

# **Party Competition and Party Behavior:**

## **The Impact of Extreme Right-Wing Parties on Mainstream Parties' Positions on Multiculturalism**

**Kyung Joon Han**

**The University of Tennessee**

**(khan1@utk.edu)**

### **Abstract**

The electoral success and rise of extreme right-wing parties in European countries lead us to question the policy impact of the parties. However, it is not easy to examine the direct policy impact of the parties because they have rarely been in government. Instead, this paper studies their impact on mainstream parties' positions on an issue that has been one of the main issues raised by extreme right-wing parties: multiculturalism. Using the analyses on the Comparative Manifesto Project data from 1981 to 2008, this paper finds that party competition between mainstream parties as well as the threat of extreme right-wing parties decides the positions of mainstream parties on multiculturalism. It also finds that a mainstream party's position shift is influenced by the position of its opponent mainstream party on the other side of the political spectrum. It implies that the policy and position impact of extreme right-wing parties on other parties should be understood in a broader background of the party system that defines the competition as well as the cooperation between parties.

## Introduction

The second wave of the rise of extreme right-wing parties has been observed since the late 1990s. In the first wave in the 1980s, the parties surprised many people by getting enough votes to get seats in local elections (Kitschelt 1995). The rise of the parties waned in the 1990s because of the introduction of restrictive policies on the inflow and integration of foreign people. However, the parties began to revive in the late 1990s and stunned the public again by threatening major parties in elections. Extreme right-wing parties in many countries, such as Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands, were successful in getting votes that were enough to give pressure to mainstream parties.<sup>1</sup>

Though there is no consensus in whether extreme right-wing parties are ‘single issue parties’ that focus only on one issue such as immigration, literature commonly suggests that issues on multiculturalism, immigration, and race have played a key role in the success of the parties (Norris 2005; Mudde 2007). For example, Ignazi (2003) concluded on the Norwegian Progress Party that the party had “connected the immigration issue with security and law and order issues, which became the party’s new main theme in the late 1980s/early 1990s”, and this theme had been “the driving force for the party’s success” in the period.

The rise of extreme right-wing parties attracted many scholars. However, while we can find numerous studies on the factors for the parties’ success and the determinants of the support for the parties, “the least examined aspect of the emergence of the radical right during the past 20 years is its impact on politics and policy” (Schain 2006). Thus, this paper examines the policy

---

<sup>1</sup> In 1999 in Austria, the Freedom Party of Austria slightly surpassed the Austria’s People’s Party. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party began to beat the Conservative People’s Party in 2001 though it has remained trailing the Social Democrats and the Liberals. In the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom outdid the Christian Democratic Appeal though it has not done the Labour Party and a major liberal party (the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy).

impacts of the parties. The direct impact of the parties on policy outputs or outcomes is, however, not easy to test. Policies on multiculturalism and immigration are hard to measure and compare. In addition, the parties have rarely been in government (Williams 2006; Mudde 2007). Therefore, this paper assesses indirect impacts of the parties: the impact of extreme right-wing parties on mainstream parties' positions on multiculturalism.

### **Extreme Right-Wing Parties and Policy Effects**

Most of the literature on extreme right-wing parties presents the lack of consensus on the concept and the identification of extreme right-wing parties. Though people have suggested several characteristics of the parties such as anti-multiculturalism, nationalism, traditional values, anti-immigration, racism, and anti-democracy, we can find no strong consensus on what 'extreme right-wing parties' mean and what political parties can be called extreme right-wing parties.<sup>2</sup> People have not agreed even on the term. They have preferred and used different terms for the parties that demonstrate such characteristics: 'extreme', 'radical', or 'populist'.<sup>3</sup>

Besides the conceptual aspects of the extreme right-wing parties, many studies have tried to answer why the parties had been successful and who had tended to vote for the parties. They found that the rise of extreme right-wing parties were determined by contextual factors such as increasing immigration and unemployment rates (Arzheimer 2009), institutional factors such as the electoral system (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Golder 2003), international factors such as

---

<sup>2</sup> Mudde (1996) surveyed 26 different definitions of right-wing extremism in the literature on the parties and found that five features are mentioned by at least half of the authors: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state.

<sup>3</sup> For detailed historic and contextual meaning of each term, see Ignazi (2003). This paper adopts the term of 'extreme' right-wing parties. The term of 'radical' has connotations of anti-system and social movements rather than political parties, and that of 'popular' causes ambiguity. Using the term of 'extreme' seems to be consistent with the focus of this paper because it denotes the parties' very rightward ideological locations.

contagion (Rydgren 2005), the behaviors of other parties such as the convergence of mainstream parties (Kitschelt 1995; Veugelers and Magnan 2005), and the interaction of these factors (Norris 2005). Studies on the determinants of supports for the parties concluded that the attitudinal factors such as the attitudes toward foreign people and immigration as well as demographic factors such as income, age, occupation, and religion decide whether to vote for the parties (Vvan der Brug and Fennema 2003; Rydgren 2008).

In contrast to the huge volume of literature on the concepts and the success of the parties, their impacts on policy outputs have been left intact (Schain 2006). One direct way for political parties to influence policy outputs is participating in governments and implementing their own policies as government members. However, extreme right-wing parties could not get enough votes to be in government until very recent elections. More importantly, extreme right-wing parties have not been considered as legitimate coalition partners by other political parties as well as by the public because of their anti-regime ideologies (Knigge 1998).<sup>4</sup>

However, it does not mean that extreme right-wing parties could not have impacts on policies on migration, race, or multiculturalism. Literature suggests that the policy impacts of the parties have been indirect rather than direct (Schain 2006; Williams 2006; Mudde 2007). A new party can bring a new issue on the agenda table and add a new issue dimension in party competition. Then, the party can shift the entire policy spectrum toward the new issue position that the party itself raised. Extreme right-wing parties have done this. The parties, by mobilizing the issues of multiculturalism, race, and immigration, have altered the distribution of voters and shifted it to the right (Thränhardt 1995). New political parties can also determine policy outputs

