events logit" estimator proposed by King and Zeng (2001) in order to correct for the potential bias that the relative small sample used could have on the coefficients.[77] Tables 1 and 2 present the same six model specifications. The difference is that while the models included in Table 1 consider all the state year observations available, the models in Table 2 were calculated using only the state year observations up to 2000. Thus, the models included in this last table allow us to test the effect of the 1996 electoral reform before the PRI lost the presidency.

I operationalize the main explanatory variable, the 1996 electoral reform, in three ways. First, I use a variable called *PRI's Share Public Funds*, which measures the share of total public resources legally allocated by IFE, Mexicos electoral commission, to the PRI every year between 1991 and 2006.[78] Second, *PRI's Margin Public Funds* measures the difference between the percentage of public funds received by the PRI and the second party with more public funds (always the PAN) between 1991 and 2006.[79] Finally, I use *1996 electoral reform*, a dummy variable that assigns a 1 to all the observations that

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[77]The results are similar if the normal logit estimator is used. These models are available upon request.
[78]The data is only available from 1991 on because IFE was created in 1990.
[79]Neither *PRI's Share Public Funds* nor *PRI's Margin Public Funds* are lagged one year because, first, the formula used to assign these resources was known by all party members before the beginning of each year, and, second, the electoral commission allocated these resources during the first two weeks of January of the corresponding year.

occurred after 1996 and 0 otherwise. Thus, while the first two operationalizations measure in a different way one of the key elements modified by the 1996 reform (i.e., the allocation of public resources among political parties),[80] the third option aims to capture other important components of the reform that are not considered by the previous alternatives.

Economic Growth measures the yearly change of Mexico's Gross Domestic Product per capita in constant prices. This variable is lagged one year to reduce problems of endogeneity or reverse causation.[81] *PRI's Previous Electoral Results* is measured using the share of votes obtained by this party in each state in the federal deputy election(s) held immediately before the corresponding gubernatorial election.[82] *Marginalization* is included as a control variable for the level of socioeconomic development in each state. This variable is measured using the Marginalization index constructed by Mexico's National Population Council (CONAPO) every five years. This index measures the intensity of the socioeconomic deprivation in each state combining nine variables related with four structural dimensions: education, housing, monetary earnings and distribution of the population. The values of this index go from -3 to 3, where higher values indicate greater poverty in the state.[83]

Given that in some states the PRI suffered defections in two or more consecutive gubernatorial elections, and previous defections might increase the chances of future defections, I also include a lagged version of *PRI's Defection* (i.e., the dependent variable)

[80]While the PRI received 49.4% of public funds legally allocated in 1994, by 1997 –only a few months after the 1996 reform was approved– this figure was 42.3% and in 2000 it was 30%. Similarly, while the PRI's margin of public funds was 35% in 1994, it dropped to 17.3% in 1997 and by 2000 it was 7.5% (-3.9% if we consider the funds of the PVEM, the PAN's ally in that election).

[81]The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 remain the same if *Economic Growth* is not lagged, if it is lagged two or three years, or if instead of the yearly change we consider a four, five or six moving average change in GDP per capita. All these additional results are available upon request.

[82]The results do not change if the PRI's *margin* of votes –instead of the *share*– is used to measure this party's previous electoral results (see the Appendix). Furthermore, I also analyzed the effect of the PRI's previous electoral results using the share and margin of votes won by this party in the senatorial, presidential, gubernatorial and state deputy elections held before the corresponding governor election. The coefficients of these alternative measurements have the same sign but smaller magnitude than the ones obtained using the federal deputy data. These results are available upon request.

