How Popular is the Democratic Peace?

A Survey Experiment of Political Preferences in Brazil and China[*]

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Abstract

Democratic peace theory offers several explanations for the observation that democracies are more peaceful, at least in pairs. Recent work has turned to experimental methods to identify and distinguish among possible causal mechanisms. Citizens in democracies may be less willing to let their leaders use force against other democracies. Yet, current studies focusing on respondents in the United States and the United Kingdom suffer from a lack of generalizability. It is not yet clear whether a reluctance to go to war with liberal regimes is unique to democratic publics, or even whether this reticence exists beyond the U.S./U.K. We conduct survey experiments in two critical developing countries — Brazil (democracy) and China (autocracy) — to determine cross-national variation in popular preferences over policies toward different regimes, and to better understand the mechanisms for liberal peace. The study clarifies the determinants of the democratic peace, and sheds light on the interplay between citizens and leaders.

Introduction

Students of international relations have devoted considerable attention in recent years to the ways in which domestic publics constrain foreign policy, inform global competition, and impact international conflict. Evidence of these relationships has been difficult to unearth, however, and available tests tend to rely as much on the good faith of readers as on definitive proof of causal mechanisms. For this reason, recent attempts to assess causality concerning the democratic peace have shifted to field experiments and surveys. In particular, research by Tomz and Weeks (2012) has sought to demonstrate certain mechanisms at work in surveys of U.S. public opinion. Democratic publics may show a preference for peace with other democracies. Data from U.S. respondents suggests that American citizens are less willing to contemplate using force against democracies than against autocracies. If this is generally the case — if most democratic publics have pacific tendencies toward democracies, but not toward autocracies — then this could account for the special democratic peace.

A potential concern with Tomz and Weeks' findings of democratic affinity involves the sample. The United States is "exceptional" in any number of ways. It is not clear why research on U.S. (or even U.K.) public opinion should be considered representative of the preferences of publics generally, or even of democratic publics. We propose to look for less exceptional examples from which to infer the utility of claims that publics prefer peace with foreign democracies. Surveying respondents from nations that are not like the United States can do much more to reveal scale and scope conditions for this version of democratic peace theory, particularly given the reliance of the theory on public perceptions and preferences. Looking outside the United States also allows us to explore a number of factors that are likely to affect public preferences for war and peace, including development, regime type, culture, and national status. We also examine the foreign policy attitudes of citizens in a non-democracy. Differences between responses from the public in democracies and non-democracies is a central component of democratic peace theory.

In looking more broadly for public preferences regarding war and peace across regime types, we seek cases where force is a viable option — it tells us relatively little if the people of Kiribati deem it inappropriate for their leader to make belligerent threats abroad. We also need to vary regime type, institutional approval, and cultural context, factors that figure prominently in explanations for war

and peace, but for which there is yet little evidence. Finally, we need to observe the presence or absence of aggressive intensions among the populations of rising powers, nations more characteristic of the future of international relations than its past. For these reasons, we focus on two nations from the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries, Brazil and the People's Republic of China.

By focusing on respondents from these two countries, we are able to explore the intensity of pro-democratic foreign policy preferences in non-Anglo nations. We use survey experiments of subjects' support for the use of force when an axiomatic country is confronted with international crises. By not imposing national labels and limiting the context to attributes said to be salient by the existing academic literature, we allow respondents to decide what labels and attributes are relevant and more closely adhere to theoretical conceptualizations in the academic literature. The key experimental treatments involve varying the regime type of the opponent (democracy or non-democracy) and approval by an international institution (UN approval or no UN approval).

Our study has elicited exciting findings. The results reveal a pro-democracy inclination in both China and Brazil, displaying the public's unwillingness to use force against a democracy, irrespective of their home country's regime type. The treatment effect of regime type for China is smaller than that in Brazil but still statistically significant, implying the presence of the democratic peace in non-democratic countries. Furthermore, our study shows that international approval has a significant effect on support for military action, even more so than than regime type. UN approval had a significant effect in both countries that was larger than the effect of democracy. The effect of UN approval was larger for Brazil than China, indicating stronger commitments to international institutions in democratic regimes than in authoritarian regimes.

We proceed by briefly reviewing the democratic peace literature, presenting the proposed treatments, discussing details of the sample frame and recruitment, and discussing the results from Brazil and China.