---

<sup>4</sup> The political backlash against the Austrian government that included the Freedom Party of Austria after the 1999 election shows how much extreme right-wing parties are considered illegitimate in Europe. Anticipating the formation of a new government including the party, EU countries signed for political sanctions on Austria including no support in favor of Austrian candidates seeking positions in international organizations (Freeman 2002).

by influencing the policy choices of other parties, particularly mainstream ones (Harmel and Svåsand 1997). The electoral success of extreme right-wing parties, as well as the growing hostility to people with different ethnicity and races, has given pressure or opportunities to mainstream parties on both sides of the political spectrum. Some parties decided to jump on the bandwagon because they, particularly right-wing parties, believed that the issues raised by extreme right-wing parties could provide opportunities to expand a broad right-wing bloc (Pettigrew 1998; Bale 2003). Some other parties, right-wing as well as left-wing ones, felt threatened by the rise of extreme right-wing parties because the electoral success was achieved by the expense of mainstream parties in many cases (Norris 2005).

Though there may be no disagreement in saying that mainstream parties have been influenced by the rise of extreme right-wing parties, it is not clear *how* the rise has impacted the mainstream parties' positions or policy outcomes on issues related with extreme right-wing parties. Also, though the effect of extreme right-wing parties on mainstream parties' policy modification has been theoretically suggested, empirical evidence does not abound. Williams (2006) attempted to test the effect quantitatively, but he could not find any significant relationship between the two.<sup>5</sup>

However, this paper suggests that mainstream parties do not shift their policy positions just because of the electoral rise of extreme right-wing parties. If the rise happened without the expense of a mainstream party, the party will not feel threatened by the rise much and want to shift its position on issues mobilized by the extreme right-wing parties. The rise of extreme right-wing parties does not give equal pressure to mainstream parties. Kitschelt (1995) suggests that the cross-country variation in the party system and that in the political economic structure have

---

<sup>5</sup> By looking at simple bivariate correlations between the positions of extreme right-wing parties and right-wing mainstream parties, she expected a strong relationship between the two, but she could not find it.

made different aspects of extreme right-wing parties more or less attractive to voters. For example, the convergence of two mainstream parties leaves the right side of the political spectrum unoccupied, so the emergence of extreme right-wing parties appeals to right-wing voters. However, the ‘welfare chauvinist’ appeal will work, and many left-wing voters, particularly manual workers, will feel attracted by the parties in countries whose economies are not quite in the advanced post-industrial phase. Thus, it is not certain whether left-wing or right-wing mainstream parties will be more threatened by rising extreme right-wing parties. Then, we can expect that mainstream parties, right-wing ones as well as left-wing ones, will change their positions and adopt the stances of extreme right-wing parties when they feel threatened by the growth of extreme right-wing parties (Harmel and Svåsand 1997; Bale et al. 2010).

This paper suggests that party competition between mainstream parties decides their strategic responses to the rise of extreme right-wing parties. Literature on interactions between mainstream and niche parties (Meguid 2007) as well as that on extreme right-wing parties (Thränhardt 1995; Bale 2003; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008) suggests that the configuration of party competition is a major factor for strategic choices of mainstream parties. Thus, this paper puts party competition in the center of the analysis and tests the effect of extreme right-wing parties on the mainstream parties’ positions on multiculturalism using time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) quantitative data.

## **Hypothesis**

Regarding the question of the impact of extreme right-wing parties on mainstream parties’ positions on multiculturalism, this paper suggests that mainstream parties do not shift their

positions just because of the electoral rise of extreme right-wing parties, but their position-taking is a strategic choice that is made within the party system to which they belong. An important aspect of the party system is party competition: the party system defines the competition and strategic interactions between political parties (Ware 1996; Aldrich 2011).

The fact that extreme right-wing parties are gaining more votes does not necessarily mean that either mainstream party is automatically losing votes. If supporters for center-right parties switch to voting for extreme right-wing parties, which was the case in France before 1984, center-left parties are hardly affected. In the same way, if votes come from center-left parties to extreme right-wing parties, e.g. France after 1984, center-right parties do not feel threatened much by the rise of extreme right-wing parties (Schain 2006). None of the mainstream parties may be threatened much if the new votes for extreme right-wing parties are from those who used to abstain from voting. Thus, the rise of extreme right-wing parties may bring in different electoral impacts to each mainstream party.

Many of the studies on issues that are related on the rise of extreme right-wing parties, such as multiculturalism, immigration, race, and xenophobia, suggest that parties' strategic choices of position-taking are strongly driven by party competition (Thränhardt 1995; Harmel and Svåsand 1997; Bale 2003; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Bale et al. 2010). For example, Schain (1988) studied how the immigration issue had changed the party competition and the party system in France and examined why the Communist Party had introduced restrictive measures on foreign people in the 1970s. According to him, it was not the change in public opinion but the decline of the party in the party system that made the party mobilize issues against foreign people. He concluded that the party "reacted more to the changing dynamics of

the party system than to mass opinion in raising and nurturing the issues of immigration and racism” (Schain 1988, 598).

Political parties may feel less threatened by the rise of extreme right-wing parties if the rise is not substantially at their expense (Harmel and Svåsand 1997). Alternatively, they may benefit from the rise of the parties if it hurts their main opponents because a party’s electoral prospect can be enhanced just by the electoral loss of its opponent party (Adams and Merrill 2006).<sup>6</sup> In other words, if we assume that the main opponent of a mainstream party is another mainstream party on the other side of the political spectrum, the two mainstream parties can react to the rise of extreme right-wing parties in different ways.

Meguid (2007) theorized the competition between niche parties and mainstream parties and suggested hypotheses on how mainstream parties react to the rise of niche parties. It argued that the strategic choices of mainstream parties are largely determined by the outcome of electoral competition between mainstream parties. A mainstream party will adopt the position of a rising niche party if it is more threatened (losing relatively more votes) by the rise than its opponent is. By adopting the position, the party expects that it can counterbalance and consequently undermine the rise (Williams 2006).<sup>7</sup> In contrast, a mainstream party will take the opposite position from a niche party if it believes that its opponent is more threatened by the rise of the party. By doing so, the party can enhance the issue salience and sustain the comparative advantage.