[83]As a robustness check, in the Appendix I show the results using the *Log Imputed Gross State Product per Capita*. The results remain the same. I did not use this variable as the main measurement of each state's socioeconomic level because Mexico's Census Bureau (INEGI) only publishes data for this variable for the period 1993-2006. Thus, I had to replace the missing observations (i.e.,1987-1992) with imputed values generated using `Amelia` (Honaker et al., 2010), after averaging the values obtained in ten imputations. The diagnostic plots of this imputation are available upon request.

to control for this potential temporal correlation. Finally, in order to control for region-specific factors (i.e., history, culture) that might affect the likelihood of a defection from the PRI but cannot be directly measured, in Models 2, 4 and 6 of each table I use a dummy variable for each region[84] as quasi-fixed effects estimator.[85]

The results in both tables consistently show that the three alternative measurements of the 1996 electoral reform have a substantive effect and are statistically significant at 5% or better. The negative sign of *PRI's Share Public Funds* and *PRI's Margin Public Funds* indicates that the probability that a contender defects the PRI increases as the share and margin of public resources allocated to this party decreases. Likewise, the positive sign of *1996 Electoral Reform* suggests that the likelihood that a contender splits from the PRI increases after the reform is approved.

Using the results of Models 1 and 5 in Table 2, Figure 6 shows the predicted probability of a PRI contender defecting the party for different levels of *PRI's Share Public Funds* (left panel), as well as before and after the *1996 Electoral Reform* was approved (right panel).[86] In the case of Model 1, the predicted probability that a contender defected the PRI in 1996, when the party was allocated 45% of all legal public

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[84]The regions used are as follows. North: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nayarit, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas; Center: Distrito Federal, Hidalgo, México, Morelos, Puebla, Tlaxcala; Bajo: Aguascalientes, Colima, Querétaro, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán; South: Chiapas, Campeche, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatán.

[85]State fixed-effects estimators cannot be used to analyze this data because some states did not suffer a defection. As a result, the state-dummy and *PRI's Defection* would covary a 100%.

[86]The rest of the variables were hold at their mean value to make these calculations.

Table 1: Rare Events Logit Models, Including Observations Up to 2006

Dependent Variable: PRI's Defection

	Model 1 (91-06)	Model 2 (91-06)	Model 3 (91-06)	Model 4 (91-06)	Model 5 (87-06)	Model 6 (87-06)
PRI's Share Public Funds	−0.144***	−0.127**				
	(0.051)	(0.051)				
PRI's Margin Public Funds			−0.106***	−0.096***		
			(0.034)	(0.035)		
1996 Electoral Reform					2.619***	2.420***
					(0.828)	(0.809)
Economic Growth (lagged)	0.015	−0.003	0.016	−0.001	0.022	0.012
	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.080)
PRI's Past Electoral Results	4.866	3.328	6.080*	4.739	3.697	2.414
	(3.119)	(3.284)	(3.294)	(3.461)	(2.630)	(2.708)
Marginalization	0.211	0.074	0.203	0.046	0.263	0.088
	(0.232)	(0.293)	(0.234)	(0.298)	(0.229)	(0.286)
Lagged PRI's Defection	−0.087	−0.300	−0.140	−0.341	−0.036	−0.285
	(0.556)	(0.563)	(0.564)	(0.572)	(0.553)	(0.568)
Constant	2.317**	3.068**	−2.208	−1.027	−4.353**	−2.864
	(1.135)	(1.299)	(1.393)	(1.617)	(1.866)	(1.995)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	100	100	100	100	112	112
Log likelihood	−58.220	−57.055	−56.904	−55.848	−60.118	−58.492
AIC	128.440	132.110	125.809	129.697	132.236	134.984

Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 2: Rare Events Logit Models, Including Observations Up to 2000

Dependent Variable: PRI's Defection

	Model 1 (91-00)	Model 2 (91-00)	Model 3 (91-00)	Model 4 (91-00)	Model 5 (87-00)	Model 6 (87-00)
PRI's Share Public Funds	−0.174**	−0.152**				
	(0.076)	(0.075)				
PRI's Margin Public Funds			−0.168**	−0.151**		
			(0.065)	(0.063)		
1996 Electoral Reform					3.129***	2.752**
					(1.175)	(1.122)
Economic Growth (lagged)	0.129	0.131	−0.072	−0.046	0.161	0.179
	(0.230)	(0.242)	(0.257)	(0.265)	(0.148)	(0.162)
PRI's Past Electoral Results	9.299**	7.364	12.679**	10.654*	9.792**	7.719
	(4.643)	(4.819)	(5.505)	(5.555)	(4.736)	(4.708)
Marginalization	0.182	0.016	0.139	−0.007	0.181	−0.101
	(0.310)	(0.381)	(0.316)	(0.390)	(0.301)	(0.382)
Lagged PRI's Defection	0.432	0.106	0.212	−0.111	0.281	−0.083
	(0.936)	(0.921)	(0.964)	(0.956)	(0.976)	(0.997)
Constant	0.498	1.439	−4.411*	−3.024	−8.711**	−6.368*
	(2.403)	(2.585)	(2.458)	(2.692)	(3.482)	(3.507)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	65	65	65	65	77	77
Log likelihood	−32.275	−30.569	−30.627	−29.041	−32.859	−30.381
AIC	76.550	79.139	73.254	76.082	77.717	78.762

Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Figure 6: Effect of the 1996 Electoral Reform on the Probability
of a PRI Contender Leaving the Party

resources, was 13.7%. In 1997, one year after the reform had been approved, the PRI got 42.3% of the public resources and the probability that a contender defected the party increased to 22.3%. By 1999 the PRI received 32% of the public resources and the probability of a contender's defection raised to 67%. Put it differently, while the probability that a PRI contender defected the party increased by 62.7% from 1996 to 1997, this probability was almost 400% times higher in 1999 than in 1996.[87] The effect of the reform is equally substantive if we analyze it through *1996 Electoral Reform.* According to Model 5, the probability of defection of a PRI contender increased almost thirteen times (from 5% to 62%) after the reform was approved.

A second relevant result is that *PRI's Previous Electoral Results* has a positive sign in all the models. This indicates that the PRI was more likely to experience a defection in the states where it had done *well* in the previous election. This result challenges a common belief about Mexico's transition and one of the central parts of Magaloni's theory (see page 9).[88] Although this variable is not statistical significant in the models that consider

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[87]The magnitud of the effect of *PRI's Margin Public Funds* is similar. While in 1996 the PRI's advantage on public resources was 20.4% and the probability of defection was 25.7%, by 1997 the PRI's resources margin was 17.3% and the likelihood of defection increased to 38.2%. In 1999 the PRI got 7.2% more resources than the second largest party, and the probability of defection rose to 78.1%

[88]As mentioned before, the same result is obtained if instead of federal deputy results the PRI's previous

the observations up to 2006 (Table 1), it gains statistical significance (at 5% or better) in five of the six models that only include the observation before the transition (Table 2).

This counterintuitive finding might be explained by the fact that the PRI's share of votes in the previous election is an indicator of how effective this party's PRI's clientelistic machines is in a specific state, and that many branches of this machine are controlled by one or more of the contenders for the gubernatorial nomination. Therefore, it could be that the more extended and effective is the clientelistic network controlled by a contender who was not nominated as gubernatorial candidate by the PRI, the more likely it is that he will leave the PRI to be the candidate for another party. I plan to test this possible explanation in the future.

Finally, although the repercussions of these defections need to be analyzed with greater detail in a separate study, I conclude this section offering some preliminary evidence on how these splits negatively affected the PRI's electoral performance. If we compare the average change in the PRI's share of votes between the gubernatorial elections of each state from 1987 to 2000,[89] this party lost 96% more votes in the 19 states where a contender defected right before the election than in the 48 states where the PRI remained united (-23.78% vs. -12.13%, respectively).[90] And a similar pattern holds if we only compare the 13 states where the PRI suffered a defection and the 17 states where it did not united during the period 1997-2000 (-23.47% vs. -14.92%, respectively). From a complementary perspective, while none of the five opposition candidates that defeated the PRI in the gubernatorial elections held between 1987 and 1995 were ex-Priístas, 38.5% (5 out of 13) of the opposition candidates that won a governor race during the period 1996-2000 were former members of the PRI, and this figure rises to 42.9% (12 out of 28) if we consider the period 1996-2006.

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electoral results are measured through the share or margin of votes obtained by this party in senatorial, presidential, gubernatorial or state deputy elections. These results are available upon request.

[89]For example, I measured the change PRI's share of votes in the gubernatorial election of Jalisco between 1988 and 1995, as well as between 1995 and 2000. I repeated this operation for all the states that had elections between 1987 and 2000, and then averaged the change.

[90]This difference of means is statistically significant with a two-tailed p-value of 0.002.

