Principle or Pressure?
Distinguishing Party Discipline from Party Cohesion in the United Kingdom[*]

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Abstract:
Both party cohesion and discipline play important roles in maintaining legislator loyalty but because these factors are usually present simultaneously, it has been particularly difficult to analyze their influences independently. I take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in the United Kingdom, studying former MPs who are elevated to the House of Lords. MPs face reelection and have the potential to hold positions of power in the government while Peers in the House of Lords are appointed for life and rarely hold senior cabinet positions. Thus, party whips in the House of Commons can increase loyalty by enforcing discipline when cohesion fails. Whips in the House of Lords must rely only on the latter. For all Peers who came from the House of Commons, I compare roll call behavior in each chamber and attribute changes in elevated former MPs' voting records to the removal of party discipline. I find that under single-party majority government, cohesion is often sufficient to maintain party-line voting. However, under the current coalition government, discipline is more often required.

I. Introduction

Roll call voting permeates the day to day life of an elected official. Each time a vote is called, she must decide if she wishes to vote based on the policies of her party. When her personal, party, and constituent opinions match, the decision is simple. However, when they differ, she must decide who she wishes to favor. Literature on the behavior of elected officials identifies two major motivations that a legislator may have for voting with her party—party cohesion and party discipline. Party cohesion refers to the extent to which legislators in the same party agree with each other on party policies. Party discipline refers to motivations that result from institutional pressures including reelection and political advancement (Ozbudun, 1970; Hazan, 2003). Both cohesion and discipline produce outcomes that are observationally equivalent—party-line voting. The analytical difficulty therefore becomes how to distinguish which is the reason that a given Member of Parliament votes with her party.

In parliamentary systems, parties have strong control over their members' prospects for both reelection and the advancement within the party hierarchy. The party leadership therefore has at its disposal a wide array of both carrots and sticks to encourage members to toe the party line and support the policies they propose. This means that Members of Parliament can face a significant pull between personal opinion and career goals when their opinions differ from that of their party.

This paper takes advantage of a common pattern of advancement in the United Kingdom to disentangle these motivations. Members of the House of Commons (MPs) who achieve leadership roles within the party typically are offered seats in the House of Lords upon retirement. The House of Commons is an elected chamber and the British Cabinet is comprised predominantly of MPs. This means that those serving in the House of Commons will be

motivated to remain loyal to their parties because of both the cohesion they feel with their co-partisans and the discipline created via the rewards and punishments of the party and the electorate. By contrast, the House of Lords is a fully appointed chamber and its members (Peers) are rarely given cabinet positions. Because Peers serve lifetime appointments and have little hope of advancing beyond their current position, the party loyalty we observe in the House of Lords should be motivated solely by ideological cohesion.

Today, there are nearly 200 individuals sitting in the House of Lords who have previously served in the House of Commons. In this paper, I examine the levels of party loyalty exhibited by these Peers during roll calls (called divisions in the British Parliament) in both chambers. Because discipline is present in the House of Commons and not the House of Lords, any changes in behavior we observe as an individual moves from the House of Commons to the House of Lords can be attributed to the removal of discipline, whereas continued loyalty, measured by party-line voting, can be attributed to cohesion. I find much more of the latter: co-partisan cohesion remains extremely high among Peers who were previously MPs. However, this high level of party cohesion seems to be tested severely in the present coalition government. Peers who belong to the parties that are part of the coalition are much less inclined to vote loyally on a range of issues. I argue that these results show that parties can remain strongly cohesive without the need for significant disciplinary techniques if parties stick to their political platforms and extensively screen their members.

This result is particularly surprising, given the emphasis that parliamentary scholars place on party leaders' ability to coerce MPs to toe the party line, whatever their true preferences. Instead, my analysis suggests that, co-partisan cohesion is often enough to maintain party-line voting during single party majority government. However, this cohesion becomes less effective

for parties participating in coalition government and discipline may be required under these circumstances to maintain a party that votes together in the division lobbies.

Although I focus on the United Kingdom, the results presented in this paper could apply to other countries as well. Any electoral system that allows voters to distinguish between individual candidates can create situations where MPs are torn between the party and the electorate. This situation mirrors many of the disciplinary pressures we observe in the House of Commons. Under these conditions, a politician may have to choose between angering her party's leaders or her district's voters. On other hand, in an electoral system that allows voters to choose only among parties, and not among individual candidates, an MP is unencumbered by such conflict. Since voters cannot reward individual MPs for rebellion in systems with only party-based voting, there is little to be gained either electorally or career-wise from rebellion.

II.   Literature Review

The Functions of Parties

Cox and McCubbins (2007) argue that political parties are legislative cartels, created and perpetuated because they help to reduce certain inefficiencies associated with individual rationality. The party's main purpose is to ensure the election and reelection of its members. To do this, those within the parties must attempt to make policies, implement those policies, and take public responsibility for the outcomes of the policies they implement (Thies, 2000).

Maintaining party unity is crucial in this view of legislative parties because it ensures that the "brand name" of the party stays strong. This brand name in turn gives voters a valuable insight into the policies that will be pursued should the candidate's party take power (Downs, 1957; Cox and McCubbins, 2007).

Political parties, particularly in parliamentary governments, benefit greatly from being in the majority. This means that unless an MP plans to leave politics all together, she can benefit from the collective party identity because she aspires to higher office or because membership in a majority party promises more influence on policy.