---

<sup>6</sup> For example, while the vote share of the Austrian People’s Party dropped by 7.97 percent point in the 2006 election from the previous election, that of the Social Democratic Party dropped only by 1.17 percent point. Consequently, the Social Democratic Party became the biggest party and went into the government. Though the party lost votes in the absolute term, it gained political power in the relative term.

<sup>7</sup> The strategy has sometimes worked out: e.g. the aggressive mobilization of race, multiculturalism, and immigration issues by Thatcher substantially damaged the British National Front in the 1979 election (Thränhardt 1995).

This paper first borrows a part of Meguid's arguments on mainstream parties' strategic responses to niche parties: mainstream parties' positions on multiculturalism in the face of the rise of extreme right-wing parties are determined by the changes in the relative vote share of two mainstream parties. Thus, this paper first hypothesizes that a mainstream party does not shift its position on multiculturalism unless the rise of extreme right-wing parties is accompanied with the vote loss of the mainstream party that is greater than that of its opponent mainstream party.

*H<sub>1</sub>: Mainstream parties shift their positions on multiculturalism toward those of extreme right-wing parties when they are electorally threatened by the parties more than their opponent mainstream parties are.*

However, a caveat of Meguid's theory is that it does not assume that the policy shift of mainstream parties costs to the parties. It presumes that mainstream parties are free to move their positions in any direction. Nonetheless, the party behaviors on the issues of multiculturalism, race, and immigration imply that the adoption of the positions of extreme right-wing parties have offered risks as well as opportunities for mainstream, particularly left-wing, parties despite the popularity of the extreme right-wing parties.

The adoption sometimes has instigated intra-party opposition from many directions. Ethnic minority people tend to vote for left-wing parties, making themselves a major constituency for the parties (Faist 1994; Messina 2007). Left-wing parties comprise many members who are ideologically more committed to liberal ideas, such as cultural pluralism, equality, and the rejection of discrimination (Lahav 2004; Ireland 2004). Therefore, whenever left-wing parties attempted to, or actually did, adopt the views on multiculturalism, race, and

immigration that were advocated by extreme right-wing parties, the shift triggered intra-party conflicts and sometimes internal split. The introduction of the Immigration and Asylum Act in 1999 by the Labour government that added more restrictive clauses on asylum seekers brought about conflicts between party leaders and backbenchers. The adoption sometimes makes voters withdraw their supports and turn to other parties. The Dutch Labor Party's approval of the stances of extreme right-wing parties in the 1990s drove some core voters to support either the GreenLeft or the Socialist Party (Bale et al. 2010).

The costs and risks for left-wing mainstream parties are intensified when they adopt the positions without other mainstream parties' doing the same thing. Multiculturalism and race have been explosive issues even for extreme right-wing parties because they could "go out of hand" anytime by provoking voters (Thränhardt 1995). Extreme right-wing parties have also known this, so they have been very astute in mobilizing the issues without relying on using outright racist terms (Betz 1993). Then, adopting the positions without right-wing parties' mobilization of the multiculturalism issues weakens the legitimacy of the left-wing parties' position shifts. In addition, the right-wing mainstream parties' mobilization of the multiculturalism issues is believed by left-wing parties to be their attempts to expand the right bloc (Bale 2003; Williams 2006). Thus, the adoption of the positions by right-wing parties as well as the rise of extreme right-wing parties and the left-wing parties' relative vote loss amplifies the pressure on left-wing parties to adopt the negative positions (Bale et al. 2010). Therefore, this paper hypothesizes that the relative threat effect on left-wing mainstream parties is increased with the mobilization of multiculturalism issue by right-wing mainstream parties.

*H<sub>2</sub>: When right-wing mainstream parties do not mobilize multiculturalism issues in a negative way, left-wing parties are not likely to adopt negative positions on multiculturalism even in the face of relatively strong threat of extreme right-wing parties. However, the effect of relative threat increases as right-wing mainstream parties strengthen their negative stances on multiculturalism.*

## **Data and Variables**

This paper examines how the rise of extreme right-wing parties affects the policy positions of mainstream parties on issues mobilized by the parties. To examine the parties' policy positions, this paper uses the data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). Of course, their real policy choices in government may differ from their positions in electoral manifestos. The real policy outputs may differ from their pre-electoral commitments also because they have to negotiate with other coalition partners. However, election manifestos are formulated to represent the strategic choices of their identities (Harmel and Svåsand 1997). Thus, analyzing their manifestos helps us to understand the strategic shifts of parties' behaviors.

Some literature rejects the idea of the 'single-issue party' that says extreme right-wing parties focus only the issue of immigration or issues that are related with it, such as race, xenophobia, and multiculturalism (Mudde 1999). However, it is still acceptable to say that the issues compose the top salient issues for the parties (Mudde 2007). Two variables in the CMP data directly indicate the issues: the variable *per607* measures parties' positive statement on multiculturalism while *per608* does negative one.<sup>8</sup> This paper uses the difference between the

---

<sup>8</sup> The description of *per607* from the codebook is as follows: cultural diversity, communalism, cultural plurality and pillarisation; preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special

positive and negative positions on multiculturalism of mainstream parties as a dependent variable. The data covers thirteen European countries from 1981 to 2008.<sup>9</sup>

Before introducing the independent variables, it should be discussed which parties are included in this paper as extreme right-wing parties and mainstream parties. Socialist parties are considered left-wing mainstream parties. The identification of right-wing mainstream parties follows Meguid (2007) though some alternatives also are tested.<sup>10</sup>

Classifying extreme right-wing parties is a very challenging and demanding work. Literature has included and excluded parties for various reasons. Because this paper focuses on the multiculturalism issue, political parties that are believed to have very conservative stances on the issue broadly defined, such as nationalism, nativism, exclusionism, and xenophobia (Mudde 2007), by literature are considered to be extreme right-wing parties. Table 1 presents the list of extreme right-wing parties. The third column includes the differences between average CMP multiculturalism scores of the parties and right-wing mainstream parties and shows that the parties have maintained more restrictive positions on the issue than right-wing mainstream parties have. I ran a multinomial logit model of voting for each of political parties using the European Social Survey data, and the fourth and the fifth columns in Table 1 summarize the coefficients of the variables of the attitudes toward immigration and foreign people in each

---

educational provisions. The description of *per608* is given as follows: enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration; otherwise as 607, but negative.