The Democratic Peace: In Search of an Explanation

The literature on the democratic peace is both voluminous and documented elsewhere (c.f. Russett and Oneal 2001). Inspired by Immanuel Kant (1957[1795]), early quantitative research found fault

with the liberal conviction that democracies are generally less warlike (c.f. Wright 1942). Babst (1964; 1972) first identifies a unique dyadic relationship.[1] Small and Singer (1976) and Rummel (1979; 1983; 1985) figure prominently in the development of the empirical observation, while Doyle (1983a; 1983b; 1997) and Levy (1988) help to shape theoretical perspectives and identify the observation as "lawlike." A vast number of studies document the special peace among democracies (c.f., Beck, et al. 1998; Bremer 1992, 1993; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Hermann and Kegley 1995, 1996; Hewitt and Wilkenfeld 1996; Huth and Allee 2002, 2003; Maoz and Abdoladi 1989; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Oneal, et al. 1996, 2003; Oneal and Russett 1997a, 1999a, 1999b; Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001; Russett et al. 1998; Senese 1997; Weede 1984, 1992).

Charles Lipson may have described the democratic peace best when he quipped that, "We know it works in practice. Now we have to see if it works in theory!" (Lipson 2005, page 1). Initial accounts of the democratic peace focused on linking domestic political attributes to reductions in the use of force. Institutionalists argue that representation, deliberation, and bureaucracy discourage military violence (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). Kant (1957[1795]) saw constitutional constraints as inhibiting the sovereign's innate proclivity to make war. Norms explanations assign an analogous role to democratic culture (Dixon 1993, 1994; Ember et al. 1992; Mintz and Geva 1993; Owen 1994, 1997; Russett 1993).[2] Constructivists argue that force in the international system is becoming socially unacceptable (Cederman 2001a, 2001b; Cederman and Rao 2001; Mueller 1989; Risse-Kappen 1995, 1997; Wendt 1999). Some see the evolution of a common identity (Deutsch 1978; Flynn and Farrell 1999). Others claim that only mature democracies do not fight states they perceive to be democratic (Weart 1994, 1998).[3]

Constraint theories have been criticized as ad hoc and deductively flawed (Layne 1994; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999; Gates, et al. 1996; Rosato 2003). Efforts to avoid a circularity between theory and evidence benefit most from the development of new empirical content (Huth and Allee 2003). Work by Mousseau (2000), Hegre (2000), and Mousseau et al. (2003), for example, shows that the democratic peace is restricted to states with advanced industrialized economies. It is not obvious

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[1]Controversy continues about whether democracies are generally less warlike, though this relationship, if it exists, is much weaker than the democratic peace (Benoit 1996; Chan 1984; Ray 2001; Rousseau et al. 1996; Rummel 1996).

[2]Old democratic dyads appear about as dispute prone as newer dyads (Enterline 1998; Ward and Gleditsch 1998).

[3]Liberal leaders or voters may potentially downplay the "democraticness" of an enemy regime (Oren 1995).

from existing explanations for the democratic peace why norms, institutions, or other factors would inhibit conflict among rich democracies but fail to do so for poor democratic states. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) assesses new implications of an elaborate theory of domestic politics and conflict (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999, 2003). Leaders in societies with small winning coalitions (autocracies) can efficiently target international opponents through limited force, while leaders facing big winning coalitions (democracies) are better off fighting harder, or not at all. Democratic dyads promise particularly expensive contests, leading leaders to prefer negotiated settlements.

Several authors view democracies as more transparent (Small 1996; van Belle 1997; Mitchell 1998). Others argue that "audience costs" or opposition groups allow democracies better to signal resolve (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 1999; Smith 1998). Properly understood, however, these explanations anticipate monadic democratic pacifism, not the dyadic democratic peace relationship. Contests should be less likely in all dyads possessing at least *one* democratic state, regardless of the regime type of the dyadic partner. These explanations are also difficult to evaluate empirically.[4]

The notion that democratic peace can be explained by elite or popular affinities is appealing given logical parsimony (Faber and Gowa 1997; Gartzke 1998, 2000). If democratic citizens or their leaders "like" each other, then this could explain the observation, without recourse to elaborate theoretical baggage to account for the special nature of the relationship. However, the risk is that such an explanation tends toward tautology, given that the absence of war among societies is an important indication of affinity. The proper way forward, then, is to assess not the "safe" cases where established democracies (or their citizenry) express approval for what is often other established democratic regimes, but to explore the cases where affinities are not inherent or obvious. If the democratic peace works by making democracies like each other — rather than by states that like each other happening to be democracies — then states that are not necessarily satisfied (non-status quo powers with the capabilities to attempt to impose change if necessary), but that *are* democratic, should behave differently than dissatisfied, rising states that are not democratic.