5 Conclusion

This paper offers a new explanation of Mexico's democratization. The argument proposed here is that despite the three economic crises and the five electoral reforms that took place between 1977 and 1994, by the mid-1990s the PRI was still able to offer most of its faction leaders an expected utility that although lower than before, was still relatively higher than what they could obtain in other political parties. As a result, the PRI was able to preserve most of its clientelistic structure united and under control. This, in turn, allowed the ruling party to maintain its significant advantage to mobilize voters and to keep outperforming opposition forces in the electoral arena. Although the PRI had suffered several sporadic defections throughout its history, the unity of this party's factions only started to erode in a systematic way after the 1996 electoral reform was approved. This reform made it much more attractive for many PRI mid- and high-ranked faction leaders to continue their political careers in a different party if they did not receive the expected utility they demanded from the dominant party. Using evidence from 112 gubernatorial elections, the statistical results indicate that the 1996 reform increased almost 4 times the probability that a PRI gubernatorial contender would leave the party as a response to either the procedure used to nominate the gubernatorial candidate or the final result of the process, even after controlling for the PRI's previous electoral results, socioeconomic levels and economic performance. The profound change generated by the 1996 reform in the structure of incentives of most PRI faction leaders soon translated into the migration of experienced cadres and the branches of the clientelistic machine (i.e., factions) under their control to other parties.

The theory presented in this paper explicitly emphasizes that one of the central advantages that the PRI was able to maintain until the mid-1990s –one that proved particularly valuable when the electoral competition started to increase in the mid-1980s– was its unparalleled capacity to mobilize voters through its extensive clientelistic networks. It was not until the PRI's clientelistic machine started to weaken as a result of the systematic erosion of the party's unity, that the PAN and the PRD substantially improved

their capacity to mobilize voters, mainly by incorporating former PRI leaders along with their respective factions or local clientelistic political machines. Hence, Mexico's democratization was possible not because the PRI's clientelistic structure disappeared, as some authors have implicitly or explicitly argued, but because it fragmented and parts of it migrated to other parties. This, in turn, gave way to a more competitive clientelistic market in which opposition parties could have their own structure.[91]

Finally, the theory presented in this paper improves our capacity to understand the demise of authoritarian dominant-parties regimes in different ways. The argument proposed above incorporates as one of its core building blocks the idea that dominant-party regimes have a clientelistic nature. This theory provides a new and more realistic explanation for why the factions of a dominant party tend to have strong incentives to remain united, as well as when and why a faction might have incentives to defect (see Garrido de Sierra, 2011).[92] The theory proposes that not all factional defections are caused by the same factors nor threaten the regime's survival in the same way, improving our theoretical leverage to predict which type of splits are actually likely to cause the end of this kind of autocracy. Even more important, this theory it is likely to be suitable to explain the demise of many other dominant-party regimes regardless of the particular mechanisms used by each party to maintain the unity of its factions (e.g., holding/banning multi-candidate and/or multi-party elections, repression). Thus, one of the future goal of this research is to test the leverage of this argument to explain the demise of such diverse cases as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1991), Taiwan's *Kuomintang* (2000) and Kenya African National Union (2002), as well as the survival in power of regimes like the ones lead by UMNO in Malaysia, the *Cham cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) in Tanzania, or the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC).

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[91]My point is not that the persuasion and coordination of voters were irrelevant strategies for the opposition parties, as other authors have emphasized (e.g., Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2008), but that they were insufficient to defeat the PRI.

[92]My theory predicts that the unity of a dominant party's factions might be an equilibrium that holds under very different circumstances. In one case the dominant strategy of all factions is to remain in the party, as Geddes (2004) suggest, because they receive a very high expected utility in absolute and relative terms. In the other cases, a faction might choose to stays in the party despite receiving a low absolute expected utility not because this represent its dominant strategy (i.e., it is the best it can do no matter what the other factions are doing), but because this is the best it can do *given* the other factions' strategies.