<sup>9</sup> The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

<sup>10</sup> Two questions are raised regarding the list in Meguid (2007). First, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) is a right-wing mainstream party in the Netherlands in the literature. However, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) is another conservative party that has been more conservative in cultural issues. The party had been larger than the VVD until the 2010 election and played a leading role in forming conservative coalition governments (Irwin 1998). The VVD has actually been included in left-wing coalition governments as well as in right-wing ones. Second, the same reservation goes to the inclusion of the Reformist Movement (PRL) and Open Flemish and Democrats (Open VLD) or its predecessor the Party for Freedom and Progress (PVV) in Belgium. Alternatively, the Christian Democratic and Flemish CD&V or its predecessor the Christian People's Party (CVP) can be considered for the same reason. Thus, alternate identification was tested, but the test did not produce substantially different results.

analysis.<sup>11</sup> The coefficients imply that the attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism were significant determinants of voting for the extreme right-wing parties in the list.<sup>12</sup> People who view that their countries' cultural life is undermined by immigrants and do not want many immigrants to come to their countries are more likely to vote for the parties.

<Table 1 Here>

This paper first hypothesizes that mainstream parties adopt more restrictive stances on multiculturalism when they are threatened by the rise of extreme right-wing parties more than their opponent mainstream parties are. Then, we need two conditions for this: there should be electoral threat and, at the same time, a mainstream party should be threatened more than its opponent mainstream party. Then, when are mainstream parties substantially threatened by the rise of extreme right-wing parties, and how can we measure the relative level of the threat?

Mainstream parties feel threatened by the rise of extreme right-wing parties when the parties get a fair number of votes in elections. Literature suggests that one of the groundbreaking moments for extreme right-wing parties is when they rise over the electoral threshold and obtain a parliamentary seat (Kitschelt 1995). Thus, this paper assumes that mainstream parties feel considerable threat when extreme right-wing parties go beyond the electoral thresholds.<sup>13</sup> This paper measures the relative level of the threat by relative gain or loss of votes between mainstream parties. If a mainstream party loses more votes or gains fewer votes than its

---

<sup>11</sup> I mainly used the European Social Survey Round 4 in 2008 except that the data does not include the parties. The following variables also are included in the model: age, gender, political ideology, household income, the education level, employment status, retirement status, the trust level on the EU, satisfaction in democracy, satisfaction in economy, and the attitudes on the cultural effect of immigrants.

<sup>12</sup> The results do not include Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain because extreme right-wing parties' emergence has been trivial in national elections. The extreme right-wing parties in the countries have not got more than 0.1 percent of vote share.

<sup>13</sup> The electoral threshold was calculated in the same way with Lijphart (1999).

opponent mainstream party, the party is assumed to be threatened more. Combining the two indicators, a binary variable for greater threat (*morethreat*) was constructed when extreme right-wing parties gain more votes than the electoral threshold and when a party suffers from the relative loss. It is expected that the variable *morethreat* makes mainstream parties adopt the stances of extreme right-wing parties on multiculturalism.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbf{morethreat}_{it} &= 1 && \text{if } V_{E(t-1)} > T \text{ and } [\{V_{i(t-1)}-V_{i(t-2)}\}-\{V_{j(t-1)}-V_{j(t-2)}\}] < 0 \quad \text{----- (1)} \\
 \mathbf{morethreat}_{it} &= 0 && \text{otherwise}
 \end{aligned}$$

( $V_E$ : vote share of extreme right-wing parties,  $V_i$ : vote share of a mainstream party,  $V_j$ : vote share of party  $i$ 's opponent mainstream party,  $T$ : electoral threshold,  $t$ : election at time  $t$ )

Another binary variable (*lessthreat*) is constructed for cases when extreme right-wing parties rise over the threshold but a party is improved with the relative gain of votes.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbf{lessthreat}_{it} &= 1 && \text{if } V_{E(t-1)} > T \text{ and } [\{V_{i(t-1)}-V_{i(t-2)}\}-\{V_{j(t-1)}-V_{j(t-2)}\}] > 0 \quad \text{----- (2)} \\
 \mathbf{lessthreat}_{it} &= 0 && \text{otherwise}
 \end{aligned}$$

The relative threat is also measured by the interaction of the relative vote change and the threat of extreme right-wing parties to mainstream parties. Now, the threat of extreme right-wing parties to mainstream parties is measured by the gap of vote share between the parties ( $V_{i(t-1)}-V_{E(t-1)}$ ). The threat is believed to be escalating as the gap decreases. Then, it is expected that the effect of the relative vote gain or loss increases as the vote share gap decreases.

The second hypothesis suggests that the position shift of left-wing mainstream parties is also determined by how much the multiculturalism issue is mobilized by right-wing mainstream parties. To test it, this paper employs the interaction term with the relative threat level variable (*morethreat*) and the negativity of right-wing mainstream parties' positions on multiculturalism. It is expected that the more negative are right-wing mainstream parties on multiculturalism, the more the relative threat makes left-wing mainstream parties adopt the stances of extreme right-wing parties.

The model also includes control variables. Public opinions on issues on multiculturalism, immigration, or race are included. Negative attitudes toward foreign people not only increase support for extreme right-wing parties but also shift the entire ideological spectrum on foreign people to the right (Williams 2006). The shift will definitely give pressure to mainstream parties. One critical problem is that it is very hard to get time-series cross-country data on the public opinion on the issues. Researchers usually look for questions in survey data, but they can hardly find the same question that has appeared in surveys for a long time.<sup>14</sup> One survey question that I could make use of is a question on foreign people in neighborhood. The European Values Survey and the World Values Survey asked the question of "I would not like to have immigrant/foreign workers as neighbors." The surveys used the same question from 1981 to 2008.<sup>15</sup> Though the question does not incorporate every aspect of multiculturalism, the question does not seem to have a critical problem in indicating attitudes toward foreign people, particularly from those from different culture. In addition, the question has exactly the same wording for the whole

---

<sup>14</sup> Ideally, the questions should have exactly the same wording both for questions and for answers.