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[4]While some critics of the democratic peace challenge its statistical validity (Spiro 1994) cultural bias (Henderson 1998), or generalizability (Henderson 2002), others offer a variety of alternatives, including alliances (Gowa 1994, 1995), the cold war (Farber and Gowa 1995; Gowa 1999), or satisfaction (Kacowicz 1995; Lemke and Reed 1996)).

Research Design

Our research design is based on cross-national online survey experiments conducted in China and Brazil. Subjects in each country were asked to read short scenarios ("vignettes") about potential conflicts with other countries, and express their support for the use of force. Two treatments were randomly assigned: regime type and UN authorization. The first treatment involves a simple variation in the regime type of the target: democratic or not democratic. This treatment consists of only a one or two word change in the vignette, identifying a country as a democratic neighbor, or as a nondemocratic neighbor. Democratic peace theory requires that democratic publics are not generally less willing to use force – only more peaceful toward democracies.

The second treatment varies the existence of United Nations' authorization for the use of force against the target country. Extensive theoretical research identifies the approval of international institutions as a key factor in determining popular support for war. One strain of thought emphasizes the legitimizing effect of authorization by an international institution, such as the UN Security Council (Claude 1966; Finnemore 2003; Hurd 2007). A second, more recent, perspective argues that international approval plays an informational role (Boehmer, et al. 2004; Chapman and Wolford 2010; Fang 2008; Thompson 2009; Voeten 2001, 2005).

The mechanism by which international institutional approval may play a role in domestic public opinion remains a subject of considerable debate. It may be that domestic publics respond affirmatively to evidence from international sources that their leader has chosen moderate or competent policies (Chapman 2011; Grieco et al. 2011). A resolution by an international body is also formal and explicit, creating a wedge issue that encourages domestic publics to rally round the flag and causing foreign publics to agitate for greater caution from their own governments (Thompson 2006). Finally, international approval implies more support and lower costs for the state or coalition using force. This should make a contest more palatable to domestic publics. Cutting edge experimental research casts doubt on informational arguments about the quality of leader choices or burden sharing. Tingley and Tomz (2012) find that international approval is most probably a commitment mechanism, compelling those states that voted for a resolution to contribute to, or at least not interfere with, the military action. However, their experiment is subject to the usual external

validity concerns. Ikeda and Tago (2013), surveying a sample of Japanese respondents, find that an instrument for the size of international coalitions produces a greater change in support for the use of force by the United States or by their own government than an instrument for UN Security Council approval, partly corroborating Tingley and Tomz's findings but also implying that burden sharing may play a larger role than expected in securing public approval.

In something of a turnabout, Tomz and Weeks (2013) find that symbolic factors may matter more than democracy. Their survey experiment, again on anglo respondents, shows that the pacifying effect of an instrument indicating that a target country supports human rights is much stronger and indeed swamps the effect of an instrument for democracy. If US respondents care more about whether the hypothetical target of military force is humanistic than democratic, then this would seem to imply that it is a common set of international preferences that lies behind the democratic peace, rather than a fondness for certain institutions or norms of governance (Gartzke 1998, 2000).

For consistency with previous work, our vignette discusses a nuclear proliferation crisis involving a hypothetical neighboring country's pursuit of nuclear weapons, following Tomz and Weeks (2012). Tomz and Weeks (2012) test four parts of the democratic peace through a series of treatments, varying whether the country was a trading partner, a significant military power, or in an alliance with the subject's country. Our primary goal is to extend results on the main effect of democracy to other countries, and given their previous results showing a main effect for democracy, we will hold these other factors constant. No information about alliances, trade, or characteristics other than regime type and UN endorsement will be varied. Scholars have sought to identify and differentiate the impact of nuclear proliferation on interstate conflict (c.f., Sagan and Waltz 2012; Kroenig 2013; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013), all of which may qualify, contradict, or enhance the effects of regime affinities and authorization by multilateral security institutions in populations. The combination of regime type and dispute type defines 2x2=4 treatments.