Alternatively, Krehbiel (1993) argues that political parties are comprised of like-minded legislators and party loyalty stems primarily from shared co-partisan preferences. Thus, political parties are do not have as much power as some would suggest. Co-partisan legislators vote together when they agree with each other, which is the vast majority of the time. When legislators disagree with the party position, they will vote against it and the party leadership can do little to prevent this. Instead, parties often try to avoid the topic all together, ensuring that topics that invite discord within the party do not make it onto the legislative agenda. In this framework, the main importance of the party label is to represent the natural, shared, policy preferences of those who belong to it.

What do individual politicians want?

When we observe a legislator cast her vote during a roll call, there are several motivations that could have influenced her decision to vote loyally or to rebel. Policy preferences, pressures facing the party as whole, constituent concerns, and a desire for higher office can all play a role in the level of party loyalty parliamentarians exhibit.

The office-seeking view of legislative behavior, exemplified by Mayhew (1974), argues that legislators are "single-minded election seekers." Thus, we should only see individuals rebelling when they believe that doing so will help them to stay in office. The costs and benefits of rebellion will depend on the strength of the party leadership and the opinions of an MP's constituents. Yet, examination of the evidence suggests that this assertion is, at best, incomplete.

It cannot explain the actions of lame duck officials (those not seeking further re-election), nor can it explain the behavior of members of appointed bodies such as the British House of Lords.

On the other hand, proponents of the policy-seeking argument assume that politicians are not motivated solely by reelection, but see elections as the means to the end of a desired policy outcome (Fenno, 1974). Party loyalty is therefore a more complicated decision. When the preferences of their constituents differ from the marching orders of their party leaders, legislators must weigh the policy benefits they believe a bill or policy will provide against the electoral backlash they may receive from the voters if they toe the party line or career backlash imposed by the party if they rebel.

The relationship between cohesion and discipline

In democratically elected legislatures throughout the world, cohesion and discipline act simultaneously to produce the levels of party loyalty we observe. Bowler, Farrell, and Katz (1999) argue that party discipline is most effective at intermediate levels of cohesion. If the level of party cohesion falls below some minimum threshold, discipline is will be insufficient to maintain loyalty. On the other hand, if cohesion is particularly high, it will become unnecessary to impose discipline, since everyone already agrees.

Hazan (2003) argues that the foundations of cohesion are created before legislators are elected, through the process of candidate and legislative caucuses. This means that "parties thus arrive cohesive or not (4)." In his model, cohesion is the first step in party loyalty, and discipline is implemented by the party leadership where cohesion fails.

Cohesion produces party loyalty because legislators who agree with each other are more likely to be members of the same political party. It is not unreasonable to believe that even purely office-seeking politicians based their choice of which party to join on shared policy

preferences policy preferences (as opposed to simply flipping a coin). Consequently, legislators should vote with their parties a significant portion of the time without any need for party discipline.

Sociological factors can also create a form of peer pressure that will encourage co-partisans to vote together, despite the absence of concrete consequences (Hazan, 2003). Some argue that MPs are socialized to vote with their party, thus creating a norm of loyalty without the need for threats and punishments (Crowe, 1986; Norton, 2003). These sociological factors mean that a legislator receives some sort of psychic benefit for voting with the party. Even if she does not agree with the policy positions, she gains the satisfaction of voting with her colleagues. Alternatively, the socialization associated with spending time with her co-partisans could mean that her policy preferences shift over time to match those of the majority of her party.

In parliamentary systems, discipline comes from two major sources; election and advancement. From the advancement side, the Westminster political system inexorably links political advancement and national party favor. The fusion of legislative and executive branches in parliamentary systems means that individuals cannot achieve the highest levels of political power without first being elected to the parliament (Hazan and Rahat, 2010).

There is a well acknowledged track for career oriented politicians in Westminster-style parliaments that takes MPs from the backbenches through various junior positions in the sub-cabinet and eventually, through favor and luck, into the cabinet.[1] Party leaders control who is appointed to these positions, meaning they can reward the most loyal backbenchers.[2] At the base

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[1] When a party is in opposition, its leadership is referred to as the shadow cabinet. Except where I refer to the direct implementation of policy, I use the term cabinet to mean both the shadow cabinet and government cabinet.

[2] When the Labour Party is in opposition, the shadow cabinet is elected by the Labour Party caucus. Nonetheless, the party leader gets to decide which shadow portfolio each MP is assigned.

of this ladder to the cabinet is the Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS), whose roles are "facilitating communication, lightening the ministerial load, and learning the ministerial trade (Searing, 1994, 219)." If an MP proves herself an effective and diligent PPS, she can be promoted to higher positions within the sub-cabinet including assistant whip or junior minister. Sub-cabinet members are often particularly eager to please their leadership because new cabinet ministers are typically chosen from the pool of junior ministers and whips.

Discipline can also be enforced among those who already hold posts within the party or government. In Britain, ministers and junior ministers are generally expected to resign their posts should they choose to rebel against their party (Theakston, 1986). This power to promote and demote individuals within the party means that leaders have significant sanctions at their disposal to punish those ministers and junior ministers who defy them.

The connection between loyalty and advancement is relatively straightforward, but the added component of the electorate means that there are times when seeking reelection can push MPs toward either being loyal or rebelling.[3] If an MP's constituents disagree with a specific party policy, it may be in the MP's best interest to rebel on divisions pertaining to that policy.