<sup>15</sup> The survey years are 1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2008. The respondents were asked to answer by either saying yes or saying no to the question.

period covered in this paper.<sup>16</sup> Thus, this paper uses this question as an indicator of public opinion on foreigners.<sup>17</sup>

The shift of positions on multiculturalism might come from the shift of overall party ideologies. For example, the unexpectedly restrictive policies on foreign people implemented by the British Labour government after 1997 was seen as a part of the ‘New Labour’ modernization program which attempted to appeal to the middle-class people (Toynbee and Walker 2001) in general and also liberalized social welfare system as a tacit (Sales 2002). This paper uses the overall left/right positions of mainstream parties from the CMP data.<sup>18</sup> Table 2 presents the summary of descriptive data.

<Table 2 here>

To estimate the interacting effects on policy shifts of mainstream parties, this paper employs pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis. Specifically, this paper runs an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) with controlling for country-fixed effects (Beck and Katz 1995).

## **Analysis results**

---

<sup>16</sup> I use the moving averages for between-surveys years. The higher values indicate more positive attitudes.

<sup>17</sup> Because migration has been one of the major factors for the rise of extreme right-wing parties and the sources of pressure on mainstream parties, the share of foreign people out of population should be included, too. However, because the negative opinion on foreign people was driven largely by their inflow, including both the public opinion and the migration level causes a multicollinearity problem. The correlation between the two variables is actually substantial (0.3341). Thus, this paper includes only the public opinion variable because it is believed to influence the mainstream parties’ positions more directly than the migration level does. Including both variables change the results of the two variables, but not those of the main independent variable.

<sup>18</sup> The *Rile* variable in the data is used. The variable is constructed mostly with left/right positions on ‘old politics’, such as military expenditure, free capitalism, free trade, fiscal policies, and welfare.

Table 3 displays results for left-wing mainstream parties' positions on multiculturalism. Model (1) implies that the threat of extreme right-wing parties itself does not move the positions on multiculturalism. The variable of the vote share by extreme right-wing parties over a threshold is a binary variable that indicates whether the parties' vote share exceeds the electoral threshold of each country.<sup>19</sup> Model (2) suggests that what is more important is competition between mainstream parties. When a left-wing mainstream party loses more votes than a right-wing mainstream party, the left-wing mainstream party becomes more negative on multiculturalism.

<Table 3 here>

Model (3) and (4) employ the variables of relative threat (*morethreat*, *lessthreat*) and indicate that the relative threat determines the position-taking of the parties. The parties adopt the stances of extreme right-wing parties when they lose more votes (or gain fewer votes) than their opponents in the face of substantial threats from extreme right-wing parties. However, if they gain more votes (or lose fewer votes), they move against the positions of extreme right-wing parties even in the face of substantial threats.<sup>20</sup>

Model (5) uses an interaction term between the competition between mainstream parties and the vote gap between a mainstream party and extreme right-wing parties. The small gap indicates the threat of extreme right-wing parties, so it is expected that the competition between

---

<sup>19</sup> Using the vote share of extreme right-wing parties instead of the binary variable does not change the result.

<sup>20</sup> There can be a couple of explanations for the left-wing mainstream parties' moving against the positions of extreme right-wing parties. A vote-seeking behavior explanation implies that the left-wing mainstream parties may want to raise the salience of the extreme right-wing parties' issues, strengthen the electoral positions of the parties, and finally sustain their comparative advantage in the competition with right-wing mainstream parties (Meguid 2007). A policy-seeking behavior explanation entails that left-wing mainstream parties can move to the left without fearing losing votes because right-wing mainstream parties' moving to the right makes the gap between the mainstream parties larger (Adams and Merrill 2006).

mainstream parties will affect the party positions particularly when the gap is small. A graphical illustration of the interacting effect is presented in Figure 1 (left graph).<sup>21</sup> When there are substantial gaps of vote share between left-wing mainstream parties and extreme right-wing parties (the right side of the graph), the competition between mainstream parties does not have an effect. However, as the gap diminishes, the competition makes left-wing mainstream parties shift their positions.

<Figure 1 here>

Finally, model (6) examines whether the party competition effect depends on the positions of opponent parties. Adopting the positions of extreme right-wing parties may embrace substantial costs to left-wing mainstream parties. The costs will be amplified when left-wing mainstream parties do so without right-wing mainstream parties' mobilizing the multiculturalism issue because of the lack of legitimacy and justification. Thus, model (6) employs an interaction term with the relative threat variable and the negativity of right-wing mainstream parties, and Figure 2 (left graph) shows a graphical presentation of the result. The party competition effect increases as the negativity is intensified. When right-wing mainstream parties do not negatively mobilize the issue, left-wing mainstream parties do not shift their positions even when they are threatened more by extreme right-wing parties.

<Figure 2 here>

---

<sup>21</sup> The solid lines in the graphs indicate the coefficients of the party competition variable. The dotted lines indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals of the variable.

The same analyses are done for right-wing mainstream parties, and Table 4 presents the results. The coefficients of main independent variables have the same pattern with those for left-wing mainstream parties. The threat of extreme right-wing parties and the party competition between mainstream parties come together and determine the position-taking of right-wing mainstream parties. Some differences, however, are worthy to be noted. First, model (1) shows that the threat of extreme right-wing parties itself makes the right-wing mainstream parties shift their positions. Second, while left-wing mainstream parties move against the positions of extreme right-wing parties when they see their opponents more threatened by the extreme right-wing parties (*lessthreat*), right-wing mainstream parties do not move in the case. Finally, the public opinion on foreign people has more consistent results across different model specification.