Our vignette is written framing a conflict between two hypothetical countries, Country A and Country B. Previous work has focused on whether respondents' own country should use force. Vignettes written this way create obvious confounding problems. For example, a vignette on a territorial dispute with a neighbor will be less salient to Brazilians who have no significant territorial

disputes, but highly salient to Chinese given their ongoing tensions with a number of other nations. To create a generalizable measure of willingness to use force, our vignettes are fully hypothetical, without any mention of real countries.

We used the following format. The script was adapted as appropriate to each country and translated into the local language. Prior to reading the script, subjects were advised that the scenario is hypothetical and should not be read as if it refers to any particular country:

Nuclear Proliferation, adapted from Tomz and Weeks *...A country in the same part of the world as Country A is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. This country (Country B) could then threaten other countries in the region with possible nuclear attack. Country A has attempted to resolve the situation peacefully, but Country B refuses to stop or even discuss the issue. Additional information: Country A would almost certainly defeat Country B in a military dispute. If Country B acquires nuclear weapons, it will have the power to blackmail or destroy other countries. Country B is [not] a democracy. If Country A attacks, it will be able to destroy Country B's nuclear development sites and prevent Country B from developing nuclear weapons. The United Nations has [not] authorized Country A to use force against Country B to resolve the situation.*

After the vignette, we measured the dependent variable, propensity or willingness to use force with an individual use-of-force question, by asking "Should Country A attack and use force to resolve the situation?" Subjects could respond with "Attack" or "Not attack".

Additionally, we collected information on demographic variables, such as subjects' age, gender, highest education level attained, annual household income, religiosity, interest in international news, and foreign policy dispositions, such as militarism, internationalism, and nationalism. We also included questions for manipulation checks at the end, in which we asked respondents whether they thought the vignette was about specific countries. This was done to control for respondents

who may have been tempted to veer away from our initial instructions. In total, our study consisted of 19-20 questions and a 3-paragraph vignette.

Recruitment and Sampling Frame

Use of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries has a number of advantages in the analysis of the democratic peace and of potential interstate conflict more generally. The BRICS have many similarities in their roles in the global system. They also provide key variance in terms of regime type that we leverage in this study. Obviously, these cases are not representative of all developing democracies or of non-democracies broadly. However, they are arguably the most important developing states that we can include in the study.

We have launched the survey in Brazil and China and are in the process of collecting more data. As of September 16, 2013, we have collected 4,113 responses from Brazil and 4,050 responses from China. Data was collected via an online anonymous survey, with subjects recruited via professional polling companies in the region. The survey firms recruited from their existing pool of subjects ("online panel"). Once recruited, subjects were led to a link with the survey, programmed by the research team, and routed back to the survey firm's website where they were compensated.

While the respondents were not perfectly representative of the population of the two countries, they give us a good picture of the opinions of middle class, well-educated citizens. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of the respondents (note: the attitudinal measures – militarism, internationalism, nationalism, and religiosity – were recoded on a 0-1 scale). Chinese respondents were more militaristic and less internationalist than Brazilians. Surprisingly, they were also less nationalistic than their Brazilian counterpart. As expected, Brazilian respondents were more religious than Chinese respondents. Other than religion and religiosity, the Brazilian sample was quite comparable to the Chinese sample in terms of demographics. In general, both groups were young, well-educated, economically stable, and quite interested in international affairs.

	Central Tendency		ANOVA on Treatment Group F-statistic	
Variables	Brazil	China	Brazil	China
Mean				
Militarism	0.26	0.48	2.18	0.63
Internationalism	0.4	0.28	0.59	2.22
Nationalism	0.59	0.26	0.75	1.86
Religiosity	0.34	0.08	1.38	0.43
Read Int'l News Per Week	4.05	4.58	0.69	2.52
Age	36.10	31.66	1.18	0.19
Median				
Gender	Female	Male	0.25	1.42
Education	Some college	College degree	0.94	0.67
Income Quintile	4th QT	4th QT	0.20	0.47
Religion	Religious	No Religion	1.92	0.87
Generic Case	Generic	Generic	0.92	1.85
N	4,113	4,050		

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Brazilian and Chinese Respondents

Results

Main Effects of Regime Type and IO Approval

In Table 2, we report the percentage of the Brazilian and Chinese respondents who supported military action against Country A, broken down by regime type and presence of UN approval separately and then by the two in interaction. We also show two simple measures of the size of the main effects, the percentage difference in support and Φ, a measure of correlations between each treatment and support for war.