It is not clear, however, how strongly constituent preferences can sway an MP toward disloyalty. Because the cabinet controls so much of the policy agenda, Cox argues that voting for MPs is oriented around the party, not the individual (1987). Thus, voting against the party during a division may anger the party leadership for very little electoral gain. There is also evidence to suggest that voters believe a prime minister who is unable to control her party members and keep

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[3] Cox (1987) lists three conditions which must be met for electoral pressure to matter: MPs must value being reelected, MPs' constituents must base their votes at least in part on the previous and projected voting behavior of candidates, and MPs must be aware that the constituents vote in this way (149-150).

them loyal is also unable to run the country (Kam, 2009). Additionally, personal characteristics of candidates play a much smaller role in the vote choices in the United Kingdom than in the United States. Many British voters base their decisions primarily on which party they want to control the government (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987).

While the link between constituency preferences and MP rebellion is inconclusive, there are numerous ways the parliamentary and national party leadership can tie loyalty to electoral security and give disloyal MPs reason for concern. Parties can influence individual campaigns,[4] enforce loyalty by attaching confidence to a vote,[5] or, as a last resort, expel an MP from the party by "removing the whip".[6]

III.   Hypotheses

Despite this conceptual delineation between discipline and cohesion, both factors usually exist simultaneously. Co-partisans probably do agree with each other on most issues, so it is difficult to detect when discipline is in play. However, the British House of Lords provides an

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[4] During the official campaign and pre-campaign activity leading up to it, the party leadership is known to target certain marginal constituencies by allocating extra volunteers time or money in the constituency. These efforts have been shown to increase the chances of winning seats in close races (Whiteley and Seyd, 2003). Presumably, the party leadership will more inclined to target its resources on the behalf of MPs who most loyally support the party.

[5] If a division with confidence attached fails, the prime minister calls a new election. Often, the threat of such an action (even implicitly) is enough to achieve the desired loyalty needed to accomplish the prime minister's goals (Huber, 1996). Note that only the government party can attach confidence.

[6] When a party removes the whip, the MP is no longer able to sit in the chamber under the party label. Running for reelection without the benefit of a major party label will spell almost certain defeat in a party-oriented electoral system such as the United Kingdom's (Crowe, 1986).

interesting testing ground. Peers are appointed for life, and so do not need to please anyone to maintain their seats. Moreover, it has become extremely rare for Peers to hold any significant positions of power within the government. This situation creates what Philip Norton calls a "discipline-free environment (Norton, 2003: 57)."

Dependent Variable

To separate the roles that discipline and cohesion play in British party loyalty, I use the roll call voting records (also called division records) of individuals who have served in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords and analyze their probabilities of rebellion. I believe that focusing on people who have served in both chambers is better than simply comparing average levels of party-line voting across the two chambers. My approach allows me to hold a number of individual factors constant, and focus on how an individual's behavior changes after she is elevated from the House of Commons to the House of Lords.

Independent Variable

The main independent variable in this project is membership in the House of Lords. I argue that the absence of discipline in the House of Lords means that the party loyalty exhibited in the chamber is due solely to sincere policy agreement. On the other hand, loyalty in the House of Commons should be driven by a combination of like-mindedness and discipline. If discipline significantly motivates the individuals in my dataset towards party-line voting, elevation to the House of Lords should increase their probability of rebellion.

Control Variables

One potential problem associated with a dataset that spans more than three decades comes from the possibility of shifts in party positions that happen over time. This issue could affect the Labour Party in particular, considering the massive overhaul the party underwent

during Tony Blair's tenure as party leader (1994-2008). The current coalition government may cause similar problems for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats because it has necessitated significant compromises in party policy. If party positions have changed, an individual might express the same policy preference in two votes separated by several years, but have the first counted as loyal and the second as rebellious (or vice versa). Since all cross-chamber migration has been from the Commons to the Lords, such a shift might be a clean measure of discipline (since a disciplined Peer would have changed her vote in accordance with the new party position). Alternatively, a Peer might be incorrectly judged to be loyal when the change over time was from a dispreferred policy position during her tenure as an MP to a preferred one after her elevation. In this case, the party moved toward her own preference, and won her support due to discipline on the first vote and cohesion in the absence of discipline on the second vote. Additionally, new and perhaps more controversial issues could arise after a person is elevated to the House of Lords. It is entirely possible that the same Peer would have rebelled against her party, had the issue arisen during her time as an MP, but the issue was only salient during her time in the House of Lords. These situations could artificially inflate rebellion scores in the Lords.

  To control for the possibility of policy drift over time, I choose to focus on a few issue areas. Europe, counterterrorism, and social security have all been regularly on parliamentary agenda in both chambers for the past thirty years and have ignited a range of public intra-party discord. Government proposals on social security policies tend to create discord between parties but not within them in the British Parliament. By contrast, Britain's relationship with the European Union continues to be a major source of friction within the Conservative Party, while there was consistent disagreement between Labour prime ministers and their backbenchers

regarding the introduction of harsher counterterrorism measures. I do not have strong priors about whether a given issue area is more or less likely to see rebellions, but it seems reasonable to allow for the possibility of different levels of loyalty for different issue areas.

I also control for the government status of each party. Because the party in government can control the parliamentary agenda, it is able to prevent issues that cause contention within the party from coming to a vote. The government can also encourage party loyalty by attaching confidence to a vote. Both of these factors should lower the rebellion rates for members of the party of government.