<Table 4 here>

The two interacting effects are graphically presented in Figure 1 (right graph) and Figure 2 (right graph). Though there is an interacting effect between party competition and the vote gap between right-wing mainstream parties and extreme right-wing parties that was also found in the left-wing mainstream party case, the interacting effect is more modest. In particular, though the substantive size of the party competition effect decreases as the vote share gap increases, the party competition still has a statistically significant effect on the position-taking of right-wing mainstream parties even when there is a substantial vote gap between the parties. In other words, the competition with left-wing mainstream parties makes right-wing mainstream parties adopt

the stances of extreme right-wing parties though there is no substantial threat of extreme right-wing parties.<sup>22</sup>

This paper suggests a hypothesis on the costs of adopting the stances of extreme right-wing parties for left-wing mainstream parties. Though it did not make the same hypothesis for right-wing mainstream parties, model (6) in Table 4 tests the same effect for right-wing mainstream parties. The result implies that the right-wing mainstream parties are constrained by the negativity of left-wing mainstream parties' positions in the same way. Right-wing mainstream parties actually seem to have suffered from the costs of adopting the stances of extreme right-wing parties from time to time. Many of the parties have encountered the opposition from liberal groups when they attempted to introduce tough positions and gone through intra-party conflicts (Schain 1988). Also, the adoption sometimes stirred central, liberal, and religious supporters and made them turn to central or left-wing parties, which happened in the late 1980s in France (Thränhardt 1995). Then, right-wing mainstream parties as well as left-wing mainstream parties may not feel free to move to tougher positions on multiculturalism even when they are more threatened by the rise of extreme right-wing parties.

## **Conclusion**

Some have suggested that the issue positions and policy positions of political parties on multiculturalism, immigration, and race would move toward those of extreme right-wing parties as the rise of the parties pushes the overall distribution of voters to the right (Norris 2005;

---

<sup>22</sup> The result is consistent with observations of some right-wing mainstream parties. The British Conservative Party had mobilized the issues of race, immigration, and multiculturalism even before extreme right-wing parties, such as the British National Party, rose as a pressure strategy against the Labour Party as well as a preventative action against extreme right-wing parties (Thränhardt 1995). The same thing happened in Norway, too (Bale et al. 2010).

Williams 2006). However, the position-taking of parties seems to be more complicated than that. It is also conditional. This paper found that the electoral threat of extreme right-wing parties, the competition between mainstream parties, and the position-taking of competing parties act together and influence the position-taking of mainstream parties.

The electoral success of extreme right-wing parties alarms and threatens mainstream parties, but the main electoral concern for the latter is the competition with their opponent mainstream parties on the other side of the political spectrum (Meguid 2007). Thus, the threat of extreme right-wing parties is interpreted by the parties in the context of the competition with their competitors. This paper found that it is not just the threat, but also the relative vote loss to their opponent parties that leads to the position shift toward that of extreme right-wing parties. In addition, position shift, particularly toward the positions of extreme right-wing parties, sometimes costs to parties. Imitating extreme right-wing parties when opponent parties do not mobilize the issues of the extreme parties may magnify the costs because it is hard to be justified and legitimated. Thus, the position of its opponent party is also considered when a mainstream party decides to shift its position on multiculturalism.

More works should be done particularly on what is not entailed in this paper. First, institutional features, such as the electoral system, should be incorporated in the analyses because they were critical factors for the success of extreme right-wing parties (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Golder 2003). They should be considered also because the electoral system and consequently the number, distribution, and location of political parties decide their competition strategies (Kitschelt 1994). Second, the party system defines the cooperation as well as the competition between parties (Ware 1996). This paper explored only party competition. Thus, the cooperation aspect, such as pre-electoral coalition (Golder 2006) or the strategic cooperation

between parties (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008), should also be taken into account in the further revision of this paper and in the future research. Finally, it should be tested if the theory of competition between mainstream parties still works even when extreme right-wing parties grow more and go above one of the mainstream parties. That sometimes happened very recently, but many of the cases are not incorporated in this paper because the manifesto data do not have very recent elections.

<Table 1> List of extreme right-wing parties

Country	Party	Multiculturalism score gap <sup>1)</sup>	$\beta$ (immigration variable) <sup>2)</sup>	$\beta$ (multiculturalism variable) <sup>3)</sup>
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	-0.12	0.50**	-0.20**
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria		1.06**	-0.46***
Belgium	Flemish Interest	-0.24	0.59***	-0.13*
Belgium	National Front		1.53*	N.S. <sup>4)</sup>
Denmark	Progress Party	-0.11		-1.37***
Denmark	Danish People's Party	-9.86	0.65***	-0.20***
Finland	True Finns	-0.80	0.43*	-0.31***
France	Nationalist Front	-2.33	1.01***	-0.33***
Netherlands	Party for Freedom		0.53**	N.S. <sup>4)</sup>
Netherlands	Pim Fortuyn List	-3.23	0.58**	-0.12*
Netherlands	Centre Democrats		1.76***	-1.75***
Norway	Progress	-1.16	0.54***	-0.23***
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	-1.72		
Sweden	New Democrats	-0.25		
UK	British National Party		1.23*	-0.30***

1) The difference of the multiculturalism scores in the Comparative Manifesto Project data between right-wing mainstream parties and extreme right-wing parties. The negative value indicates that an extreme right-wing party has a more negative stance on multiculturalism than a right-wing mainstream party.

2) The coefficient of the variable on the number of immigrants. The question in the European Social Survey is what respondents think about the statement of “Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe”. The positive coefficient indicates that the people who do not want many immigrants to come to their countries are more likely to vote for the extreme right-wing party.

3) The coefficient of the variable on multiculturalism. The question in the European Social Survey is what respondents think about the statement of “Country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants”. The negative coefficient indicates that the people who think their cultural life is undermined by immigrants are more likely to vote for the extreme right-wing party.