These results confirm the main effects of the target country's regime type and UN approval in Brazil and China. Contrary to the expected dyadic democratic peace relationship, the data demonstrates the public's unwillingness to fight a democracy, regardless of their home country's regime type. It was not only citizens of Brazil, a democracy, who showed less support for fighting a democracy, but also citizens of China, an autocracy, who preferred not to fight a democracy. Less

| | % Supporting Attacks (Between) | |
	Brazil	China
Regime Type		
Autocracy	39.79	52.22
Democracy	32.14	48.34
% Difference	7.65	3.88
Φ	0.08***	0.04**
IO Approval		
UN Approval	42.80	56.40
No UN Approval	28.98	44.48
% Difference	13.82	11.92
Φ	0.14***	0.12***
Regime Type×IO Approval		
Autocracy with UN Approval	47.29	58.60
Democracy with UN Approval	38.16	54.05
Autocracy with No UN Approval	31.86	46.07
Democracy with No UN Approval	26.22	42.77
N	4,111	4,050

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$

Table 2: Percentage of Support for Attacks by Regime Type and IO Approval in Brazil and China

than a third of the Brazilian subjects supported attacking a democracy whereas close to 40 percent of them backed military action against a non-democratic country. In other words, the estimated effect of regime type was about 8 percent, which was statistically significant. Similarly, only 48 percent of the Chinese respondents advocated the use of force against a democracy but the support increased to 52 percent when the target was a non-democratic regime. The effect size of regime type was around 4 percent, smaller than the Brazilian equivalent but still statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

The fact that the democratic peace is present among citizens in an authoritarian regime is striking, but even more influential than regime type is international approval. Both Brazilians and

Chinese were significantly affected by the United Nations' approval in deciding whether to support war. Approximately 30 percent of the Brazilians assigned to the treatment with no UN approval espoused the attack against the potential nuclear proliferation but about 43 percent endorsed the attack with UN approval. The size of the effect of UN approval for the Brazilian sample was around 14 percent, large and significant. Meanwhile, among Chinese respondents, about 45 percent backed an attack without UN authorization whereas 56 percent supported military action with UN authorization. The effect size of UN approval was nearly 12 percent, again, a tad smaller than the Brazilian sample but quite large and statistically significant.

For both countries, the effect of UN approval was even larger than the effect of the target country's regime type. The effect size of regime type was estimated to be 7.65 percent for Brazil (with the 95 percent confidence interval of 4.73 - 10.58 percent) and 3.88 percent for China (with the 95 percent confidence interval of 0.80-6.96 percent). Both are clearly overwhelmed by UN approval's effect sizes – 13.82 percent for Brazil (95 percent confidence interval: 10.91 - 16.72 percent) and 11.92 percent for China (95 percent confidence interval: 8.86 - 14.97 percent).

Finally, aggressive intensions varied by country among the populations of rising powers. Chinese respondents were more aggressive than Brazilian respondents. This cross-national difference is fairly consistent and statistically significant across treatments. It is also bigger than some of the differences generated by the treatments.

Support for War and Cross-National and Individual Differences

This section discusses the results of the logistic regression of war support with experimental variables and attitudinal and demographic controls (Table 3 in the appendix). Variables "Autocracy" and "UN Approval" denote the treatments. Militarism, internationalism, and nationalism measure and control for individuals' basic foreign policy disposition, following Tomz and Weeks (2012). The variable "specific" controls for manipulation checks. Income was measured by the respondents' income quintile in each country. Variable "International News" reflects the number of days per week respondents read about international news both online and offline. It was included to assess respondents' interest in, and potentially knowledge of, international affairs.