This logic of government agenda control aiding party loyalty holds most strongly for single party majority governments, which dominated the British government from the end of World War II until 2010.[7] However, the 2010 general election produced a "hung parliament", with no single party winning a majority of seats in the House of Commons. Because the David Cameron-led Conservatives gained a plurality but not a majority of seats in the 2010 general election, they formed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. This was the first coalition government in the United Kingdom since World War II, and the first time that the Liberal Democrats had ever held any seats in the cabinet.

Governing as a coalition requires compromise. But the political parties in the United Kingdom are unaccustomed to such requirements. The norm of single-party majority government allows candidates and voters to anticipate the policies that will be implemented, should the party gain a majority of seats. Once elected to government, the party is able to institute these policies with little to no obstruction. If a party is not elected to government, its role is to become the government in waiting. This primarily involves opposing and scrutinizing the government's policies. When the lines are clear—Conservatives vs. Labour, Liberal Democrats vs. everyone

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[7] The only exception to this is the minority Labour government from February to October of 1974.

else—this is not difficult. But coalition government blurs these lines and the parties in government are suddenly forced to implement policies they disagree with.

I expect that the added complications of coalition government will mean an increase in the probability of rebellion. Furthermore, because members of the coalition government parties will be required to make compromises more often than opposition parties, I also expect the interaction between coalition government and government party status to increase the probability of rebellion.

Finally, the holding of posts within the party or government should influence rebellion rates as well. MPs and Peers who hold cabinet or sub-cabinet posts should be the least likely to show disloyalty because they are expected to resign their positions if they rebel against the party on major divisions. Ministers are also able to shape party policy to match their own preferences, so they should have the least desire to rebel in the first place.

Table 1 summarizes my hypotheses; it presents the signs I expect the coefficients of the independent and control variables to take in a multivariable regression analysis. Section V presents and discusses the full statistical analysis.

[Table 1 about here]

IV.   Data and Methods

The Data

The data contain the voting records for individuals belonging to the Labour, Conservative, or Liberal Democratic Parties who served in the House of Commons at any time and the House of Lords at any point since January, 2000. Division records from the House of Commons cover MPs in the Labour or Conservative Parties beginning in 1979 and Liberal Democrats MPs

beginning in 1992.[8]

The data for the House of Lords begin in January, 2000 and end in November 2012. Before 2000, the large number of Hereditary Peers meant that Conservative Party consistently had a strong majority in the House of Lords.[9] However, in 1999, the Blair government enacted a major reform that removed a majority of Hereditary Peers from the chamber. There has been a fairly even balance between Labour and Conservative Peers since then.[10] If it is true that Peers vote solely based on their opinions, then the Conservative dominance of the House of Lords should not have influenced whether an individual chose to rebel. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that it may have influenced an individual's propensity to be present for a division at all given that Peers are not paid a salary and it is not uncommon for them to have careers outside the chamber.

I use a dummy variable to indicate rebellion (1) or loyalty (0) for each vote cast. I compile the data in three different ways. The first, which I call *Eligible Rebellions*, counts an individual as loyal whenever she did not actively rebel. Thus, I code absence as a vote with the party. The next method, which I call *Voting Rebellions*, counts an individual as loyal only if she votes with her party; I remove any absences from the dataset. For both of these measures, an

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[8] The Conservative and Labour parties are the two main political parties in British politics. The Liberal Democrats are the largest of the third parties. The Liberal Democrats was founded in 1988, when the Liberal and Social Democratic parties united. Between 1979 and 1992, the two parties never held more than 25 seats combined and in 1979 held only 11 seats.

[9] Hereditary Peers are those who inherit their titles. The Peers in my data are Life Peers. Life Peers are allowed to keep their titles for life but cannot pass them on to heirs.

[10] The Liberal Democrats as well as other minor parties in the UK are also represented in the Lords. Peers can also choose to remain unaffiliated, joining the Crossbenches.

individual is coded as rebelling if she voted against the majority of her co-partisans who cast

votes in a given division. Finally, *Absence Rebellions* treat absences as rebellions—an

individual is only considered to be loyal to her party if she votes with them. Otherwise, she is

considered in rebellion. *Eligible Rebellions* cover the entire time period of dataset, 1979 to 2012.

Voting Rebellions and *Absence Rebellions* begin in 1992.[11]

Coding absences as loyalty (as in *Eligible Rebellions*) or omitting them entirely (as in

Voting Rebellions) takes a very conservative view of what constitutes a rebellion, while *Absence*

Rebellions likely overestimate the true level of rebellion. An absence on an important and highly

anticipated division is often construed as a mild form of rebellion, especially in the House of

Commons (Jackson, 1968). However, this is clearly not always the case; divisions can come up

unexpectedly, ministers and sub-cabinet members may be away from Westminster to fulfill their

duties outside the chamber, or an MP or Peer may simply be ill. These three measures of

rebellion allow me to measure the full range of possible disloyalty. Because absentee rates are

typically higher in the House of Lords, *Eligible Rebellions* give the lowest chance for seeing an

increase in rebelliousness after elevation to the Lords, creating a lower bound of sorts. *Voting*

Rebellions give a higher rate of rebellion but by removing absences from the dataset, still likely

underestimating the true level of rebellion. On the other hand, *Absence Rebellions* show the

maximum level of rebellion and the most generous measure of discipline in the House of

Commons, creating an upper bound. One Peer I interviewed who served as a party whip in both

chambers explained that the challenge in the House of Commons was to get MPs to vote with the

[11] Data from 1979 to 1992 come from a dataset published by Philip Norton, division data from 1992-1997 come
from the TapiR dataset published by David Firth and Arthur Spelling and the 1997-2012 data come from
publicwhip.org. The Norton dataset records only rebellions, while both TapiR and publicwhip code how each
individual voted in each division.

party while in the House of Lords his main task was to get Peers to attend at all.