Appendix

Table 3: Data Sources

Name	Years	Source	Comments
National GDP per capita	1987-2006	Penn World Table 7.1	I used the variable called "PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices", with codename "rgdpch", as the measurement of real GDP per capita.
State GDP per capita	1993-2006	INEGI	The missing values for 1987-1992 were replaced with imputed values generated using Amelia, after averaging the values obtained in ten imputations.
Exchange rate	1982-83, 1985-86, 1994-95	INEGI	In the three cases I considered the change from January of the first year to December of the second.
Inflation	1982-83, 1985-86, 1994-95	INEGI	
Real minimum wage	1982-88	Magaloni (2006: 109-121)	
Public Debt	1982, 1987	Molinar (1991: 205-210)	
Poverty level	1994-96	Székely (2005: 16)	
Federal deputies results	1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006	For 1985 and 1988 Banamex (2001). For all other years IFE (www.ife.org.mx)	
States governed by the PRI and opposition parties	1987-2006	Banamex (2001) and states electoral commissions	
Share of seats controlled by the PRI in the state legislatures	1985-2000	Lujambio (2000: Annex 1)	
Public founds allocated to political parties	1991-2006	IFE	The data for 1991-1996 was obtained through the information request No. UE-13-692 made to IFE. The data for 1997-2006 was obtained from IFE's website.
Marginalization		CONAPO	Given that the CONAPO only published the *Marginalization* index for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005, for the rest of the years I assigned the values in the following way: 1990 for 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991 and 1992; 1995 for 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1997; 2000 for 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001; 2005 for 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. There were no governor elections in 1990, 1996 and 2002. In principle, this decision does not seem too risky given that, in general, the values of each state's *Marginalization* vary little from one measurement to the following.

Table 4: Rare Events Logit Models Using the Margin of Votes Obtained by the PRI in the Previous Election for Federal Deputies, Including Observations Up to 2006

Dependent Variable: PRI's Defection

	Model 1 (91-06)	Model 2 (91-06)	Model 3 (91-06)	Model 4 (91-06)	Model 5 (87-06)	Model 6 (87-06)
PRI's Share Public Funds	−0.154*** (0.052)	−0.150*** (0.052)				
PRI's Margin Public Funds			−0.112*** (0.034)	−0.111*** (0.035)		
1996 Electoral Reform					2.702*** (0.845)	2.675*** (0.839)
Economic Growth (lagged)	0.003 (0.103)	−0.011 (0.101)	−0.001 (0.104)	−0.016 (0.103)	0.014 (0.080)	0.007 (0.079)
PRI's Past Electoral Results	3.142* (1.744)	2.832 (1.798)	3.778** (1.824)	3.579* (1.892)	2.259 (1.479)	1.959 (1.510)
Marginalization	0.162 (0.240)	0.008 (0.301)	0.152 (0.243)	−0.024 (0.306)	0.237 (0.233)	0.049 (0.290)
Lagged PRI's Defection	−0.094 (0.560)	−0.331 (0.568)	−0.157 (0.569)	−0.398 (0.580)	−0.031 (0.555)	−0.279 (0.566)
Constant	4.489*** (1.655)	5.034*** (1.743)	0.175 (0.479)	0.865 (0.742)	−3.019*** (0.914)	−2.251** (1.036)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	100	101	100	101	112	112
Log likelihood	−57.782	−56.220	−56.427	−54.828	−59.935	−57.980
AIC	127.563	130.441	124.853	127.655	131.870	133.961

Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 5: Rare Events Logit Models Using the Margin of Votes Obtained by the PRI in the Previous Election for Federal Deputies, Including Observations Up to 2000

Dependent Variable: PRI's Defection

	Model 1 (91-06)	Model 2 (91-06)	Model 3 (91-06)	Model 4 (91-06)	Model 5 (87-06)	Model 6 (87-06)
PRI's Share Public Funds	−0.147** (0.071)	−0.138* (0.072)				
PRI's Margin Public Funds			−0.139** (0.059)	−0.136** (0.061)		
1996 Electoral Reform					2.723** (1.097)	2.599** (1.086)
Economic Growth (lagged)	0.093 (0.219)	0.093 (0.233)	−0.087 (0.245)	−0.079 (0.258)	0.113 (0.138)	0.144 (0.150)
PRI's Past Electoral Results	4.017* (2.389)	3.375 (2.428)	5.322* (2.697)	4.878* (2.807)	4.183* (2.344)	3.669 (2.356)
Marginalization	0.218 (0.309)	0.0003 (0.384)	0.194 (0.313)	−0.029 (0.395)	0.245 (0.300)	−0.094 (0.382)
Lagged PRI's Defection	0.350 (0.936)	−0.053 (0.925)	0.094 (0.971)	−0.347 (0.971)	0.179 (0.967)	−0.280 (0.983)
Constant	3.493 (2.770)	4.142 (2.829)	0.492 (1.445)	1.367 (1.615)	−4.157*** (1.467)	−2.912* (1.555)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	65	66	65	66	77	77
Log likelihood	−33.036	−30.715	−31.758	−29.344	−33.883	−30.694
AIC	78.071	79.430	75.515	76.689	79.766	79.387

Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 6: Rare Events Logit Models Using Imputed Gross State Product per Capita instead of Marginalization, Including Observations Up to 2006

Dependent Variable: PRI's Defection

	Model 1 (91-06)	Model 2 (91-06)	Model 3 (91-06)	Model 4 (91-06)	Model 5 (87-06)	Model 6 (87-06)
PRI's Share Public Funds	−0.147*** (0.051)	−0.124** (0.051)				
PRI's Margin Public Funds			−0.108*** (0.034)	−0.095*** (0.035)		
1996 Electoral Reform					2.705*** (0.827)	2.429*** (0.808)
Economic Growth (lagged)	0.011 (0.104)	−0.011 (0.103)	0.012 (0.105)	−0.008 (0.104)	0.016 (0.081)	0.001 (0.081)
PRI's Past Electoral Results	5.083 (3.092)	2.973 (3.335)	6.317* (3.263)	4.378 (3.490)	3.856 (2.594)	2.028 (2.732)
Imputed Log GSP per Capita	−0.424 (0.556)	−0.344 (0.579)	−0.438 (0.562)	−0.335 (0.586)	−0.701 (0.543)	−0.569 (0.576)
Lagged PRI's Defection	−0.001 (0.547)	−0.283 (0.564)	−0.052 (0.554)	−0.324 (0.573)	0.072 (0.539)	−0.263 (0.567)
Constant	3.373* (1.942)	4.044** (2.026)	−1.195 (2.196)	−0.014 (2.363)	−2.725 (2.471)	−1.240 (2.577)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	100	101	100	101	112	113
Log likelihood	−58.332	−56.878	−56.960	−55.663	−59.919	−57.988
AIC	128.664	131.755	125.920	129.325	131.838	133.976

Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 7: Rare Events Logit Models Using Imputed Gross State Product per Capita instead of Marginalization, Including Observations Up to 2000

Dependent Variable: PRI's Defection

	Model 1 (91-06)	Model 2 (91-06)	Model 3 (91-06)	Model 4 (91-06)	Model 5 (87-06)	Model 6 (87-06)
PRI's Share Public Funds	−0.187** (0.076)	−0.156** (0.076)				
PRI's Margin Public Funds			−0.178*** (0.065)	−0.153** (0.064)		
1996 Electoral Reform					3.225*** (1.169)	2.727** (1.113)
Economic Growth (lagged)	0.121 (0.228)	0.132 (0.240)	−0.092 (0.255)	−0.049 (0.264)	0.164 (0.147)	0.169 (0.160)
PRI's Past Electoral Results	10.378** (4.603)	7.678 (4.833)	13.674** (5.418)	10.832* (5.533)	10.413** (4.658)	7.452 (4.635)
Imputed Log GSP per Capita	0.280 (0.753)	0.341 (0.764)	0.242 (0.757)	0.282 (0.778)	−0.174 (0.713)	0.062 (0.765)
Lagged PRI's Defection	0.584 (0.903)	0.084 (0.916)	0.321 (0.937)	−0.148 (0.957)	0.392 (0.935)	−0.145 (0.993)
Constant	−0.192 (3.042)	0.657 (3.172)	−5.298 (3.304)	−3.725 (3.391)	−8.689** (4.158)	−6.421 (4.130)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	65	66	65	66	77	77
Log likelihood	−32.413	−30.482	−30.689	−28.972	−33.042	−30.415
AIC	76.827	78.963	73.378	75.944	78.084	78.829

Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

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