In the full model, experimental variables were significant for both countries. It shows that both regime type and IO approval matter in determining public support for war. Regime type may not have been significant for China in other models because of the small effect size. Meanwhile, individuals' levels of militarism, internationalism, and nationalism had a significant effect on their likelihood of supporting war for both countries, albeit in different directions. A strongly militaristic or internationalist individual is likely to back military action in comparison to a less militaristic or internationalist individual. However, a Brazilian and a Chinese with strong pride in his own country are both less likely, not more likely, to support war. Those who thought of specific cases were more likely to aggressive, which may explain the relatively smaller effect sizes in studies with hypothetical situations than studies with real cases.

Many variables, in particular those on demographics, were significant for Brazil but not for China. For Brazil, age, gender, education, income, and interest news were all significant at the 0.05 level; older, female, better-educated Brazilians were more likely to oppose war; and Brazilians with higher income and stronger interest in international news are more likely to support war.

Based on the logistic regression model aforementioned, we show an "average" respondent's predicted probability of endorsing military action in each country in Figure 1, calculated by the Stata package Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). An average respondent is one who is likely to be representative of the characteristics of our samples in Brazil and China, respectively. For Brazil, it is a female with some college education, annual household income in the 4th quintile, and some religion. For China, it would be a male with a college degree, income in the 4th quintile, and no religion. Each respondent's militarism, internationalism, nationalism, interest in international affairs, age, and religiosity were held constant at means of his or her own country.

The story remains the same. Regime type and IO endorsement affect both individuals' attitudes toward the possible use of force. The predicted probabilities for both Brazilian and Chinese respondents indicate their unwillingness to fight a democracy. Given UN approval, the predicted probability of the Brazilian representative to support a military attack against a non-democratic nuclear proliferator is 0.44 and a democratic proliferator is 0.38. The likelihood further decreases to 0.29 when the target is an autocracy and there is no UN authorization and even more so to

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Figure 1: A Representative Individual's Predicted Probability of Supporting Attacks

0.22 when the target is a democracy under the equivalent condition. The effects of regime type and UN approval also exist for the Chinese representative although they are less drastic. The predicted probability that he backs military action sanctioned by the UN is nearly 0.60 against a non-democratic target and 0.53 against a democratic target. Assuming there is no blessing by the UN, the likelihood of him supporting the attack is 0.45 if the target regime were non-democratic and 0.40 if it were democratic. The mean difference in predicted probabilities between support for war against a democracy and against an autocracy was 0.07 for the Brazilian representative. The difference was 0.06 for the Chinese representative.

The predicted probabilities of the two citizens again indicate the effect of the United Nations'

approval on war support. Both the Brazilian representative and the Chinese representative were influenced by the United Nations' approval in their support for war. The difference in predicted probabilities between support for war approved by the UN and war without explicit approval of the UN was 0.16 for the Brazilian representative and 0.13 for the Chinese representative. Again, the effect of UN approval seems to be larger that the effect of regime type.

The Chinese representative also was more likely to support the attack than his Brazilian counterpart, regardless of the treatment. Again, this may imply the Chinese public's willingness to resort to military force in international affairs.

Conclusion

In this paper, we extend survey experiments beyond the confines of the United States to emerging powers, one democratic, and one authoritarian. We also generalize our treatments, making them entirely hypothetical and removing any potential stake in the outcomes that subjects may have from their local context. Our results are striking. Evidence of a pro-democracy inclination is significant and present in both China and Brazil. The treatment effect for China is smaller than that in Brazil - which may reflect sampling differences or random error - or may reflect a weaker, though still significant pro-democracy effect in authoritarian countries.

Even more significant than regime type, however, is international approval. UN approval had a significant effect in both countries that was larger than the impact of democracy by 50% or more. Again, these effects were larger for Brazil than China, suggesting stronger commitments to international organizations and international law in democratic regimes than in authoritarian regimes.

We see this project as the first step in what could be come a large-multicountry study - either adding a survey experiment to existing survey vehicles, like the regional Barometro surveys, or other multicountry studies, or by expanding the internet component to include other cases. We anticipate that the findings from this proposed study will advance the literature in several important ways. First, it will empirically test democratic peace theory, foundational to the study of public opinion and international relations. Second, it will examine the impact of international institutions and

norms in shaping public opinion. Overall, the proposed study permits us to explore fundamental questions about war and peace which have implications for national and international security.