I also include dummy variables for each of the issue areas in my dataset: *Counterterrorism*, *Europe*, and *Social Security*. I decided which issue area each division pertained to by reading the bills and debates associated with each vote in the 33 year span of my data. This information is published in the parliamentary record (Hansard) for each chamber.[12] If a division did not fit one of the chosen issue areas, I excluded it.

The *Government* variable takes the value 1 when an MP or Peer belonged to the party or parties in government at the time of the vote.[13] Similarly, the *Coalition* variable indicates whether the government was a coalition as opposed to single-party majority (for now, this is an indicator variable for the current Cameron government alone). It is coded as 1 for both opposition and government parties when more than one party holds seats in the cabinet.

I also include biographical information for the 195 individuals in my dataset, which I collected and coded from the House of Lords website. These data include the dates each individual served in each chamber, the party or parties they belonged to, and information on their career paths in both the House of Lords and the House of Commons.

An individual was coded as a *Minister* if she held a position that required attendance at cabinet meetings or if served as the Speaker of the House of Commons or as the Lord Speaker at the time of each division. If an opposition MP or Peer was the shadow of one of these cabinet members (for example, the Shadow Home Secretary) or the leader of their party, they were coded as holding a cabinet position. I classified an individual as being in the *Sub-Cabinet* if, at

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[12] See appendix for a more detailed explanation of my coding scheme.

[13] The Conservative Party was in government from 1979 to 1997, the Labour Party from 1997 to 2010, and the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties have been in coalition government since 2010.

the time of the vote, she held a position associated with a ministry, shadow ministry, or the offices of the party whips or Speakers of either chamber but were not required to attend cabinet meetings.

The published biographical information typically includes only the years an MP or Peer held her positions in either the cabinet (as a minister or shadow minister) or the sub-cabinet, rather than precise start and end dates. I therefore coded individuals who started a position during an election year as holding it from the election date. Similarly, I coded individuals who left a position during an election year as holding it up until the day of the election. If an individual started or left a position during a year in which there was no general election, I coded them as having the position for the entire year. Once an individual no longer held their position, they were no longer coded as belonging to the cabinet or sub-cabinet.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 shows the *Voting Rebellion* (where absences are removed) rates of each chamber as a whole.[14] It shows that rebellion is rare in both chambers, and party-line voting is therefore by far the norm. Table 3 shows the *Eligible Rebellions* (where absence equals loyalty) by individuals belonging to the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democratic Parties who have served as both MPs and Peers. Table 4 shows *Voting Rebellions* for the same group. The tables show that all told, rebellion is remarkably rare in both chambers but as a group, these individuals appear more likely to rebel after elevation to the House of Lords (0.571% vs. 0.979% for *Eligible Rebellions* and 1.135% vs. 1.865% for *Voting Rebellions*) than they were while serving in the House of Commons.

While rebellions are relatively rare, absences are not. Table 5 shows *Absence Rebellions* where absences are treated as disloyalty. MPs either voted against their party or refrained from

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[14] This includes MPs and Peers who have not served in both chambers.

voting at all 36.03 percent of the time while for Peers, this figure reaches more than half of all

possible votes, 50.19 percent. Many of the absences in the House of Commons, 18 percent, come

from the fact that cabinet members are often absent from divisions because they have to fulfill

numerous duties away from Westminster. Since Cabinet ministers are drawn almost exclusively

from the Commons,[15] this significantly contributes to MP absence rates. However, the same

cannot be said for the House of Lords.

<center>[Tables 2-5 about here]</center>

One might suspect that the decision to focus on individuals who have served in both

chambers introduces a selection bias, in that the behavior of these people is systematically

different from the behavior of those who have served only in the House of Commons or only in

the House of Lords, but not both. This is not an unreasonable suspicion; party leaders are likely

more inclined to promote the most loyal MPs to the unaccountable, life-long appointment that is

a seat in the House of Lords, and to pass over those who required discipline during their careers

as MPs. However, because former ministers and shadow ministers are significantly more likely

to be promoted to the House of Lords, this group is also the most likely to show the patterns that

would distinguish cohesion from discipline because ministers are often subject to the highest

levels of disciplinary pressure. As previously mentioned, ministers and shadow ministers

typically must resign their positions when they rebel on a major policy issues. Thus, they have

the most incentive to remain loyal. On the other hand, when these former MPs move into the

House of Lords they can vote as they wish without fear of political retribution. Nonetheless,

since those promoted are also the most likely to be like-minded, I present a very conservative test

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[15] There are by necessity certain cabinet positions that must be fulfilled by a Peer, including Speaker of the House of

Lords and Chief Whip in the House of Lords.

of the importance of discipline in the House of Commons

Table 6 compares the *Voting Rebellion* rates of the each chamber as a whole as well as only those who have taken seats in both chambers. Individuals who are promoted to the House of Lords are less rebellious in the House of Commons than other MPs (1.135% vs. 1.433%). On the other hand, after elevation, they are marginally more rebellious than other Peers (1.865% vs. 1.722%). There therefore appears to be a selection effect that is consistent with the idea that potential advancement to the House of Lords can be used to discipline MPs, and makes it less likely that I will find evidence of discipline.