4) N.S. = Not significant

<Table 2> Data description

Variables	Number of Observation	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Multiculturalism score (RMP)	112	-0.08	1.55	-12.96	2.50
$\Delta$ Multiculturalism score (RMP)	111	-0.06	1.72	-7.57	12.38
Multiculturalism score (LMP)	113	0.23	1.26	-8.36	5.48
$\Delta$ Multiculturalism score (LMP)	112	-0.01	1.51	-7.65	5.80
Vote share by ERP over a threshold	113	0.33	0.47	0	1
$\Delta$ Vote share by ERP	113	0.51	3.88	-16.90	16.50
<i>morethreat</i> (RMP)	108	0.16	0.37	0	1
<i>morethreat</i> (LMP)	108	0.19	0.39	0	1
<i>lessthreat</i> (RMP)	108	0.19	0.39	0	1
<i>lessthreat</i> (LMP)	108	0.16	0.37	0	1
Overall partisanship score (RMP)	112	11.14	17.51	-33.33	59.80
$\Delta$ Overall partisanship score (RMP)	111	-0.90	16.81	-40.40	47.06
Overall partisanship score (LMP)	113	-13.72	14.51	-45.45	43.24
$\Delta$ Overall partisanship score (LMP)	112	0.86	20.28	-88.70	83.37
Public opinion on foreign people	87	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.24
$\Delta$ Public opinion on foreign people	72	0.003	0.03	-0.10	0.12
Vote share by LMP - Vote share by RMP	112	-0.04	21.50	-75.50	27.00
$\Delta$ (Vote share by LMP - Vote share by RMP)	111	-0.75	9.50	-18.88	31.11
Vote share by RMP - Vote share by ERP	112	26.18	19.85	-19.00	84.60
$\Delta$ (Vote share by RMP - Vote share by ERP)	108	-1.32	7.44	-26.44	21.25
Vote share by LMP - Vote share by ERP	113	27.42	12.33	-4.70	48.34
$\Delta$ (Vote share by LMP - Vote share by ERP)	113	-1.22	7.43	-30.30	17.80

\* RMP - Right-wing mainstream parties; LMP - Left-wing mainstream parties; ERP – Extreme right-wing parties

<Table 3> Rise of extreme right-wing parties, party competition, and left-wing mainstream parties' positions on multiculturalism (Dependent variable:  $\Delta$  Multiculturalism score, negative values indicate negative positions on multiculturalism)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Multiculturalism score ( <i>t-1</i> )	<b>-0.82***</b> (0.21)	<b>-0.81***</b> (0.18)	<b>-0.87***</b> (0.18)	<b>-0.79***</b> (0.19)	<b>-0.81***</b> (0.18)	<b>-0.92***</b> (0.22)
Vote share by ERPs over a threshold ( <i>binary, t-1</i> )	-0.46 (0.49)	-0.45 (0.42)				
$\Delta$ Vote share by ERPs	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Overall partisanship score ( <i>right-wingness, t-1</i> )	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.002 (0.014)
$\Delta$ Overall partisanship score	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.004 (0.015)
Public opinion on foreign people ( <i>t-1</i> )	4.74 (3.71)	4.86 (3.35)	4.86 (3.41)	4.70 (4.06)	5.71 (4.52)	4.61 (3.33)
$\Delta$ Public opinion on foreign people	7.82 (5.10)	5.03 (4.97)	<b>7.91*</b> (4.27)	<b>10.80***</b> (3.78)	6.73 (4.61)	5.51 (3.92)
<i>morethreat</i> (more threat to LMP than to RMP)			<b>-1.30***</b> (0.39)			-0.47 (0.45)
<i>lessthreat</i> (less threat to LMP than to RMP)				<b>0.66**</b> (0.33)		
Negativity multiculturalism score of RMP ( <i>t-1</i> )						-0.15 (0.15)
<i>morethreat</i> x Negativity multiculturalism score of RMP						<b>-0.43***</b> (0.15)
Vote share by RMP- Vote share by LMP ( <i>t-1</i> )					-0.01 (0.01)	
$\Delta$ (Vote share by RMP - Vote share by LMP)		<b>-0.04***</b> (0.01)			<b>-0.04**</b> (0.02)	
Vote share by LMP - Vote share by ERP ( <i>t-1</i> )					0.004 (0.022)	
$\Delta$ (Vote share by LMP - Vote share by ERP)					0.02 (0.02)	
Vote share by LMP - Vote share by ERP ( <i>t-1</i> ) x $\Delta$ (Vote share by RMP - Vote share by LMP)					0.001 (0.001)	
Constant	0.00 (0.39)	-0.09 (0.34)	0.17 (0.49)	-0.43 (0.63)	-0.38 (1.13)	-0.01 (0.50)
N	72	72	72	72	72	72
R <sup>2</sup>	0.4150	0.4699	0.4795	0.4204	0.4470	0.7061

Note: \*\*\* indicates  $|p| < .01$ ; \*\* indicates  $|p| < .05$ ; \* indicates  $|p| < .1$

† Standard errors are in parentheses.

†† RMP - Right-wing mainstream parties; LMP - Left-wing mainstream parties; ERP – Extreme right-wing parties

<Table 4> Rise of extreme right-wing parties, party competition, and right-wing mainstream parties' positions on multiculturalism (Dependent variable:  $\Delta$  Multiculturalism score, negative values indicate negative positions on multiculturalism)