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	Brazil	China	Brazil	China	Brazil	China	Brazil	China	Brazil	China	Brazil	China
Autocracy	0.274***	0.134	0.316***	0.143	0.320***	0.139	0.345***	0.180*	0.395***	0.185*	0.375***	0.185*
	(0.0980)	(0.0889)	(0.103)	(0.0952)	(0.103)	(0.0953)	(0.113)	(0.0966)	(0.113)	(0.0966)	(0.116)	(0.0967)
UN Approval	0.552***	0.453***	0.666***	0.470***	0.673***	0.462***	0.763***	0.491***	0.748***	0.492***	0.769***	0.492***
	(0.0955)	(0.0911)	(0.100)	(0.0974)	(0.100)	(0.0975)	(0.110)	(0.0985)	(0.110)	(0.0985)	(0.113)	(0.0986)
Autocracy X UNApproval	0.100	0.0517	0.0297	0.0968	0.0228	0.0985	-0.0790	0.0687	-0.113	0.0714	-0.117	0.0683
	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.153)	(0.137)	(0.152)	(0.137)	(0.156)	(0.137)
Militarism			1.691***	1.590***	1.692***	1.567***	1.647***	1.571***	1.665***	1.571***	1.642***	1.570***
			(0.116)	(0.0893)	(0.116)	(0.0896)	(0.128)	(0.0914)	(0.128)	(0.0916)	(0.130)	(0.0916)
Internationalism			-0.979***	0.557**	-0.949***	0.590**	-0.775***	0.561*	-0.830***	0.558*	-0.795***	0.556*
			(0.198)	(0.278)	(0.198)	(0.279)	(0.221)	(0.289)	(0.220)	(0.290)	(0.225)	(0.290)
Nationalism			-0.398***	-0.829***	-0.434***	-0.847***	-0.496***	-0.866***	-0.499***	-0.841***	-0.490***	-0.845***
			(0.152)	(0.215)	(0.153)	(0.216)	(0.171)	(0.219)	(0.169)	(0.219)	(0.174)	(0.220)
Specific					0.244***	0.173**	0.243***	0.183**	0.211**	0.181**	0.215**	0.183**
					(0.0779)	(0.0733)	(0.0858)	(0.0745)	(0.0861)	(0.0747)	(0.0877)	(0.0747)
Age							-0.0114***	0.00190	-0.0113***	0.00188	-0.0123***	0.00192
							(0.00331)	(0.00408)	(0.00331)	(0.00406)	(0.00339)	(0.00408)
Female							-0.334***	-0.0233	-0.281***	-0.0227	-0.295***	-0.0224
							(0.0793)	(0.0720)	(0.0788)	(0.0720)	(0.0808)	(0.0721)
Education							-0.0826***	-0.0491	-0.0704**	-0.0480	-0.0758**	-0.0482
							(0.0305)	(0.0378)	(0.0305)	(0.0378)	(0.0311)	(0.0379)
Income							0.0770**	0.00675	0.0789**	0.00795	0.0789**	0.00838
							(0.0380)	(0.0362)	(0.0379)	(0.0362)	(0.0388)	(0.0362)
Int'l News							0.0292*	-0.0164	0.0247	-0.0158	0.0329**	-0.0166
							(0.0160)	(0.0160)	(0.0160)	(0.0161)	(0.0164)	(0.0161)
Religion							0.147	-0.0150			0.192	-0.0233
							(0.112)	(0.0701)			(0.120)	(0.0777)
Religiosity									-0.0831	0.0205	-0.143	0.0497
									(0.109)	(0.183)	(0.119)	(0.203)
Constant	-1.034***	-0.291***	-0.929***	-1.020***	-0.983***	-1.062***	-0.623**	-0.846***	-0.531**	-0.873***	-0.649***	-0.864***
	(0.0705)	(0.0643)	(0.142)	(0.113)	(0.144)	(0.115)	(0.263)	(0.261)	(0.247)	(0.257)	(0.269)	(0.262)
N	4,111	4,050	4,007	3,916	3,986	3,908	3,322	3,838	3,339	3,833	3,194	3,830

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Logistic Regression of Support for Attacks in Brazil and China (Between)