[Table 6 about here]

V.   Analysis and Discussion

I use a probability linear model (PLM) to analyze of the changes in voting behavior as an individual moves from the disciplined House of Commons to the undisciplined House of Lords. PLM produces similar results to those of a logistic regression over the probabilities of rebellion we observe, which are quite small in both chambers. The PLM method is also preferable in this case because, as a variant of the ordinary least squares method, interpreting the coefficients is straightforward; they represent the changes in the probability that the dependent variable (rebellion) equals 1 for each unit increase in the independent variable. In all of the regressions I present, I use person fixed effects. This allows me to keep individual characteristics and ideologies constant.

Table 7 shows the results of the most basic model, with only membership in the House of Lords and person fixed effects as independent variables. For every measure of rebellion, the *Lords* coefficient is positive and highly significant. This means that any given individual is more

likely to rebel after she is freed from discipline. Looking first at *Eligible Rebellions* and *Voting Rebellions*, the move from the House of Commons to the House of Lords increases an individual's total likelihood of rebellion by between 0.37 and 0.62 percent. This may not seem like very much, but when we consider that the overall rebellion rate in each chamber never exceeds 2%, these increases in levels of disloyalty are actually quite substantial. *Absence Rebellions* also show a significant increase. The likelihood of rebellion or absence increases by 7.65 percent after entering the House of Lords. The overall *Absence Rebellion* rate in the House of Lords is 50.19 percent so once again, this increase in the probability of rebellion is relatively large.

[Table 7 about here]

For the rest of the analysis I focus on *Voting Rebellions*, which remove absences from the data. While not as conservative a measure of disloyalty as *Eligible Rebellions*, which treat absences as loyalty, it is not as generous a measure as *Absence Rebellions,* which treat absences as rebellions. The models in Table 8 include several sets of control variables to account for factors that may influence the level of rebellion that parties are willing or able to allow.

[Table 8 about here]

I first control for the issue area of the vote. Though the subject of the division does influence overall rebellion rates, the *Lords* coefficient remains significant and positive and actually increases relative to the baseline model in Table 7.

Next, I control for government status. The results contradict the traditional hypothesis that government MPs should be less likely to rebel. Instead, the individuals in my dataset are 1% more likely overall to rebel. This is surprising, but it may be heavily influenced by the current coalition government. Because the coalition government in Britain was the result of the most

recent election, and because my data set is limited to politicians who have served in both chambers, all of the MP votes in my dataset took place during single-party governments. [16] Therefore, the only data I have during the coalition period is from the House of Lords. This most likely also inflates the *Coalition* and *Coalition*Government* coefficients in model 3 of Table 8, because the Conservative and Liberal Democrat leaders do not have the disciplinary tools to induce loyalty among their Peers. Nonetheless, the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Peers in my dataset are 3.8 percent more likely to rebel during the period of coalition government—more than twice the average rebellion rate in the House of Lords. These controls also remove the significant positive effect of government status on the probability of rebellion, though they do not cause the coefficient to reverse sign.

A recent example of these problems within the parties in coalition government is the issue of tuition fees. During the 2010 general election campaign, the Liberal Democrat manifesto promised to eliminate tuition fees for university students. However, after less than a year, the government tripled tuition fees in England and Wales (Griffiths, 2011). Although there were many Liberal Democrat MPs who defied the whip and voted against the proposal, enough remained loyal to allow the measure to pass. In contrast, many Liberal Democrat Peers spoke *against* the measure in the Lords, and either voted against the bill or simply absented themselves.

Another interesting result of this specification is that the coefficient for the *Lords* variable becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, from 2000 to 2010, when the Labour party was the only party in government, an individual would be no more likely to rebel in the House of Lords than

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[16] Former MPs are most often take seats in the House of Lords in the months following a general election. Because there has been no general election since 2010, MPs that have served under the coalition government have not yet had the opportunity to enter the House of Lords.

the House of Commons. Because single party majority governments can often enact their most favored agenda while parties in coalitions must compromise, the results show a government-party Peer to be more likely to rebel only when her party deviates from its political platform. This implies that the individuals in my dataset behave loyally in the House of Lords despite the removal of discipline, and only increase their rates of rebellion when their parties ask them to support coalition compromises instead of traditional party policy platforms.

Finally, I control for an individual's status as a cabinet or sub-cabinet member. As expected, those who hold positions in the party hierarchy are substantially less likely to be disloyal. The effect of moving to the House of Lords, however, becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Only 7.6 percent of my data from the House of Lords comes from ministers or sub-cabinet members, while 50.55 percent of the House of Commons votes are by MPs in the cabinet or sub-cabinet (see Table 9). This, combined with the small and insignificant results of House of Lords membership in model 4 of Table 8, implies that the differences we observe for individuals as they move from the House of Commons to the House of Lords is not the result of the change in chambers per se, but instead the result of moving from cabinet or sub-cabinet positions within the party to the backbenches. Nonetheless, I argue that this shows that prospects for advancement (either to the cabinet for those currently in the sub-cabinet or to a Peerage for current ministers) are effective disciplinary tools, serving to repress an individual's propensity to rebel.