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Multiculturalism score ( <i>t-1</i> )	<b>-0.67***</b> (0.09)	<b>-0.67***</b> (0.09)	<b>-0.63***</b> (0.09)	<b>-0.64***</b> (0.09)	<b>-0.70***</b> (0.08)	<b>-0.94***</b> (0.08)
Vote share by ERPs over a threshold ( <i>binary, t-1</i> )	<b>-0.78***</b> (0.25)	<b>-0.78***</b> (0.25)				
$\Delta$ Vote share by ERPs	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	<b>-0.07***</b> (0.03)	0.005 (0.031)	0.03 (0.02)
Overall partisanship score ( <i>right-wingness, t-1</i> )	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)
$\Delta$ Overall partisanship score	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.005)
Public opinion on foreign people ( <i>t-1</i> )	1.49 (1.71)	1.42 (1.84)	1.01 (2.29)	2.41 (1.84)	0.92 (1.78)	1.58 (2.50)
$\Delta$ Public opinion on foreign people	<b>6.60**</b> (2.96)	<b>7.86**</b> (3.81)	<b>6.82**</b> (2.78)	<b>9.38**</b> (3.17)	<b>7.79*</b> (4.12)	<b>8.78***</b> (2.55)
<i>morethreat</i> (more threat to RMP than to LMP)			<b>-0.72*</b> (0.42)			0.29 (0.24)
<i>lessthreat</i> (less threat to RMP than to LMP)				-0.28 (0.25)		
Negativity multiculturalism score of LMP ( <i>t-1</i> )						<b>-0.20*</b> (0.11)
<i>morethreat</i> x Negativity multiculturalism score of LMP						<b>-2.35***</b> (0.23)
Vote share by LMP- Vote share by RMP ( <i>t-1</i> )					0.02 (0.02)	
$\Delta$ (Vote share by LMP - Vote share by RMP)		<b>-0.008**</b> (0.0033)			<b>-0.05**</b> (0.02)	
Vote share by RMP - Vote share by ERP ( <i>t-1</i> )					0.0003 (0.0136)	
$\Delta$ (Vote share by RMP - Vote share by ERP)					<b>0.05***</b> (0.02)	
Vote share by RMP - Vote share by ERP ( <i>t-1</i> ) x $\Delta$ (Vote share by LMP - Vote share by RMP)					<b>0.0007**</b> (0.0003)	
Constant	0.01 (0.27)	0.001 (0.279)	-0.13 (0.35)	-0.29 (0.27)	-0.05 (0.40)	-0.21 (0.34)
N	71	71	71	71	71	71
R <sup>2</sup>	0.3359	0.3405	0.3219	0.3271	0.3685	0.7433

Note: \*\*\* indicates  $|p| < .01$ ; \*\* indicates  $|p| < .05$ ; \* indicates  $|p| < .1$


† Standard errors are in parentheses.

†† RMP - Right-wing mainstream parties; LMP - Left-wing mainstream parties; ERP – Extreme right-wing parties

<Figure 1> Competition between mainstream parties, the threat of extreme right-wing parties, and positions on multiculturalism (LMP = left-wing mainstream parties, RMP = right-wing mainstream parties, ERP = extreme right-wing parties)



<Figure 2> Negativity of the opponent party and the relative threat effect (LMP = left-wing mainstream parties, RMP = right-wing mainstream parties)



## Reference

- Adams, James and Samuel Merrill, III. 2006. "Why Small, Centrist Third Parties Motivate Policy Divergence by Major Parties," *American Political Science Review* 100 (3): 403-17.
- Aldrich, John H. 2011. *Why Parties? A Second Look*. Chicago: Chicago University Press,
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2009. "Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002," *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2): 259-75.
- Bale, Tim. 2003. "Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems," *West European Politics* 26 (3): 67-90.
- Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pdersen, André Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter. 2010. "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe," *Political Studies* 58 (3): 410-26.
- Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. "What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," *American Political Science Review* 89 (3): 634-47.
- Betz, Hans-George. 1993. "The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe," *Comparative Politics* 25 (4): 413-27.
- Faist, Thomas. 1994. "How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse, 1978-1992," *Western European Politics* 17 (2): 50-71.
- Freeman, Heather Berit. 2002. "Austria: The 1999 Parliamentary Elections and the European Union Members' Sanctions," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 25 (1): 109-24.
- Golder, Matt. 2003. "Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (4): 432-66.

- Golder, Sona Nadenichek. 2006. *The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation*. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press.
- Green-Pdersen, Christoffer and Jesper Krogstrup. 2008. "Immigration as a Political Issue in Denmark and Sweden," *European Journal of Political Research* 47 (5): 610-34.
- Harmel Robert and Lars Svåsand. 1997. "The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' Platforms: The Cases of the Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and Norway," *Party Politics* 3 (3): 315-40.
- Ignazi, Piero. 2003. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ireland, Patrick R. 2004. *Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State*. Pittsburgh, Philadelphia: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Jackman, Robert W. and Karin Volpert. 1996. "Conditions Favoring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe," *British Journal of Political Science* 26 (4): 501-21.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.
- Knigge, Pia. 1998. "The Ecological Correlates of Right-wing Extremism in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* 34 (2): 249-79.
- Lahav, Gallya. 2004. *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lijphart. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

- Messina, Anthony M. 2007. *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe*.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, Cas. 1996. "The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family," *West European Politics* 19 (2): 225-48.
- Mudde, Cas. 1999. "The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue," *West European Politics* 22 (3): 182-97.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1998. "Reactions toward the New Minorities of Western Europe," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24: 77-103.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2005. "Is Extreme Right-wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family," *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (3): 413-37.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2008. "Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-wing Voting in Six West European Countries," *European Journal of Political Research* 47 (5): 737-65.
- Sales, Rosemary. 2002. "The Deserving and the Undeserving? Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Welfare in Britain," *Critical Social Policy* 22 (3): 456-78.
- Schain, Martin A. 1988. "Immigration and Changes in the French Party System," *European Journal of Political Research* 16 (6): 597-621.
- Schain, Martin A. 2006. "The Extreme-Right and Immigration Policy Making: Measuring Direct and Indirect Effects," *West European Politics* 29 (2): 270-89.

- Thränhardt, Dietrich. 1995. "The Political Uses of Xenophobia in England, France and Germany," *Party Politics* 1 (3): 323-45.
- Toynbee, Polly, and David Sales. 2001. *Did Things Get Better?* London: Penguin Books.
- Van der Brug, Wouter and Meindert Fennema. 2003. "Protest or Mainstream? How the European Anti-immigrant Parties Developed into Two Separate Groups by 1999," *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (1): 55-76.
- Veugelers, John and André Magnan. 2005. "Conditions of Far-right Strength in Contemporary Western Europe: An Application of Kitschelt's Theory," *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (6): 837-60.
- Ware, Alan. 1996. *Political Parties and Party Systems*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Michelle Hale. 2006. *The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.