[Table 9 about here]

VI.   Conclusion

Cohesion is clearly strong…

The results suggest that partisan cohesion in the United Kingdom is extremely high for

several reasons. First, the low probability of rebellion, even in the "discipline-free" House of Lords, shows that shared preferences are often sufficient to maintain consistent party-line voting. Second, changes in the rates of party-line voting seem to be driven mainly by either participation in the cabinet or sub-cabinet, or the coalition status of the government, rather than the chamber an individual sits in.

The low levels of rebellion in the House of Lords show an important implication of this project; it is possible to maintain a strongly loyal group within a legislative body with neither institutional nor coercive measures to enforce it. This seems to support Krehbiel's view of political parties as groups of individuals who agree with each other. On the other hand, the time an individual spends in the House of Commons can be viewed as a decades-long interview, which allows party leaders to ensure they only choose candidates for promotion who need little convincing to back party policy.

There are, of course, several alternative if largely untestable factors that could explain the patterns we observe. The party leadership in the House of Commons might decide that some divisions are unimportant from either an issue or saliency standpoint and therefore not worth making disciplinary threats to enforce loyalty. In these instances, there is probably an implicit direction the party whips urge an MP to vote, even if they do not intend to enforce their suggestions with consequences.[17] Similarly, the party leadership may realize that attempting to control all MPs all of the time will be impossible and will accept a need to choose their ideological battles. Thus, there may be some small base level of rebellion for each individual that they accept will occur; the tools in the disciplinary arsenal will only be deployed when an MP's

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[17] This is as opposed to free votes, in which the party has no official position. Typically, free votes are called on matters of conscience—policies that govern moral issues such as abortion or the death penalty.

rebellion rate starts to exceed this amount. Leaders would certainly be aware of which MPs they have to discipline the least and may only promote those individuals to the cabinet positions and the House of Lords. If this is true, it should be no surprise that we should see little difference in the probability of rebellion for the same person in the Commons and the Lords—only the true believers get elevated.

It is also possible that the only individuals who are willing to accept Peerages are those who strongly support their party and therefore are highly cohesive with their co-partisans. Serving as a Peer has opportunity costs; there is no salary associated with the position (Rogers and Walters, 2004).[18] The levels of experience and expertise typical of former MPs appointed to the House of Lords could certainly prove lucrative in the private sector or on the lecture circuit. Taking a seat in the House of Lords, therefore, may prove to be more hassle than it is worth. Even if these retiring MPs do decide take a seat, they are likely to be absent quite often. Furthermore, the level of influence an individual has as a Peer is significantly reduced as compared to being a cabinet member, or senior MP. It is therefore likely that there is a second selection effect, where only those who feel strongly cohesive with their parties are willing to take seats in the House of Lords and then be willing to make the effort to show up and vote.

… but cohesion can fail

The results show that a Peer whose party is participating in a coalition government is much more likely to rebel against her party than any other politician. This suggests that cohesion holds only as long as each political party stays true to its party platform while in government. When compromises on policy are necessitated by multi-party government, intraparty cohesion is

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[18] The few ministers that sit in the Lords are awarded a salary by the relevant government department, but the level of daily allowances they are allowed to claim is decreased.

no longer sufficient to maintain consistent party-line voting. Discipline can then be imposed in the House of Commons, but not in the House of Lords.

Next Steps

Unfortunately, as of the writing of this paper, there are no Peers who served as MPs under a coalition government. This makes it impossible at the present time to compare how the same person acts under coalition government while both subjected to and freed from discipline. Many political commentators in Great Britain believe that coalition governments will become more common in the future. If this proves to be the case, the next decade should see enough MPs elevated to the House of Lords to allow for a more thorough analysis.

There may also be some bias in my dataset because *Voting Rebellion* and *Absence Rebellion* data are only available from 1992. For Conservative Peers particularly, this means I often do not have data that span an MP's entire career. Instead, the data I have at times covers only the periods where an individual was either a minister in the House of Commons, or a backbench Peer in the House of Lords. In the future, it would be beneficial to collect data on the entire time these individuals were in the House of Commons. I would also like to collect parliamentary career data on all MPs and Peers in the British Parliament. This would allow me to determine how large the selection effect might be in determining who gets elevated to the House of Lords.

Another interesting step would be to remove the British equivalent of what Cox and McCubbins (2007) term "motherhood and apple pie votes"—votes on uncontroversial and relatively mundane issues. Keeping these in the data essentially equate indifference with loyalty, making rebellion look that much more unusual. This problem is mitigated to a certain extent in my paper because I choose to focus only on specific issue areas but a more narrow focus on

divisions that are politically salient would provide a clearer picture of the relative frequency of rebellion and loyalty in each chamber.

Appendix 1: Issue Coding Scheme

I used the following key phrases to code the issue areas of the divisions in my dataset: European Community, European Union, European Elections, the Common Agricultural Policy, or the Common Fisheries Policy, counter-terrorism, terrorism, social security, and pensions

The parliamentary records (Hansards) are divided into sections and sub-sections for each day. The sub-sections typically have titles regarding the subject of debate. If any of the key phrases appeared in the title of the sub-section, I coded all divisions included within it as pertaining to the relevant issue area. For example, on February 14, 1984, there were 5 divisions in the subsection of the Commons Sitting portion of the Hansard titled "Social Security". All five of these divisions were included in my dataset under the social security and pensions issue area.

Divisions were also included if any of the key phrases appeared in the proposal being voted on. For example, the proposal associated with division No. 106 on March 24, 2004 was "That this House takes note of European Union Document No. 15388/03, draft Regulation.." I therefore included it in the European Union issue area. Similarly, if amendments being voted on included any of the key words, I also included them.

Finally, I examined the debates that occurred in the chamber before each division. If one of the key phrases was mentioned by more than three different individuals, it was included. This most often applied to counterterrorism divisions. Often these divisions were part of debates on emergency legislation in Northern Ireland.

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Table 1: Predicted Influence on Probability of Rebellion

Variable	Prediction
Lords Membership	+
Counterterrorism Votes	?
Europe Votes	?
Social Security Votes	?
Government Party Membership	-
Coalition Government	+
Coalition Government * Government Party	+
Cabinet Membership	-
Sub-Cabinet Membership	-

Table 2: "Voting Rebellions" of all MPs and Peers

	Commons	Lords
Loyal Votes	312,732	41,422
Rebellious Votes	4,546	726
% Rebellions	1.433	1.722

"Voting Rebellions" remove absences

Table 3: "Eligible Rebellions" of MPs who became Peers

	Eligible Rebellions		
	Commons (1979-2010)	Commons (1992-2010)	Lords (2000-2012)
Loyal Votes	109,779	53,939	22,445
Rebellious Votes	627	398	222
% Rebellions	0.571	0.732	0.979

"Eligible Rebellions" treat absences as loyalty

Table 4: "Voting Rebellions" of MPs who became Peers

	Voting Rebellions	
	Commons (1992-2010)	Lords (2000-2012)
Loyal Votes	34,680	11679
Rebellious Votes	398	222
% Rebellions	1.135	1.865

"Voting Rebellions" remove absences

Table 5: "Absence Rebellions" of MPs who became Peers

	Absence Rebellions	
	Commons (1992-2010)	Lords (2000-2012)
Loyal Votes	35,456	11,854
Rebellious Votes	19,971	11,945
% Rebellions	36.03	50.19

"Absence Rebellions" treat absence as rebellion

Table 6: "Voting Rebellions" of all MPs and Peers

	All		Served in Both Houses	
	Commons	Lords	Commons	Lords
Loyal Votes	312,732	41,422	34,680	11,679
Rebellious Votes	4,546	726	398	222
% Rebellions	1.433	1.722	1.135	1.865

"Voting Rebellions" remove absences

Table 7:

	Dependent variable:			
	Rebellions			
	PLM			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Eligible	Eligible[a]	Voting[b]	Absence[c]
	(1979-2012)	(1992-2012)	(1992-2012)	(1992-2012)
Lords	0.0041***	0.0037***	0.0062***	0.0765***
	(0.0006)	(0.0009)	(0.0015)	(0.0048)
Constant	0.0091**	0.0096**	0.0155**	0.3815***
	(0.0031)	(0.0033)	(0.0053)	(0.0179)
Observations	$133,072$	$77,003$	$46,978$	$77,003$
R^2	0.0412	0.0683	0.1011	0.0841
Adjusted R^2	0.0398	0.1366	0.0975	0.0818
Residual Std. Error	0.078	0.0864	0.1084	0.469
	(df = 132876)	(df=76811)	(df=46786)	(df=76811)
F statistic	29.15***	29.31***	27.42***	36.72***
	(df = 196; 132876)	(df=192; 76811)	(df=192; 46786)	(df=192; 76811)

Note: $^*p < 0.1;^{**} p < 0.05;^{***} p < 0.01$
All regressions include person fixed effects

[a]"Eligible Rebellions" treat absence as loyalty
[b]"Voting Rebellions" remove absences from the data
[c]"Absence Rebellions" treat absence as rebellion

Table 8:

	(1)[b]	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Dependent variable:			
	Voting Rebellions[a]			
	(1992-2012)			
	PLM			
Lords	0.0081***	0.0065***	0.0004	−.0002
	(0.0015)	(0.0056)	(0.0017)	(0.0015)
Europe	0.004**			
	(0.0013)			
Social Security	−0.0057***			
	(0.0013)			
Government		0.0098***	0.0022	
		(0.0012)	(0.0014)	
Coalition			−0.0118***	
			(0.0032)	
Coalition *Government			0.0506***	
			(0.0043)	
Cabinet				−0.0112***
				(0.002)
Sub-Cabinet				−0.0205***
				(0.0015)
Constant	0.0153**	0.009	0.0158**	0.0165**
	(0.0053)	(0.0053)	(0.0053)	(0.0053)
Observations	46,978	46,978	46,978	46,978
R^2	0.1024	0.1024	0.1059	0.1051
Adjusted R^2	0.0987	0.0987	0.1022	0.1014
Residual Std. Error	0.1083	0.1083	0.1081	0.1082
	(df = 46784)	(df = 46785)	(df = 46783)	(df=46784)
F statistic	27.52***	27.65 * **	28.42***	28.33***
	(df = 194; 46784)	(df = 193; 46785)	(df=195; 46783)	(df=194; 46784)

Note: $^*p < 0.1;^{**} p < 0.05;^{***} p < 0.01$
All regressions include person fixed effects.

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[a]"Voting Rebellions" remove absences
[b]Counterterroism is the omitted issue variable

Table 9: Votes of Cabinet and Sub-Cabinet

	Commons (1992-2010)	Lords (2000-2012)
Backbench	28,051	29,151
Cabinet or Sub-Cabinet	28,673	2,399
% Cabinet or Sub-Cabinet	50.55	7.6